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# **JPRS Report—**

## **Soviet Union**

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***Political Affairs***

# Soviet Union Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-026

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**Estonian Officials View Net Loss of Party Members**

18000610 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 16 Feb 89 p 3

[Interview with E. Kuuli, member of the Estonian CP Central Committee's Commission on Party Control, and T. Volkova, chairman of the party commission under the Leninskiy party raykom, city of Tallinn by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent N. Maandi: "Who Is Not On the Same Path With Whom?"]

[Text] It is no secret to anyone that new membership in the CPSU is declining, while the number of communists who have expressed a desire to leave the party is increasing. What are the reasons for these phenomena? Who are they, these communists who have decided to break with the party? Can we reverse the process of alienation which is taking place today in their ranks? All this was discussed at one of the recent meetings of the Estonian CP Central Committee's Commission on Party Control. We are publishing today the conversation of our correspondent with the participants in this meeting, Estonian CP Central Committee Commission on Party Control member E. Kuuli, and chairman of the party commission under the Leninskiy party raykom in the city of Tallinn, T. Volkova.

[Maandi] Tell us, did the conversation at that time deal only with party discipline?

[Kuuli] Naturally not, since the charter responsibilities of a communist include the sum of his interrelations in society—productive, civil, as well as ideological. We also spoke about labor discipline, since in the Leninskiy rayon the situation with this is far from brilliant.

[Volkova] In fact, there was even the following example: In the first 6 months of 1988 alone there were 2,118 management-excused work absences. What does this mean? Because of this, the duration of the work day in the rayon during this period comprised not 8, but only 6.7 hours, and 860,000 rubles worth of production remained unproduced...

[Maandi] Yet these are only the counted, "official" absences? And, of course, some of those who did not report to work for a "respectable" reason were communists? Yet, as I understand from the materials of the meeting of the CPC [Commission for Party Control] under the Estonian CP Central Committee, the main points discussed were nevertheless questions of disciplinary practice of a different order?

[Kuuli] Yes, of course. In this case, the topic of the meeting itself came knocking at our door. Look at what complex and contradictory processes are taking place in our life and in our society. Naturally, they cannot help but be reflected also in the party, which itself was the initiator of perestroika. The reform of the political system of society also increases the demands placed on

the personal and moral-ideological qualities of communists. Frankly speaking, even we, the members of the Commission for Party Control, were at a loss at first. After all, before in some organizations there was a sort of "waiting list" for party membership. But what is happening now? Let us take that very same Leninskiy rayon in the city of Tallinn...

[Volkova] Yes, the figures are not encouraging. While generally in a year we accepted over 200 people, in 1988 we only accepted 90.

[Kuuli] And as an oncoming negative process there is also the exodus from the party. I have been working in the Commission for Party Control for about 10 years, and I cannot remember that in past years, even 2-3 years ago, a communist would part with his party card of his own initiative. This always became a sort of extraordinary occurrence, and was always associated with some extraordinary circumstances.

[Volkova] In our rayon alone, out of the 49 membership status cases reviewed, 34 have been reviewed at the personal initiative of the communist himself.

[Maandi] And, probably, this is not only in Leninskiy rayon?

[Kuuli] Yes, we see a similar picture also in other rayon and city party organizations throughout the republic.

[Maandi] But this is all very serious! And, frankly speaking, it raises many questions...

[Kuuli] Exactly. Now we are acquainting ourselves in greater detail with the reasons why communists are leaving the party. We have taken a broader look at this process. Also, more specifically, we look to see what contribution these people were making to the social life of their party organization, to see what the party has really lost with the departure of such a communist from its ranks.

[Volkova] For clarity, let me present a few examples from our rayon. Last year the party raykom buro excluded 7 people from CPSU membership at the PSO "Elamu": V. Annekas, V. Nikolayev, A. Obukhovskiy... All of them had long ago lost contact with the party organization, but not once did the communists ask them how they are fulfilling the Charter requirements or what help they needed. Just as many communists had to be excluded also in the Tallinn fruit and vegetable market. And for the very same reasons. These were all such communists who should have been excluded long ago. It was not they who would not walk the same path as the party, but the party with them! So, should the party regret such a loss? It is another matter when a communist does not find it possible to realize his ideals or the ideals of perestroika within the party organization, when the ossified forms of our life and manifested bureaucracy suppress all the inner motivations of the communist and

he becomes disillusioned and decides to leave. Here we can clearly see the fault of his party comrades for not sensing when to support the person, when to wage the struggle against stagnation all together.

[Kuuli] Yet fortunately there are not many such cases. Generally there is today a purging of the party of those who entered its ranks under conditions of so-called "standardized" admission, and often, although this sounds crude, nevertheless it is quite precise—to "save their own skins".

[Maandi] But it was that kind of time...

[Kuuli] Yes, there really was not just the desire for self-interest by the person who filled out the application for party membership, the desire to get a promotion at work, to create other personal social benefits for himself. There was also a system of "fulfilling the indicators" which were in operation at that time. This is so clear to everyone today that it is simply embarrassing to repeat. So, what kind of a fighter for party ideals could such a communist be? And, during the first serious sign of a storm it is specifically he who abandoned the party ship. Such a party member gives no help in the struggle for renewing society. I liked very much the opinion recently expressed in the party press that a communist cannot sit in two chairs (in the political sense).

[Maandi] Yet are you sure that, for example, among those 90 people who became communists this year in Leninskiy rayon there are not some like this?

[Volkova] I can vouch for those who are entering the party today. This, you know, is like it was during the war. Do you think every soldier wrote before a battle: "If I die, call me a communist"? No, not every one. It was only that one who felt the spiritual need for this. So it is in our day. I am sure that today the application for party membership is filed only by the person who truly believes in perestroika and in the forthcoming encouraging changes, the person who has felt in his heart and understood in his mind that in the ranks of the communists he will be able to do more good for the people and the country, that it is not he who needs the party now, but rather the party needs him! It is just such people who today enter, for example, in our rayon: assembler I. Kulla and deputy chief engineer M. Ermo from the "Kooperator" Production Association, P. Koemets—a teacher from Secondary School 39, A. Allik—shop chief of the "Avtotekhobsluzhivaniye" Production Association, and V. Pachulin—electrical installer at the "Vazar" Production Association. All these communists were accepted into the party not only because they do their work well and honestly. Today, when the acceptance takes place primarily at open party meetings, when a person stands not before a handful of his future party comrades, but before all the people, the responsibility increases many times over. After all, here anyone can look you in the eye and say: "What kind of communist would you be if you...?"

[Kuuli] Yes, and here we are speaking already of the level of requirements for a party member today. While before it was enough to work well and to accept the Charter—although it is interesting: not to fulfill, but merely to accept it—today the basic requirement is specifically political literacy. The future party comrades look to see whether the person is ready to share with the party not only its joys, but also its sorrows...

[Maandi] Could it be that you are raising this level too high, Ekha Yukhanovna?

[Kuuli] No, not at all. After all, you will not deny that difficult times have set in for our Communist Party? And if this is so, then I personally have particular trust and respect for that person who becomes my party comrade specifically in difficult times. And it somehow seems sad to me that there are fewer Estonians, for example, entering the party today than people of other nationalities... Yet in our Estonian Soviet Republic it should be obvious that specifically the representatives of the native nationality must be like-minded party supporters in matters of perestroika...

[Maandi] That is a very interesting, but truly a global question. The three of us probably will not be able to discuss it as it should be discussed. Yet if we return to our previous topic, then as far as I understand, having rejected the mechanical regulation of acceptance into the party, today this very process itself has been left to follow its own course?

[Kuuli] No, that is not quite so. Today the communists themselves are selecting more worthy people into their ranks. Of course, this depends on the level of work of the primary party organization. A detailed analysis, which we made based on the example of the Leninskiy party raykom, proves that while the raykom party apparatus is being restructured, stagnation nevertheless continues in many of the primary organizations. Look, for example, what certain communists have recently been punished for and what question on disciplinary practice has been discussed at the party organization. A member was not present at a meeting. He was late in paying his dues. He came [to the meeting] in an intoxicated state... Yet who has ever asked the rank-and-file communist what he thinks about a certain event, how he evaluates it, what he would suggest doing? Even the stormy events of this last summer in our republic were not able shake certain organizations out of their state of hibernation. That is, many primary party organizations clearly forgot about the main purpose of the communist—to be a POLITICAL leader in the collective. Perhaps this is why there are so many other entirely different leaders and entirely different movements arising. Sometimes in a conversation with a communist you can clearly see to what degree he is unable to think politically. This means that the very situation in the primary organizations has not forced him to do so. And after such a conversation you are no

longer surprised when you read his application for dismissal from the party. I believe that in every such voluntary departure the primary party organization is largely at fault.

[Volkova] Not always, I think. For example, communist E. Abramova spoke at our rayon reporting-electoral party conference and told about her territorial organization. There are 60 members in it, and their average age is 65. The party membership dues are being paid by the children and grandchildren—the members themselves are all in hospitals. It turns out that the only thing they still do together in their organization is to bury one after another...

[Maandi] You are painting a very bleak picture...

[Volkova] But that is the way it is, if you think about it. And E. Abramova's question is quite appropriate: "Who would think of gathering into one organization helpless, weak, old people?". So who can think of the political face of every individual communist in such organizations, for example?

[Maandi] Here, yes, here I am in full agreement with you. But I believe this question—on the status of the territorial party organizations or their disbandment—will be examined. Nevertheless, perestroika moves ahead, and much is already being resolved. Remember how many questions there were in the period of preparations for the 19th Party Conference, especially as concerned party dues, and "declassification" of certain articles by which they were used? And then, here you are, we read a full account of all this in PRAVDA dated 10 February...

[Kuuli] Yet we still often ask ourselves: Where is it, our party comradeship, not to mention charity and kindness? Perhaps sometimes it is specifically the absence of party comradeship as such, the absence of heartfelt warmth that for some communists is that last drop which overfills the cup of their patience? After all, we often see cases where the applications for leaving the party come in specifically from aged pensioners.

[Maandi] Yes, it seems like it, and not just from pensioners... But let us return to that meeting of the Party Control Commission under the Estonian CP Central Committee at which the question of party discipline in the Leninskiy rayon of Tallinn was discussed...

[Kuuli] It seems to me that we have been talking about this the whole time. It was specifically these questions which we discussed at the commission meeting...

[Volkova] These same questions were also discussed at the regional meetings quite recently in the republic's rayons and cities, and here in Tallinn—in the party gorkom.

[Kuuli] And all of this is but a prologue to the meeting of the chairmen of party commissions and heads of organizational departments which will convene in Tallinn today. All this speaks of the fact that questions of party discipline and disciplinary practice today are among the burning questions of our party life which demand full glasnost.

#### **Turkmen CP CC Buro Discusses Poor Performance in Law Enforcement Organs**

18300345 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 Jan 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro has passed a resolution "On the Unsatisfactory Fulfillment by the Communist-Leaders of Law Enforcement Agencies of the Turkmen CP Central Committee Resolutions on the Struggle Against Crime and Prevention of Law Infringements."

The resolution noted that the communist-leaders and associates of the law enforcement agencies, in fulfilling the resolutions of the 23rd Turkmen CP Congress and the Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum, have activated a struggle against negative manifestations. Strengthening party influence on matters of law enforcement work and reinforcing the leadership of administrative agencies with competent specialists, able to deal with the tasks that have been posed, have contributed to this.

Significant work has been accomplished in strengthening law and order, investigating abuses in cotton-growing, and exposing corrupt groups which had permitted figure-padding, theft, bribery, and other crimes. These efforts have received the working people's approval and support.

However, the resolution states further, the leaders of law enforcement agencies have not been persistent, purposeful and consistent in fulfilling the requirements of the 6th Turkmen CP Central Committee Plenum and the measures set forth in subsequent Central Committee Buro resolutions, on strengthening the struggle against infringements of the law. Uncritically evaluating that which had been achieved, they reduced their activeness, reconciled themselves to numerous shortcomings, and sharply weakened efforts to restructure work by subdepartmental agencies to rid themselves of those who have compromised themselves, of dishonest employees.

V.A. Grinin, minister of internal affairs, limited himself to taking initial steps, overestimated that which had been done in the beginning period and ceased decisively achieving the elimination of shortcomings. He is not persistently influencing the improvement of the activity of the collegium, the ministry system, and its local

agencies, displays complacency, and lacks exigency toward his subordinates. He deals with critical observations without the proper responsibility.

V. Dovletov, deputy minister, chief, TuSSR MVD Political Department, and the party committee (former secretary N.I. Revenko) of the ministry have not restructured party and political work and are not giving principle-minded evaluations of the inactivity and misdemeanors by communists. The ministry's party and political system is not having a noticeable influence on improving the moral and psychological climate in the agencies, due to the shallow analysis of affairs and an adherence to formalism and work methods that have become obsolete.

S.I. Karpov, deputy minister for cadres, permits great mistakes in implementing cadre policy, in organizing upbringing work, and in raising the professional level of associates. On his fault, the ministry has not formed an effective system for the qualitative selection and placement of specialists and for raising their skills. Often, ill considered decisions are made regarding advancements, and the transfer of associates who have compromised themselves to other posts is being practiced. As before, the militia agencies are littered with dishonest employees and have not eliminated nepotism, ties between associates and criminal elements, official abuses and bribery.

K.R. Tachmamedov, V.D. Fisak, and M. Byashimov, deputy ministers of internal affairs, responsible for the work of operative investigative services, and N.N. Brodnitskiy, TuSSR deputy prosecutor, are not ensuring the appropriate public order and timely investigation of crimes, and have not organized effective preventative work. The activeness of militia inspectorates, patrol and sentry details, the GAI service, the voluntary people's patrol, and other subdivisions has declined.

Many courts are unprincipled, treat the examination of cases superficially, do not disclosing violations of legality permitted at the preliminary stage of investigations, conduct examinations with an accusatory bias, and set unjust punishments.

A.A. Kistovich, head of a legal collegium on criminal cases, TuSSR Supreme Court, treats the fulfillment of his party and official duty irresponsibly and organizes the collegium's work unsatisfactorily. The collegium has frequently failed to correct the mistakes of the courts. In 1988, the TuSSR Supreme Court Plenum and the USSR Supreme Court changed a number of the collegium's resolutions, rehabilitating those convicted.

N.M. Yusupov, chairman, TuSSR Supreme Court, is slowly applying the new approaches to implementing justice and insufficiently persistently influences the raising of the court's level of work.

Many shortcomings in the work of the courts are the consequence of poor control and unskilled leadership of them on the part of TuSSR Minister of Justice Yu. Khaitov, who used unsuitable methods for staffing the justice institutions, exaggerates the results of work, and for whom vanity and unpleasant criticism are characteristic. In examining cadre problems, Yu. Khaitov does not consider the opinions of the party organization, collegium members and subdivision leaders, and therefore often makes mistakes.

V.M. Vasilyuk, republic prosecutor, is applying the new forms of work indecisively, does not act as an example of the innovative approach to solving official tasks, manages poorly and does not hold subordinates strictly responsible for omissions. As a result, the effectiveness of prosecutor's supervision remains low.

O. Begniyazov, republic deputy prosecutor for cadres, does not display a party-minded approach to solving cadre problems. The light-handed evaluation of associates' political and practical qualities and poor judgment in advancements to management work are inherent in him. Adequate steps are not being taken to cleanse the prosecutor's agencies of unsuitable employees. One-tenth of the employees are being punished for various misdemeanors and numerous violations of socialist legality are permitted on their part.

Unsuitable methods of leadership, inherent in the republic department apparatuses, have been inherited by their local agencies. Great shortcomings have been exposed in the Tashauz Oblast UVD, where the concealment of crimes has become widespread. In Chardzhou Oblast, the Kerkin'skiy Interrayon Prosecutor Dzhapbarova was convicted of bribery, and her husband, Militia Colonel Soltanov, murdered Kh. Rozybayeva, the party obkom instructor. The law enforcement agencies of Mary Oblast and the city of Ashkhabad are working unsatisfactorily.

As a result, the effectiveness of the struggle against infringements of the law has declined. Public order in the republic has worsened and speculation and other infringements of the law have become widespread. Many crimes are not being exposed in a timely fashion.

Most recently, the party committees and soviets of people's deputies have weakened ideological work with the population and exigency toward leaders for the state of affairs directly in labor collectives. They have decreased control over the activity of law enforcement agencies and their exigency toward communists working in this sector, and are not deeply analyzing the crime situation. In examining these problems, they make declarative decisions and nonspecific measures.

The leadership of law enforcement activity in the Tashauz Party Obkom (first secretary O. Khodzhakov), which does not give principle-minded evaluations of

serious omissions in the work of the administrative agencies, of numerous cases of concealment of crimes, and other violations of legality, has noticeably weakened.

The Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro deemed the work of the communist-leaders of the law enforcement agencies to fulfill the requirements of the party and of the Turkmen CP Central Committee resolutions on the problems of the struggle against criminality, the prevention of infringements of the law, strengthening of legality and law and order, and forming a morally irreproachable, politically hardened cadre potential, to be unsatisfactory.

Serious omissions in the organization of the department work and in the struggle against criminality and infringements of the law, and the inadequate reaction to cases of unconscientious use of official position by subordinates were strictly pointed out to CPSU members V.A. Grinin, minister of internal affairs, B. Dovletov, MVD Political Department chief, V.M. Vasilyuk, republic prosecutor, and N.M. Yusupov, TuSSR Supreme Court chairman. Assurances that exhaustive measures would be taken by them to eliminate shortcomings were taken into consideration.

The Central Committee Buro acknowledged that communists S.I. Karpov and V.D. Fisak, TuSSR deputy ministers of internal affairs, O. Begniyazov, TuSSR prosecutor, and A.A. Kistovich, TuSSR Supreme Court chairman, have not justified the trust placed in them and have not provided skilled leadership of the areas of work entrusted to them. It was deemed inexpedient to keep them in their positions any longer.

The fact that Yu. Khaitov, TuSSR minister of justice, had submitted a statement for release from his duties due to his state of health, was taken into consideration.

The Central Committee Buro instructed the primary party organizations of the TuSSR MVD, the TuSSR Prosecutor's Office, and the TuSSR Supreme Court to determine the degree of party responsibility of CPSU members S.I. Karpov, O. Begniyazov, A.A. Kistovich and N.I. Revenko.

It was recommended that the communist-leaders of the law enforcement agencies thoroughly study the causes of the unsatisfactory work to prevent infringements of the law, observe socialist legality, expose crimes, and ensure the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens, and that they carefully investigate each incident of violation of legality. Measures must be defined by the collegiums to avoid future such phenomena, to reinforce the agencies with professionally trained cadres, to raise their skills, and to increase responsibility for the performance of official duties.

The need to carry out decisive measures to eliminate protectionism and nepotism and to rid the agencies of dishonest, incompetent associates who have compromised themselves was emphasized.

It was recommended that the resolution be discussed in all law enforcement agency collectives and their party organizations. The primary party organizations of the law enforcement agencies should fully employ the right granted in the CPSU Statutes to control the work of the apparatus, should ensure the restructuring of the style and methods of its activity, and should decisively eliminate manifestations of complacency and an uncritical attitude toward the results of work.

The Turkmen CP obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, and the TuSSR MVD Political Department were instructed to strengthen control over the work of law enforcement agencies and to offer them the necessary assistance in the selection and upbringing of cadres. A profound understanding on the part of every worker in the militia, the prosecutor's office and the courts of their personal responsibility to the party and the people for the state of law and order and the observance of socialist legality must be achieved. Jointly with the ispolkoms of soviets of people's deputies, the state of law and order and the observance of socialist legality in the oblasts, cities, and rayons, and in every settlement and labor collective, must be studied in a months' time, and the resolution should be discussed in the party committees and organizations, soviet, trade union and Komsomol agencies, and in assemblies of working people. Specific measures must be drafted to radically improve law enforcement work and to give a principle-minded party evaluation to those guilty of shortcomings and omissions. The Turkmen CP Central Committee should be informed in March 1989 of the measures taken.

A. Khodzhamuradov, chairman, republic Committee for the Struggle Against Drunkenness, Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, party member, was instructed in the first half-year to thoroughly study the work by local committees, to implement measures to make their work more active and to strengthen the struggle to overcome these shameful phenomena.

Assurances by O. Khodzhakov, Turkmen CP Tashauz Obkom first secretary, that he will take immediate steps to strengthen law and order, improve control over the work of administrative agencies, and increase exigency toward employees for the work entrusted to them, were taken into consideration.

#### **Problems in Turkestan Receive Special Scrutiny 18300315 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 89 pp 1-2**

[Article with materials prepared by R. Nasirov: "Reader's Conference. Turkestan: Solving Social Problems"]

[Text] In 1988 KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA received 40,027 letters from readers. Many of them had

the return address: Turkestan, Chimkent Oblast. Precisely here, as the letters attested, many problems have accumulated which negatively reflecting on the city's life. After studying the received mail, the editors decided to hold a reader's conference in the city. On 25 December 1988, the newspaper published an article, "Turkestan—City of Social Problems." It was based on readers' letters. The questions raised in these letters required most serious attention, analysis and immediate solution.

On 3 January, on instructions from the KaSSR Council of Ministers, an expanded meeting was convened by K.A. Abdullayev, KaSSR Gosplan chairman, for the preliminary discussion of the entire range of Turkestan's problems. It was attended by responsible officials from the Kazakh CP Central Committee, Gosplan, primary leaders or their deputies and main administration chiefs from the republic Minzdrav, Minobrazovaniya, Minbyt, Minvodkhoz, Mincenergo, Minlegprom, Mintorg, Mintrans, Minfin, Minzhilkomkhoz and Mingaztop, the Kazakh SSR Gosagroprom, Goskomtrud, Gossnab, Goskomkultury and Inturist, the republic Society for Preservation of Monuments, the Kazakh Consumer's Union, the Alma-Ata Railroad Administration, and representatives of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA—34 people in all.

In order to more fully study the situation on site, the meeting decided to send a brigade to Turkestan consisting of specialists from republic ministries and departments and the Chimkent Oblispolkom, headed by D.Kh. Sembayev, Gosplan deputy chairman, and for the republic ministries and departments and the Chimkent Oblispolkom, with the participation of the Turkestan Gorispolkom, to develop specific proposals for accelerating Turkestan's socioeconomic development, which include solutions for problems of a current and long-term nature, and to present them to Gosplan by 12 January. Gosplan was to summarize the received proposals and present them to the KaSSR Council of Ministers.

Thus, by the start of the reader's conference all the problems had been considered at the most competent level, a full idea of the true state of affairs had been obtained, and a program for further action had been drafted.

The conference was held on 14 January. Representatives from the above-mentioned ministries and departments, M.S. Karbayev and O.N. Nurzhanov, Chimkent Party Obkom secretaries; S.Zh. Barakhov, Chimkent Oblispolkom deputy chairman; N.B. Balkiyayev, Turkestan Party Gorkom first secretary; R.S. Kalmuradov, Turkestan Party Raykom first secretary; E.I. Dzhurabekov, Turkestan Gorispolkom chairman; and other responsible officials of the oblast and city took part in the conference. I.M. Romanov, deputy chief, Kazakh CP Central Committee Ideological Department, also participated in the reader's conference.

S.F. Ignatov, newspaper editor, conducted the reader's conference.

14 January, Railroad Worker's Club. The hall is packed. People are crowded as though on a bus at rush hour and are standing in the passages. Those who could no longer fit into the hall are out in the courtyard.

G.G. Urmurzina, KaSSR Deputy Minister of Health Care, was given the floor.

If the reader recalls, the publication "Turkestan—City of Social Problems" noted in particular that the infant mortality here is high and that the effectiveness of many preventative treatment measures is low.

The painstaking familiarity of Minzdrav workers with the situation in local areas confirmed that changes are urgently needed in this most important social sphere for Turkestan. The material base of preventive treatment institutions is extremely poor. The infectious wards of the city hospital (70 beds) and the central rayon hospital (60 beds) are located in barracks where the temperature even now, while it is still mild winter, does not go above 15 degrees, the walls have been struck by fungi, and the most elementary sanitary and hygienic conditions are lacking for both patients and personnel. The rayon maternity home is located in a building constructed in 1900. Because of the shortage of premises, a number of auxiliary premises were not developed, so there are no milk rooms where mothers would be able to feed their newborns. The condition of the anti-tuberculosis out-building causes great alarm. The existing dispensary is located in two barracks-like buildings with no sewer system.

Seven hospital institutions (1,135 beds) and seven outpatient polyclinic institutions, with 1,310 visits per shift, provide medical assistance to the 79,000-strong population in Turkestan. The provision with beds is 79.5 percent of the norm, and provision with outpatient polyclinic institutions is 56.1 percent of the norm. The city and rayon need 150 doctors, but there are 97. The situation with allocating housing for physicians is poor.

The sanitary, hygienic and epidemiological situation in the city is characterized as complex. The extremely unsatisfactory condition of the water supply is the basic cause of the high level of infectious disease. The water does not meet the requirements of GOST 2874-82 on "Drinking Water." The bacterial contamination of the water is caused by the presence of a large number of outdoor toilets, cesspools, the irregular removal of garbage and the filtration of sewage into the lower water tables, from which drinking water is taken. Only 15 percent of the city is involved in regular planned cleaning. The existing sewer systems and purification installations are overloaded by a factor of 2.5-3. At the same time, the construction of city-wide sewage installations has already continued for 13 years.

Poor provision with children's preschool institutions (23.4 percent), high overcrowding (by a factor of 1.5-2), 2-3 shift classes in schools and 51 percent provision with school desks, the unsatisfactory organization of nourishment in school cafeterias, the low caloric value of the food (16.4 percent of samples did not meet standards), and its poor quality (10.2 percent of samples taken did not meet standards for bacteriological indicators) are some causes of the high pathology in the development of children and of the continuation of an unfavorable situation with the infectious disease rate.

Not only the sanitary and hygienic condition of schools causes dissatisfaction. Many buildings are already completely dilapidated. The classroom building of School No 13 is in dangerous condition, the School imeni Dzhabayev is located in the warehouse space of a pre-revolutionary building, and the wooden-panel building now occupied by the School imeni Makarenko was equipped in the 1920s. According to Ministry of National Education data, only 7 out of 18 school buildings are standard. Four schools have stove heating. Only one school has centralized heating. All the schools lack a sewer system. Nine schools have no sports halls or grounds, and two have no military sport campuses. The children's and youth sports school occupies a former church building and has no showers or stadium. Only two schools have their own cafeterias, and only 22 percent of the children receive hot food.

The total capacity of the schools is 10,359 students, but 16,889 children study in them in fact, and the shift coefficient is 2.4. In four schools, classes are held in three shifts. The School imeni Kalinin, intended for 540 students, is attended by 1,386 children.

The 20 existing preschool institutions can accept 3,530 small children, but 4,286 children are placed in them in fact, which is a crowding by 756 places. The inclusion of children by kindergartens and day care centers is 23.4 percent. This is 10,027 places short of the norm, and there are 1,842 unsatisfied applications. Three kindergartens have stove heating. The "Teremok" Kindergarten occupies an adobe building built in 1936.

What has been planned to bring about a radical change in the present state of affairs in health care, national education and preschool upbringing? G.G. Urmurzina, deputy minister of health care, A.G. Kukanova, chief inspector, Ministry of National Education, and D.Kh. Sembayev, deputy chairman of Gosplan, told participants in the reader's conference about this part of the program.

The city is 211 hospital beds short of the norm. In order to rapidly increase the number of hospital beds, it was stipulated in the current half-year to convert an administrative building belonging to the MVD into a tuberculosis hospital (150 beds). A maternity home (60 beds) and women's clinic with 300 visits per shift is to be built in 1989-1990. A hospital with 60 beds will soon be

commissioned at the railroad worker's settlement, and by 1993—a polyclinic with 100 visits per shift. Right now, the children's kitchen prepares no more than 500 portions of food for children. The Alma-Ata Railroad Administration is offering high quality premises for a children's kitchen. It will also begin operating this year and will produce 2,000-3,000 portions of nutritious food per day. The premises and garage of the former automotive school are being converted into an "emergency aid" station, and the number of doctors' brigades working in the "emergency room" will increase 10-fold. Minzdrav is meeting entirely the demand for medical equipment by the city's treatment institutions. One-time aid in allocating furniture will also be offered. In February already, a comprehensive brigade of doctors from Alma-Ata will arrive in Turkestan, and it will undertake to develop specific measures for radically improving specialized aid to the population. Fifty doctors, graduating in 1989, will be sent to Turkestan. The gorispolkom promises to provide them with housing as young specialists.

By the end of 1990, the city will be provided with medical institutions even somewhat higher, quantitatively, than the norm. However, many buildings are very old. Even now, for example, the pharmacy is located in a building built about 100 years ago. Therefore, it was decided in the draft plan for 1991-1995 to consider the question of constructing a central city hospital with a polyclinic, infectious ward, an additional maternity home building, and a stomatology polyclinic in Turkestan.

Now, about the schools. By the start of next school year, a new school with 1,266 places and an annex for 460 places will go into operation, and next year—yet another school with 1,176 places. This year already, the design and budgetary documentation for a general education school (1,176 places) and a music school (500 places) will be completed. Their commissioning is set for 1991. Right now, 51.8 percent of children study in the first shift, by 1989 this figure will grow to 68, and by 1991—to 80 percent, which corresponds in practice to the established norm.

For the new school year, city schools will receive new educational visual aids worth 90,000 rubles. The Chimkent Oblispolkom is allocating 500,000 rubles for procuring furniture, equipment, and inventory for schools, preschools and extracurricular institutions.

Presently, only one-fourth of small children attend kindergarten and day care centers. Right now, it has been planned to construct a 280-place kindergarten, and next year—two kindergartens with 480 places, and for 1991—two more with 370 places. The level of provision with children's preschool institutions will reach 41.2 percent, which is higher than the average indicator for Chimkent Oblast.

Three math teachers and one specialist for the music school will be assigned to Turkestan. For purposes of improving the material base of the Turkestan Industrial and Pedagogical Tekhnikum, Minobrazovaniya will allocate 30,000 rubles to this educational institution in 1989 in order to complete the design of a multipurpose building, and the construction of educational production studios has been proposed for the 13th 5-year period.

Housing remains a sharp social problem. The city's total housing space is 800,200 square meters, of which 48,200 are in buildings under the jurisdiction of the city soviet. There are an average of 12.3 square meters of general living space per resident and, in the city soviet's fund—11.7 square meters. Moreover, many families have been waiting for years for apartments.

The "Measures by the Republic's Ministries and Departments, the Chimkent Oblispolkom and the Turkestan Gorispolkom for Solving Urgent Socioeconomic Development Problems in the City of Turkestan," drafted by Gosplan and presented to the KaSSR Council of Ministers for examination, states: "In 1989, the construction and commissioning of 58,083 square meters of housing space, or 578 apartments, will be implemented, of which:

—23,504 (398 apartments) by the contract method, including 60 apartments by the fodder antibiotics plant, 32—by the mechanical repair plant, 60—the "Remstroydormash" Plant, 24—the ferroconcrete products plant, 16—the combine for construction parts and structures, 12—the cotton-cleaning plant, 20—the sewing factory, and 158 apartments—by Turkestan Station. It is planned to build 10,354 square meters of housing (129 apartments) by the economic method, including: through the efforts and resources of Turkestan Station—18, through those of SMP-194—12, of the inter-rayon wholesale center for consumer cooperatives—7, of the ferroconcrete products plant—12, of the Turkestan inter-rayon gas industry administration—2, of SMP-313—5, of the restoration studio—4, of the cotton-cleaning plant—12, of the city passenger automobile transportation administration—6, of the municipal depot—16, the non-ore materials combine—8, the industrial construction materials motor transport depot—2, the oblast consumer union's motor transport depot—2, the cost-accounting repair and construction administration—6, the RSU—11, the fuel depot—2, the construction parts and structures combine—4, the forge and press equipment plant—10 apartments, and 51 buildings by the individual method.

For the material and financial support of the housing program, Minvodkhoz is allocating 2.5 million rubles (1989—1991), and Minmestprom, the Alma-Ata Railroad Administration, Gosagroprom, the Kazakh Consumers Union, Mingazprom, Mintrans, a number of

other republic departments, and cost-accounting enterprises, from their own profits, are also allocating large appropriations. The state is allocating significant loans for individuals to build their own homes.

Until recently, more than 10 ministries and departments were in charge of housing resources and the municipal economy. Right now, the situation is changing, and the soviet is becoming the sovereign master of the city. However, the gorispolkom has inherited a troublesome legacy. This is easily visible in the plan for the heating, water supply and sewer networks. The strings of routes and their branching pipes are drawn in ink of different colors, and each color has its own owner. There are also 300-500 meter-long insertions. Under this situation, of course, there cannot be even a question of some sort of planned repair of the networks and their use. Hence, the numerous complaints about the "intense cold" in apartments, cessation in the supply of water to upper floors, and the forced use of lavatories as storerooms.

What is a pity, the heating capacity of the boiler-house that supplies buildings in the first microrayon, exceeds the actual need by a factor of 1.5, yet it is cold in the apartments. The fact is that the hot water enters the central heating system of each building not from the main heating pipeline, but is passed in a chain from building to building. As a result, the houses placed at the beginning of this chain are hot, while in the next buildings it gets increasingly colder and colder. The residents themselves are also at fault. In many apartments in the heating radiators, taps have been installed instead of stoppers, from which the residents use hot water for their own needs. In the mornings and evenings, when the taps are opened all at once in hundreds of apartments, the pressure in the return water pipe drops to nothing, and the heating system is emptied. Water consumption at this time, from 150 cubic meters, reaches up to 1,500 cubic meters. The boiler-house cannot cope with this load and scarcely any heat goes into the water system.

In this situation, the gorispolkom was forced to forbid the use of heating water for household needs. The overflow taps have been replaced with stoppers. The buildings in the microrayon have been switched over to automatic heating. As E.I. Dzhurabekov, gorispolkom chairman, reported by telephone yesterday, the heat supply has normalized in 15 buildings in the first microrayon. An 18-member brigade of metalworkers is working in the three remaining buildings and 28 apartments to stabilize the heating supply. In a day or so, apparently, everything will meet the standards. Thus, the critical remarks expressed by those who spoke at the reader's conference were immediately solved.

Small boiler-houses have become a real problem for the city. There are 96 of them, which emit 2,434.4 tons of harmful substances into the city's air supply annually. Fly ash has even begun to destroy the glaze on the cupolas of Akhmed Yasavi's mausoleum, which until now had kept the original freshness of its colors for 5 centuries.

Ye.A. Abitayev, deputy minister of housing and the municipal economy, explained at the reader's conference what measures are being taken to solve problems related to the city's heat and water supply, its improvement, and the preservation of the surrounding environment.

The list of measures in this "package" is as follows: the construction of 2.7 kilometers of heating system should be completed, and 12 small boiler-houses should be extinguished by 1990. The execution of the "Turkestan Heat Supply System" program should begin and small boiler-houses should be entirely eliminated in the 13th 5-year period. Gas-cleaning devices should be installed in the existing boiler-houses; the construction of the No. 3 Water Intake with a feed capacity of 15,000 cubic meters of water per day is to be completed in the first half of 1989; in the second quarter, the main water pipeline along 50th Anniversary of October, Kutuzov, Satpayev, and Furmanov streets is to be put into operation. In a time period defined as the first half-year, the ringing of the water supply systems in the first microrayon is to be fulfilled, and the construction of a biological cleaning station for sewage, which will make it possible to sharply improve the city's sanitation conditions, is also to be completed. This year the gorispolkom was allocated 750,000 rubles for improving urban areas, construction and repair of the roads, sidewalks, and irrigation system, street lighting, and for maintenance and use. Increasing the branching water supply systems by 16 kilometers, the capital repair of water pipes (10.5 kilometers), and the design and construction of water supply installations with a throughput of 20,000 cubic meters per 24 hours and a network length of 12 kilometers is specified for 1990 and subsequent years.

In the article "Turkestan—City of Social Problems," the readers raised the question of building an underpass for a through connection between the city and the station settlement, and about the supply of natural gas to the city. A definite decision about the time periods for building a through connection will be made when the plan for the new 5-year period is formed, and the question of designing and building the Manta-gas-Turkestan-Kentay gas pipeline branch, with a 180 kilometer length, requires further working out by Union agencies.

The readers also noted that gas stoves have fallen into the scarce category in the city. Minzhilkomkhoz is allocating 70,000 rubles to replace gas stoves in apartments, and Minvodkhoz is providing money to replace 336 gas stoves. In the first quarter, all 63 applications for the installation of gas stoves in buildings will be satisfied.

According to established procedure, departmental residential buildings are being transferred over to the city soviet. Over the year, Minvodkhoz is making capital repairs on 25 multi-story buildings in the second microrayon (17,100 square meters of housing) and will give them to the gorispolkom. For these purposes, 155,000 rubles were allocated. Moreover, it is planned to additionally allocate budget appropriations of 100,000 rubles to cover the use expenses of the housing fund for the purpose of bringing ongoing repairs up to the set standard.

In order to improve the use of the municipal electrical supply and increase its reliability, Minenergo enterprises are taking ownerless electrical transmission lines (121.7 kilometers) and 21 substations onto the balance at a overall cost of 572.9 thousand rubles.

The operation of the municipal auto transport also sparked the readers' censure. In reality, the regularity of traffic on city routes is fulfilled by 88.4 percent, but on route No. 3—by 68.9 percent. Mirtrans is allocating 13 buses for the city this year. The number of line buses on route No. 3 was raised to seven and the traffic interval was reduced to 10 minutes.

V.N. Fedotov, deputy chairman, KaSSR State Committee on Culture, informed the conference that it has been planned to begin constructing a city House of Culture with 700 seats in 1989. The committee allocated five amusement attractions and eight automatic game machines for installation in the central park.

Currently, the question of including the "Khodzhi Akhmed Yasavi Architectural Complex" Museum on the "universal heritage" list, is being considered. Furthermore, on a resolution by the 24th Session of the UNESCO (Paris, 1987) General Assembly, the execution of the international "Great Silk Road" program was started. Historic Turkestan will be a component part of this program. In this connection, the "Kazproyektrestavratsiya" Institute has developed technical and economic calculations (TER) for the regeneration, town-planning restoration, museum-making, and improvement of the city's preservation zone, and the conversion of Turkestan into a major center of domestic and foreign tourism. The TER stipulates the location in the preservation zone of hotels, housing, trade enterprises, domestic service, communications, health care, culture, handicraft studios and other projects, carried out on the basis of traditional architectural and planning decisions using natural bricks with modern engineering support. In other words, the recreation of Turkestan's medieval look, when it was still called Yasy, with its quarters of potters, [zergerov], goldsmiths, and bakers, a nomadic village, etc., is being proposed. Except that it will not be a static museum exhibition, but a revival of the old days. Suppose, for instance, that the part of the house with the inner courtyard is occupied by a large family. The men in this family work in, for instance, in engraving, and the women—in providing services for tourists, who are put on the second floor of the building, which has been converted into a hotel. Eastern cuisine, eastern exoticism—all of this, beyond a doubt, will increase the flow of tourists and can provide significant hard currency receipts. Such construction could provide housing for up to 3,000 people, employ a large number of people in the tourism industry, and provide an opportunity for young people to master entirely forgotten, but very interesting professions. For instance, the profession of camel drivers and, simultaneously, of guides, accompanying tourists who have set off with a caravan on an excursion along the reconstructed section of the Silk Road. Tempting?

**There could probably be no other opinion!** Jointly with interested organizations, the committee intends to organize a discussion of the draft and submit it for judgment to the residents of Turkestan.

Visitors, not spoiled by any food prosperity at home, are startled by the emptiness of Turkestan food stores. In fact, there is something to be startled by. According to the standards for provision to the city population, 6.5 thousand tons of potatoes, 8.4 thousand tons of vegetables, and 2.8 thousand tons of grapes are needed. In fact, in 1988 consumption consisted of: potatoes—3,000 tons (40 percent of the norm), and vegetables—4.7 thousand tons (56 percent). In this regard, 2.1 thousand tons of potatoes, 1.7 tons of vegetables, and 1.9 thousand tons of grapes were received from state resources. Last year, agroindustrial farms sold the city... 30 tons of potatoes, 140 tons of vegetables, 240 tons of melons, and 4 tons of grapes, and cooperatives—even less. Turkestan, once famous for its melons and grapes, having exported them to other lands by the hundreds of wagon-loads, has been turned into a consumer itself: all other crops have been crowded out by the monopolist—cotton.

Matters are even worse with the milk supply. On the average, 40 kilograms of milk per city resident is supplied from state resources, but the standard is 257 kilograms. Meat, sausages and other items, which have fallen into the category of delicacies, generally cannot be found at state prices.

True, agroindustry is supposed to bring in 2,000 tons of potatoes and 500 tons of carrots to Turkestan from the 1989 crop. However, again it is a matter of "bringing in." The decision to open 10 "proprietary" trade centers in the city and sell 800 tons of vegetables, 1,000 tons of melons, 300 tons of fruit and 100 tons of early potatoes through them will not affect the problem. The conference participants would have liked to hear the Chimkent Oblagroprom representative's explanation of this, but the oblagroprom did not even consider it necessary to send their representative to the meeting with the readers.

Far from every citizen in Turkestan has the opportunity to realize his constitutional right to a job. After publishing the article "Turkestan—City of Social Problems", the KaSSR State Committee on Labor and Social Problems held a special study in the city. It was established that 6,500 people, or 16.6 percent of the working-age residents, are not working. Of them, 5.1 thousand (79.4 percent) are women. Of these women, about 400 are mothers with children under 1.5 years of age, and 1,900 are raising four or more children. On the whole, according to the committee's estimate, job placement is needed for 1,800 women and 1,400 men. In the survey, more than 1,000 mothers said they would like to find a job, but they could not get their children into a kindergarten, and 250 wanted to work, but only part time, 180 wanted to

work at home, 280—to engage in individual labor activity, 190—to join a cooperative, given the additional creation of cooperatives, 50 people would prefer to work on the shift method, and 480 would like to learn a profession.

The sociological study will continue, and the results will be summarized later and conclusions made accordingly. However, it is already obvious that it is hard to find a job in Turkestan.

Of the unemployed population, 700 people are registered with the city job placement bureau, of which there are 78 drivers, 51 seamstresses, 16 nurses, 21 accountants, 48 construction workers, 12 welders, 49 secretaries and typists, 285 in other specialties, and 143 without a profession. Jobs were found for 100 people in 1988.

What more can be done? In 1989-1990, 1,200 additional jobs will be created by reconstructing existing and commissioning new production capacities, by raising the shift coefficient for work at enterprises, and by developing cooperatives and at-home forms of labor. This includes 20 jobs at the "Remstroydormash" plant, 20 at the ZhBI [Ferroconcrete Products] Plant, 15 at the cotton-cleaning plant, 100 at the Sewing and Knitted Goods Factory, 30 at the locomotive depot, 240 at the refrigerated sheep slaughterhouse, and 650 at an enterprise which is being built. Other enterprises will take about 5-10 people.

In the 13th 5-year period, steps are planned which will ensure the accelerated socioeconomic development of Turkestan, the achievement of rational employment of the work-capable population on the basis of an upsurge in the material production sectors and the placement of a number of new enterprises. This list includes a 60,000 spindle cotton-spinning factory (650 people), a dry mix shop at the gypsum-fiber slab plant (468 people), the combined fodder factory (60 people), and a branch of the Alma-Ata Machine Tool Building Plant (1,500 people). These enterprises will determine the industrial aspect of ancient Turkestan and its future.

The conference lasted 5 hours without interruption. Those who were not in the hall listened to it on two loudspeakers installed outside. Everyone who wanted to was able to approach the microphones and say everything he wished to say. Sometimes emotions overflowed a bit too much, but most often this was sharp criticism, addressed primarily at the city's party and soviet bodies. N.B. Balkiyayev, party gorkom secretary, speaking at the end of the conference, admitted: "Many times, I went hot and cold. Indeed, for me, it seems, and for everyone here, this is a real lesson in glasnost and openness. We will try to draw the proper conclusions from this lesson." The representatives of ministries and departments, present in the hall, and people who managed to exchange impressions later on, shared this opinion.

This is also KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA's first experience with a conference of this type. We will also develop it further. Obviously, the social problems of small cities are not exhausted by Turkestan alone. We invite readers to participate in discussion of these problems. Send us letters on this subject, but, please, only with a note on the envelope: "Social Problems of Small Cities." Your letters will suggest new solutions to us.

The conference presidium received 173 notes and questions. They were all studied and the measures taken were reported. The editors will not slacken their watch over the course of implementation of the program for Turkestan's socioeconomic development.

#### Readers Comments At the Conference

A. Yugay: Turkestan's problems arose long ago. Plan things that are realistic. However, that which is planned cannot be implemented without the people of Turkestan themselves. Here, we must work well. Constant control is needed on the part of the newspaper.

E. Shalamova: I suggest that the regular plenum of the Turkestan Party Gorkom consider the question of work with letters. An answer should be required from leaders who are not reacting at all to the complaints and appeals of the working people.

Here is an example. There have been so many alarms about the poor operation of the municipal automotive transport. Yet, as it was, so it has remained. How come the gorkom and gorispolkom are not reacting to these alarms?

S. Abdullayev, chairman, City Council of War and Labor Veterans:

Many veterans need improved living conditions. I propose constructing a 50-apartment building for them, locating a medical center with doctors on duty 24 hours, cooking for orders, a laundry and other services needed by the elderly, on the first floor. We also need a club for meetings not only among ourselves, but also with young people.

Such a building could not only become a convenient residence for those who went through the war or worked on the home front, but also a unique center for upbring- ing the teen-age generation.

T. Safronov, metal worker, repair and mechanical plant:

Last year, 500 apartments were put into commission. This is not many. In the new buildings, many things are unfinished, it is cold in the winter, hot in the summer and there is no water. How come the builders turn out defective work, but do not answer for it?

We have a high infant mortality. Did the responsible officials of the city and oblast not know about this? If they knew, how come they did not take measures and suddenly remembered it only after the newspaper article? Is there any guarantee that there will not be infant deaths now?

G. Yermanova, war and labor veteran:

There are many things "for show" in the schools. If they are expecting a visit from the committee, the children are forced to take off their winter clothing, and the children catch the chills.

I recently visited a school, and little girls were washing the floor of a cold classroom with cold water. Would the teacher really let her own daughter do this? Yet, after all, it is all so simple: just heat the water. We have many indifferent teachers in our schools.

N. Shatilov: More than 5,000 people in the city do not work, there are no jobs. Thus, why do so many retirees work? Apparently, they are irreplaceable? Young people need to work!

N.M. Baytuov, teacher, Middle School No 15:

A question for the gorispolkom secretary and gorispolkom chairman: to this day the buildings in the brick plant rayon are not being heated, regardless of numerous appeals to you about this. Right now, it is 12-15 degrees in the apartments even with the constant use of electric heaters.

S. Yusupova, mother of eight children:

My husband works as a driver. We have a son, Sergey Yusupov. From 1982 to 1983 he served in Afghanistan. He was awarded the Order of the Red Star for bravery displayed in performing his military duty.

He returned home crippled for life, a class 2 invalid, for which we have the appropriate documents. However, last time he was removed from invalid status. So believe the doctors and surgeon Comrade Kenes Buksebayev, under the leadership of the chief doctor of the City Medical Association, Nyshanov. It is a shame that they are treating an internationalist soldier like this, and he has still not yet recovered from the injury.

I wish to receive justice and a proper opinion from the doctors.

Note from the hall:

A request in the names of many readers: Let the local leaders organize a conference with readers again. Problems that depend on the republic have been solved, but those depending on local authorities have not.

N. Khalmetov, CPSU member since 1979, hydraulic engineer by training:

For 4 years, I have been unable to find a job in my specialty. I turned to various authorities, starting with the gorkom on up to the CPSU Central Committee, but to this day I have not received a satisfactory answer.

To feed my family, I have worked for 4 years in construction as a concrete worker, although it was forbidden to me for reasons of health.

Since 10 May 1988, I have not worked because my health has worsened. Where is social justice?

Vnukovskaya: Three questions for the representative of the Ministry of National Education:

1. When will our children receive all of their textbooks?

2. When will our children no longer have to pick cotton?

3. Why is it hard for Russian children to enter the local pedagogical and medical schools?

T. Bazarbayev: Why are they commissioning unfinished buildings, yet the gorispolkom is still signing the acceptance document?

A. Babayeva: When will food finally appear? If the city leaders stood in lines and constantly went home with empty baskets, just like we do, they would probably think about the people, but everything is put on the

tables for them at the first call. So why should their hearts bleed for the people? Everything is taken from the depot, and does not even reach the stores.

S. Kim: Would it be possible to receive the premises of the "Zhalyn" Movie Theatre for a youth center? Could funds be allocated for its reconstruction and equipment?

B. Bersugurov: Telephones are being installed in apartments slowly here, and people have been waiting in line for 10 years. Will this problem be solved in the near future?

Sadykova: I ask you to help us find jobs. My husband and I are without work. We have three children. My husband has 24 years of work experience, and I have 20. It is particularly hard for women to find jobs. Presently, I would be able to work at home (since I have been unable to find day care for my children). Please do not send me to the job placement bureau. They are of little use.

Note "From the Street":

We request that the conference be held at the locomotive depot stadium or that you provide an amplifier. There are 1,000 people outside who cannot get into the hall, but they have many questions.

A. Gorbakko: Turkestan has a party gorkom and raykom. Their buildings are next door to each other. I propose joining these committees into one and putting a House of Pioneers in the party gorkom building.

**Academics Analyze Era of Stagnation**  
*PM3011113088 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English*  
*No 46, 13 Nov 88 pp 8-9*

[Yuriy Levada, D.Sc., and Viktor Sheynis, D.Sc., article:  
"Sinking Into The Quagmire: Act One (1964-1968)"]

[Text] It is instructive to analyze the epoch known as "the period of stagnation". This period logically resulted from the period of mass terror, abortive reforms, disappointment and weariness. It is a quagmire where many turbulent and murky waters of history merge. It is the sum of an inefficiently run economy, an undemocratic government and ideological double standards.

**Times Changed**

The first post-Stalin decade differed as glaringly from the following period as violent ebbs and flows differ from stopped time. But the difference did not end there. In the 50s we had a politically immature and inert society awakening from the bloody terror, and a government that was continuously experimenting as it groped for a way out of the blind alley of Stalinism. Come October 1964—everything changed. The authorities' ideas about what they could or should do became increasingly conservative and their behaviour more guarded. At the same time society was maturing, becoming more enlightened, was looking for answers, trying to be more socially and politically active. Without this, March 1985 and perestroika would have been impossible.

In October 1964 portraits of Khrushchev were replaced by those of Brezhnev and Kosygin, who took over his posts. This was the most important and really the only change in the top echelon of power. A bit later Mikoyan quit the scene. But on the whole there was precious little change in the central Party bodies. The October 1964 coup was special in that there was a political change with minimal personnel changes. This perhaps explains why the line proclaimed at the 20th and the 22nd Party Congresses received diminishing support from the top leaders and depended mostly on Khrushchev, his influence and the prestige of his office. When Khrushchev went so did the policy supported by sham unanimity. There was no democratic mechanism to prevent coups in the apparatus.

Stalinism vested the Party and government apparatus with tremendous power and granted them envious privileges, while the 20th Party Congress made them sure of their security. From then on they were a comparatively distinct part of society with their own bureaucratic methods of recruitment (which they billed as those used by Lenin in selecting personnel). They became far more confident.

In the autumn of 1964 the power went to a set of people who would keep it not for a short time, as many had hoped, but for 20 years. They were Khrushchev's moderate supporters turned "liberal" conservatives, increasingly corrupt officials in Moscow and elsewhere, pragmatic social climbers and their scientific and ideological advisers. Their supporters included politically active neo-Stalinists who naturally did not want another mass terror but who urged "selective" repressions while nursing a nostalgia for "order".

The new set's policy remained unclear for some time obviously because after toppling Khrushchev his former lieutenants weren't sure what to do with the power. At any rate, some of their first steps were more encouraging to ordinary people than to bureaucrats. They restored the geneticists' good name and exposed Lysenko: Special investigators found that Lysenko's "achievements" on his experimental plot of land near Moscow had been a fraud. They saved the Russian spelling rules from a ridiculous would-be reform and lifted all the unnerving restrictions on subscriptions to newspapers and magazines.

**From Attempted Reforms to A Stagnating Economy**

They eliminated the absurd doubling of the Party and government apparatus, subdivided to supervise industry and agriculture. On the agenda was a deeper-going reform (first discussed in special publications in 1962 and then in the press).

The Central Committee Plenary Meeting in March 1965 was an attempt to remedy the situation in agriculture. It justly criticized authoritarian pressure on collective and state farms, the exorbitant production quotas, the imbalanced pricing system. The reformers, however, ignored the fact that price changes to benefit agriculture without universal price changes would only help for a short time, that their calls for "ending all management by injunction" made no sense while they saw the evil in isolated errors rather than in the system (management by injunction) itself.

The September 1965 Plenary Meeting devoted to industry went even further. It aimed to make cost accounting really work. There was a feeble attempt to give industrial enterprises independence. It was recognized that it was wrong for economic authorities to have all the rights and enterprises all the duties.

Some people hold that those good plans were ruined by bureaucrats. This is only partially true. The reform's ruin was caused by its inconsistent and limited nature. The renovated management, planning and incentive structures gave their supporters little leverage and they contained almost nothing that could not be taken away.

"Analysis shows that the difficulties affecting our economy are temporary and should be overcome in a short time," was stated at the September Plenary Meeting. But

when Siberia's vast oil fields were discovered, the oil was used as inefficiently as other natural resources. The lagging of our economy behind those of industrialized capitalist countries was acquiring a qualitative character.

### The Party And The Intelligentsia

This was the title of a February 1965 article in Pravda by its new Editor-in-Chief A. Rumyantsev who lashed out at Stalin's and Khrushchev's approach to intellectuals. Rumyantsev advocated free expression and the clash of opinions, recognition of different schools and trends in science, literature and the arts. But in September Sinyavski and Daniyel were arrested for publishing their books under pen names abroad.

The Sinyavskiy and Daniyel trial was preceded by a persecution campaign in the press—calling the defendants traitors, ascribing the words of their characters to them, and asserting that their satirical remarks (tame by today's standards) were punishable under the Criminal Code. The court sentenced Sinyavskiy and Daniyel to seven and five years respectively in a strict-regime camp. The public applauded the sentence which was followed by a new wave of political arrests and trials.

"You may disagree with what these men wrote. You may tell them so. You may fine them for breaking the law that prohibits books from being taken out of the country without authorization," wrote Louis Aragon. "But to imprison Sinyavskiy and Daniyel for the contents of a novel or a story is to establish a precedent that is bound to harm socialism more than their books ever could."

### Taking Revenge

The 23rd CPSU Congress was held 10 years after the 20th Congress. Though some speakers still referred to the 20th and the 22nd Congresses, it was clear what part of the heritage was being renounced by the new leaders and what part they wanted to revive.

The Congress was very long on rituals, so all ideological work was to be conducted in short spurts between one anniversary to the next.

The Congress accomplished what those who carried out the 1964 October coup needed—consolidation of power and guaranteed privileges (if one didn't step out of the line). Quotas for the renewal for Party bodies and limits on terms of elective offices were edited out of the Party Rules. After the constant reorganizations, removals and appointments under Khrushchev, bosses of all ranks could breathe a sigh of relief. Kunayev was quite outspoken: "The Party's current management style gives us confidence."

Literature was another highlight at the 23rd Congress. Said Brezhnev: "Cultural hacks have made the denigration of our system and the slandering of our heroic

people their speciality." The hostility toward free thinking and free speech, toward the press that had gotten out of the bureaucrats' control, the determination to stop exposing Stalinism and make the press toe the line as before—everything that had been up in the corridors of power was voiced openly at the Congress.

Party and government officials of different ranks denounced NOVYY MIR and Yunost as "proponents of low morals only pretending to fight the consequences of the personality cult", "posing as defenders of historical truth", "primping in front of the mirror of history", "running things down", "portraying isolated facts as typical", "detecting elements of Stalinism in the national policy"...

The 23rd Congress was an opportunity for Party and government bureaucrats to avenge the years of uncertainty, instability and degrading weakness. They have forgotten nothing and had learned a thing or two. They moved their people from the reserves into the top-power echelon (G. Romanov, N. Tikhonov and S. Trapeznikov became members of the Central Committee, K. Chernenko and N. Shcholokov became alternate members). For two decades they effectively banished the alternative road of development that had opened up in the 1950s.

### Resistance

"Stagnation's" ideological and political climate evolved gradually. Brezhnev's first mention of Stalin—on the 20th anniversary of Victory Day—sparked rumours of a revision of Party decisions on Stalin and Stalinism. Twenty-five scientists and cultural figures, including Academicians L. Artsimovich, P. Kapitsa, A. Sakharov and I. Tamm and writers V. Nekrasov, K. Paustovskiy and K. Chukovskiy, sent the leadership a warning letter (recently published in OGONEK). Typewritten copies of the letter circulated widely and triggered the "campaign of petitions". Famous people, winners of prizes and decorations, and totally unknown ones started appealing to political leaders. Thousands of people wrote and signed letters for or against specific actions or plans and claimed the right to participate in the country's political life. "Samizdat" published more memoirs, historical research works, novels and classified documents. Everything that slipped through during this period of relaxation was thus illegally published—including Akhmatova's "Requiem", Ginzburg's Journey into the Whirlwind, Zhores Medvedev's Discussion in Biological Science, Roy Medvedev's Let History Judge.

May 1967 brought another writers congress, preceded by the charges that the Writers Union was not standing up for repressed authors and not speaking out against those preventing publication. Still people managed to get around the censors: "Samizdat" was supplemented by books brought from abroad; the taped songs of Okudzhava, Kim, Vysotskiy and other bards resounded in homes and on the streets.

"Samizdat" songs, books and discussions at the start of the stagnation period lacked the bite, incisiveness and farsightedness of what our papers and magazines publish today. But glasnost wouldn't have been possible without what was then.

#### Intimidation

Thus began the shaping of independent public opinion, various positions, views and moods. The authorities could not reconcile themselves to that. The greatest invention of the stagnation period may have been the highly efficient (unlike the economy) mechanism of repression for separate individuals. They didn't have to resort to the idea of mass terror to restore "unanimity".

At first "renegades" were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their jobs, barred from science and literature, deprived of the right to earn money, and finally kicked out of the country. This was done mainly with the help of colleagues and former friends.

But after that momentary exposure to the "air of freedom", there were people who refused to be cowed by "troubles" in their careers or to be bribed by offers of privileges, trips abroad and God knows what else. There was a separate system of punishment for this lot. In 1966 Article 190 was added to the Criminal Code. It established a maximum three-year sentence for "spreading fabrications discrediting the Soviet state and social system". The same actions, but qualified as "agitation and propaganda with intent to undermine or weaken Soviet power", were punishable under Article 70 with seven years in prison. Although the punitive organs (whose activities could not be discussed by the public) never resorted to mass repressions, they had sufficient power and "rights" to broadly interpret the laws and to twist them.

The so-called dissident movement (newspapers today would call it an unofficial movement) had its strong and weak points. At times it was affected by someone's ambitions. But without doubt, a line of public protest was emerging which would stand up well to tests. Who knows how many gifted and strong-willed people society lost because they could not work constructively for social renewal. The sustained efforts to demoralize, suppress and drive out people found "guilty" of trying to uphold legality, the right to openness and creative work played havoc with culture and gave excessive ideological functions to state services, primarily the security department.

There were heroes and righteous men. But their voices were isolated. When condemning Brezhnev and Suslov, it should be recalled that many people thought protest against duplicity and calls for honest living were unfounded maximalism. In the autumn of 1969 Solzhenitsyn was solemnly and unanimously expelled from the Writers Union. His defenders were expelled later. Andrey Sakharov felt secure for some time because of his past services to the state, his awards and titles. His

increasing political activity alarmed the guardians of "ideological discipline". His appeals fell on deaf ears. The machinery of "unanimous" condemnation (of approval too) was operating more and more efficiently.

True victims numbered hundreds, not millions as under Stalin. But an unfair trial doesn't wound just the defendant. Unfairness towards even a single person ("in the name of society"!) hurts all of society, even if it doesn't realize this. "Martyrs of the dogma, you are also the century's victims," Pasternak wrote. What about martyrs of fear? And those who raised their hands simply to be undistinguishable from the other voters? Those who feigned unconcern? Those who were saving themselves for "a more important" cause? And those who clenched their fists in impotent desperation?...Socrates was right: "a people without honour today will go without bread tomorrow".

#### Under Cover of Anniversary Noises

The adjective "Leninist" began to be used indiscriminately in connection with what bosses wrote and did. Surely the attempt to create the illusion of continuity of power and authority ("from Illich to Illich"—a reference to Lenin and Brezhnev's identical patronymic) had no more chance of succeeding than the praises for the mediocre Brezhnev's literary and military talents. But according to the rules of the game (increasingly accepted), the most important thing was to report a success even if it didn't exist.

The epoch of "anniversaries" was geared to reminiscences of heroic deeds. Hence the idea of turning our history into a sacred history (Stalin's concept of the country's history came in handy as a model and source of information). History, it was held, must be a history of great victories and reproachless heroes exclusively. We hardly had a chance in the 1950s to soberly assess the Civil War, the Great Patriotic War, collectivization and the year 1937 before all attempts at unbiased research were ordered cancelled. There was a clear effort to restore Stalin's halo under the guise of objectivity, to make Stalin's rule appear respectable, though not without references to some of his mistakes and departures from the line.

The end of the 60s saw a number of ideological attacks. The Institute of Sociology was smashed. Economists were rapped for their infatuation with the market economy. Authors, artists, stage and film directors were taken to task for "denigration" and "lack of patriotism". It was then that the first environmentalists protesting the pollution of Lake Baykal were silenced. Scientists whose approaches weren't standard were accused of deviating from "unshakable principles". Ideological preachers led by Suslov had a pathological hatred for all things "unauthorized" and "foreign".

**Summer of 1968**

We are describing the events the way we see them totally. But in the mid-60s the outcome of many battles seemed, or perhaps was, unclear. NOVYY MIR edited by Tvardovskiy was still alive and fighting back. "The generation of 1956, children of the 20th Congress" were still together, were not yet demoralized. Corruption and indifference had not yet set in.

The country's political development was steered by specially selected people. Still, those people had to learn from the policy they carried out.

**"Victors" To Be Judged [subhead]**

1968-1969 saw the end of the "transition" period and the triumph of the concept known in the West as the "Brezhnev doctrine". According to it, the diktat and monopoly on the truth were justified by the "supreme interests" of socialism. Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR was gagged, Academician Sakharov was punished, many pages of the Great Patriotic War were rewritten, and "social deviants" were locked up in special psychiatric hospitals. Voices of protest grew weaker and weaker.

But the "victors" could not prevent the country from slipping into a profound social crisis: the growing economic lag, the declining prestige abroad, social and moral corrosion that went beyond the top echelons.

Not everyone kept silent, however. Directly or indirectly, publicly or privately, people spoke out, wrote, published and transmitted information. Real literature was not defeated. Overcoming the bans, writers honestly communicated with their readers, preventing cultural rot. Talented plays and world-class films were produced and shown. Within the Party and government apparatus the civically conscious forces were becoming stronger. A new generation was growing up.

**Soviet Psychiatrists Address Issue of Stalin's Mental Health**

18300302a Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 28 Dec 88 p 13

[Letters to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA from N. Blokhin, academician, A. Gofman, doctor of medical sciences (who has worked 40 years in psychiatry), Moscow, and O. Vilenskiy, head of the Psychiatric Department of the Dagestan Medical Institute, Makhachkala, in response to article by Oleg Moroz, "The Last Diagnosis," in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 28 Sep 88, and a letter from Ye. Kreslavskiy, pediatric psychiatrist, to Oleg Moroz and his response: "The Last Diagnosis"]

[Text] O. Moroz's article, "The Last Diagnosis" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 28 Sep 88), discusses Stalin's mental illness.

**To the Editor:**

The opinion of Academician V. M. Bekhterev about the fact that Stalin suffered from paranoia was, to some degree, well known in medical circles, although it had never been officially published anywhere. It is natural that this question had been discussed and many people had been convinced that Stalin was suffering from a paranoid persecution complex in combination with a delusion of grandeur. Also discussed was the similarity of his illness to that of Ivan the Terrible, whose mental illness was also combined with enormous personal power, which made it possible [for him] to annihilate thousands of innocent people with impunity. I also expressed these ideas in my own essay "To Serve Mercy" (the journal OKTYABR, No 8, 1988).

Some readers, after my essay in the journal OKTYABR, said that, in acknowledging that Stalin was mentally ill, I was, as it were, diminishing his responsibility for the crimes he committed. I had already heard similar opinions also with regard to the article which appeared in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

How truly terrible it is when unlimited power is concentrated in the hands of an insane person! At the same time, the medical practice knows about the possibility of the combining in one person of serious mental disorders and definite, sometimes highly significant gifts, which was the case in this specific instance.

As is well known, Lenin recognized the danger of the concentration of power in Stalin's hands and warned his closest associates about the danger of leaving him in the post of general secretary. This tells of the extraordinary responsibility of the group of party leaders who headed up the party and the country after Lenin's death.

Unfortunately, they immediately got into a power struggle, and after Stalin managed, by dividing them, to strengthen his own absolute rule, they were among the first to begin to talk about Stalin's exclusiveness as party leader. The speeches of Zinovyev and Kamenev and later Bukharin as well already contained elements of the propaganda of the cult of Stalin.

Tsar Ivan was the hereditary ruler of Rus—"God's Anointed One." It is necessary to recall what this meant in the eyes of the people in that era. The question about the possibility of his removal was, certainly, much more difficult than the removal of the party's general secretary, for which Lenin left instructions in his will.

Later, it turned out to be possible to actively replace N. S. Khrushchev and it was done by such mediocre persons as Brezhnev, Suslov and others, while the people from Lenin's closest circle turned out to be incapable of fulfilling his instruction about replacing Stalin and themselves became victims of the insane ruler.

Now, during the period of rehabilitation of those condemned 50 years ago and more, we say that they were not guilty of what they were accused back then. At the same time, however, it is impossible to forget their enormous guilt before the country and the people, who were left by them at the mercy of a dangerous maniac. With regards to the group of people who became "Stalin's comrades-in-arms" in subsequent years, these were already basically "Oprichniki" [bodyguards of the tsar], if we go back to the terminology of Ivan the Terrible's time.

Stalin's illness in combination with the opportunities concentrated in his hands for unlimited criminal activities describe to me the reasons for the experienced difficult times.

[Signed] N. Blokhin, academician

#### The Opinions of Psychiatrists

It is very difficult to imagine that, with paranoia, a person can make a large number of sensible decisions while being consumed by the illness. Meanwhile, Stalin made sound decisions, for example, when the

matter concerned purely technical military questions (he could even abandon a previously made decision, if he was convinced of its erroneousness) and he meddled in topics of literary productions not because of his illness, but rather, for political reasons, and so on. There can be no tying together of the diagnosis of paranoia with Stalin's insidiousness, his willingness to deceive, his ability to engage in intrigue and his flexibility in changing decisions and replacing slogans. For a paranoiac obsessed by the illness, with its extraordinary rigidity and all-consuming nature, this is simply impossible. Therefore, it is necessary to repudiate the diagnosis of paranoia. No one ever detected a systematized illness in Stalin. If Stalin had an illness, it was just a persecution complex. Modern psychiatrists, in these instances, talk not about paranoia, but rather, about schizophrenia.

By the way, the entire history of the life of Ivan the Terrible is the history of the life of an insane schizophrenic and not of a paranoiac (the persecution complex dies down and grows more acute).

In order to establish the presence of an illness in Stalin, it is necessary to use not the fact of the repressions carried out by him, but rather, other facts. Khrushchev, in a well-known speech, mentioned Stalin's incredible suspiciousness. Turning to Khrushchev, he said approximately the following: "What is this look on your face? Why are you averting your eyes?"

It was recently written that Stalin even feared that an associate of the Okhrana [secret police] would shoot him. It is also known that Stalin was a reserved, uncommunicative and unsociable person. This reservedness in combination with suspiciousness is typical for the condition of those suffering from schizophrenia. It is possible that

there were aggravations, during which time, there arose states of alarming timidity with insane evaluation of behavior. However, this needs to be confirmed by eye-witness testimony.

I think that the facts need to be amassed.

[Signed] A. Gofman, doctor of medical sciences (with 40 years of experience in psychiatry), Moscow.

Did Stalin suffer from paranoia? First of all, paranoia as a separate illness was isolated at the beginning of the 20th century and, subsequently, it was included within the framework of schizophrenia as one of its varieties.

Paranoid (that is, delirious) schizophrenia most often develops over 30 to 40 years, since it appears gradually. These sick people have an extremely peculiar way of thinking, in accordance with which, the main thing is their internal world, and the phenomena of surrounding activities should correspond to their internal views, opinions, logic and the laws they themselves devise. Everything which goes beyond the

limits of these internal laws is not perceived and, in their opinion, does not have a right to exist. It is against this background that delusions of grandeur and persecution arise.

It must be emphasized that, behind the limits of their own delusions, such sick people maintain a total orientation to their surroundings and their intellect does not suffer at all. Typical for them are an unusually sharp memory and sharp powers of observation with a constant alert evaluation and insane interpretation of the words, actions and slightest gestures of those around them. The illness proceeds continuously, throughout a person's entire lifetime, but there can be acute intensifications and temporary weakenings of the delusions.

Such sick people can be ideally suited for the role of an absolute dictator. Their fanaticism and devotion to a single idea—regardless of any facts of actual reality—their ruthlessness and boundless cruelty and their ability to captivate people make it possible for them to achieve political successes, while the total annihilation of all their own real and imaginary enemies makes it possible for them to retain power for a very long time.

Throughout history, there have been a number of persons who have managed to follow this scheme: the Judean king, Herod, the Roman emperors, Caligula and Nero, Ivan the Terrible, Hitler...

Stalin's life, his reservedness, his constant suspiciousness and his extremely peculiar way of thinking, while ignoring any actual facts, which he attempted to subordinate to his own ideas or to destroy (hence, the gross strategic errors both before and during the war), his grandiose mania of grandeur and persecution—with periodic

aggravations, and the many millions of victims, whom he sacrificed thoughtlessly in order to satisfy his own delusion and fear of "enemies," also fit into the scheme of paranoid schizophrenia.

[Signed] O. Vilenskiy, head of the Psychiatric Department of the Dagestan Medical Institute, doctor of medical sciences and professor, Makhachkala.

#### Our Correspondence

Dear Oleg Moroz:

The publication in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of the materials on the death of V. M. Bekhterev, evidently, will not leave a single psychiatrist indifferent, at least any one who loves his own specialty and its history. I, as well as my colleagues, have had to listen more than once to information coming from various sources about the death of Vladimir Mikhaylovich, which differed from that presented in your article only in the details.

It seems to me, however, that the idea about Stalin's mental illness,

which has already resounded twice from the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (the first time in the excerpts from Volkogonov's book), does not need popularization. I do not consider it possible to debate the basis of the diagnosis with V. M. Bekhterev, a person who not only knew psychiatry better than I do, but who also personally observed I. V. Stalin. But, it seems to me that the dissemination of the idea about Stalin's mental illness can have dangerous political consequences, since it removes from him completely not only moral responsibility, but also, by contemporary standards, legal responsibility for the crimes committed against the people and the state.

Respectfully,

[Signed] Ye. Kreslavskiy, pediatric psychiatrist

Dear Comrade Kreslavskiy:

The suggestion regarding Stalin's illness does not in the least cancel out questions about what features of the system led to Stalin's absolute rule and what conditions led to the unchecked power of those who should have not permitted the debauchery of terror and violence. Just the opposite: such recognition makes it possible to say that, with regards to Stalin himself, everything is more or less clear and to concentrate on the analysis of the conditions for the accession and prolonged flourishing of the tyrannical regime.

In my opinion, the Stalinist era as a whole, first of all, is subject to the judgment of contemporaries and the judgment of history. Stalin is just its central element. Whether or not he was healthy or sick, a schizophrenic or a psychopath—ultimately is not that important. In the

extreme instance, we are talking only about a certain redistribution of the responsibility among those who assisted in establishing and supporting the bloody regime. It is unthinkable even to dream of removing the guilt from any one at all.

There is also an unusually important and practical aspect, which is urgent even today, to the question of Stalin's illness. How is the health of those who aspire to the highest state positions to be examined (as is being done in many countries of the world)? Where are the guarantees that a hopelessly sick person will not again turn up in such a position? Indeed, Brezhnev's incapacity in recent years was quite evident to the naked eye. It was also evident that Chernenko was not even healthy enough to head up the government...

Respectfully,

[Signed] Oleg Moroz

#### Lessons of Brezhnev, Kunayev Era in Kazakhstan 18300401 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by G. Kozlov, deputy director, Institute of Party History, under Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, candidate of historical sciences, under rubric "Experience of Historical Analysis": "Stagnation"]

[Text] The sharp discussions that have recently dealt extensively with our history in general, and party history in particular, have basically concentrated on the "unexplored areas" of the 1920's and 1930's and, for the time being, have bypassed the period that immediately preceded the present one. And yet the tasks of the day require the urgent and thorough, well-principled analysis of the processes that occurred in the party and the state precisely during the 1970's and the early 1980's. Research on this period is important not only in order to understand the process of the maturation of the prerequisites for perestroika, but also in order to obtain a more precise definition of the measures linked with the overcoming of the negative consequences of the time of stagnation: the conservatism and dogmatism that continue to manifest themselves, as was mentioned at the 19th Party Conference, in the actions and thought processes not only of individual Communists and party workers, but even of committees and organizations.

The dogmatism and conservatism in party work were engendered by various factors. But to a large extent they are the result of the underestimation of the entire depth and gravity of the distortions in intraparty life that were allowed to occur during the time that preceded the period of perestroika. We simply did not know much and it is only now that we see that the neglected state of affairs in various spheres of party building proved to be more serious than had previously appeared. But the assertion of the truth, however necessary it may be and however emotional it sounds, is only half the job. It is necessary to give a

strictly scientific explanation of the reasons why the CPSU, with its tremendous experience in political organization, including the experience linked with the attempts to overcome the Stalin personality cult, had not been able to prevent the stagnation or to prevent the serious deviations from Leninist principles and norms of party life, which deviations had a negative effect on the combat capability of the party organizations and the party as a whole, and on the level of party influence. The following article is one of the attempts to answer these questions.

Characterizing the condition of the party in the 1970's and the early 1980's, it is necessary first of all to note that even during that period, despite the most serious distortions, many party organizations and cadres acted dynamically, in the interests of the nation, thus guaranteeing a definite growth in the economic and scientific potential, the reinforcement of the country's defense capability, and the rise in the standard of living of Soviet citizens.

However, in many instances these broad party opportunities were used ineffectively. The buildup of negative processes was only kept in check, but could not be prevented. As a result there arose phenomena of stagnation and other phenomena that are alien to socialism; the country began losing its rates of movement ahead; and difficulties and unresolved problems began to accumulate. For example, Kazakhstan, by the beginning of the 10th Five-Year Plan had moved back to the last place in the country with regard to the increase in national income per-capita of population, labor productivity, return on investments, and other very important indicators, although its leaders continued to talk about the "upward flight into space" that had been taken by the republic's economy and culture, and about the fact that, on its boundless expanses, as D. A. Kunayev said at the 24th CPSU Congress, "the emotional splendor of astonishing achievements, and the happiness and joy of headlong creativity, reign."

Many party organizations began losing their class, proletarian intolerance toward deviations from socialist principles, and they proved to be unable to oppose the growing corruption, the attitude of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" and of complete permissiveness, bureaucratism, the uncontrollable greed, the weakening of discipline, the wide spread of drunkenness and alcoholism, the onslaught of narrowly departmental and local interests, or nationalistic manifestations.

The persons who undoubtedly were primarily guilty of the unforgivable, serious blunders that had been made during the period being considered were: in the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, and in the Kazakhstan CP, D. A. Kunayev. History, of course, will provide a complete and objective evaluation of their activity and their political, moral face. But obviously this is not only a matter of evaluating the true role of the former administrators and their close "cohorts." The problem of managers should

not be reduced simply to people's personality features. A more serious question lies in establishing on what basis, in accordance with what principles, the party's collective agencies operated at that time, in establishing whether they did not attempt to oppose, or had been unable to oppose, the subjectivistic and unprincipled work style of L. I. Brezhnev or D. N. Kunayev.

In the search for an answer to these questions, we must invariably deal with the analysis of how the principle of democratic centralism was understood in party building during the period of stagnation. This is necessary both from a political and a scientific point of view, since they touch upon the very foundations of the viability and functioning of the Communist vanguard and its role in socialist society.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that the correct application of democratic centralism as the inseparable unity of two principles—democracy and centralism—introduces high organizational spirit into the party's activities and enables the party to fulfill its functions "correctly, successfully, victoriously." Lenin's conclusions were graphically confirmed both by the historical experience of the CPSU and by the practice of the Communist and workers' parties in the socialist countries.

All the deviations from democratic centralism that occurred in history in the Marxist-Leninist party or the instances when that principle was espoused by them only verbally, substantially weakened the vitality of those organizations and promoted the arising in those organizations of phenomena of stagnation, which went so far as being critical ones.

At the 19th Party Conference it was unambiguously stated that the distortions in the CPSU and the weakening of the party guidance of society had occurred primarily because the principle of democratic centralism, which principle had formed the basis of the party's structure and activities, at a definite stage had been significantly replaced by bureaucratic centralism.

A retrospective view of the processes linked with the carrying out of the principle of democratic centralism in the CPSU makes it possible to see with sufficient clarity that the development of those processes in the past was largely determined by the fact that, beginning with the Stalin period, the entire fruitfulness of Lenin's ideas, plans, and practical recommendations with regard to this question had not been completely assimilated either in theory, or especially in practice. Frequently they were treated in an oversimplified, and consequently distorted, way, and their theoretical depth and significance were emasculated from them. Democratic centralism was presented as the mechanical combination of democracy and centralism, and the dynamics of its development and application were presented as the absorption or crowding out of one of its aspects by the other. There was

an ignoring of Lenin's fundamental principle that intra-party democracy and centralism are dialectically interrelated and interdependent, and that democracy can be implemented only by means of discipline. Otherwise it degenerates into anarchy and permissiveness. In turn, centralism that is devoid of democratic action or supervision inevitably leads to bureaucratism and autocracy, and creates the opportunity for the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a single person or group of persons, and thus the opportunity for the abuse of power and for the leaders to escape scrutiny by the masses.

Another Leninist principle that was distorted is the just as fundamental one that unity and centralization in the party are not absolute, but they designate unity only in general, for the most part, and presuppose at the same time, in organizing its internal life and activity, the taking into consideration of all the local peculiarities, the broad development of local initiative and independence, and the large diversity of paths, methods, and means for moving forward to the common goal. The Communist ideal is not deadening unification, not depressing uniformity, but, rather, the full-blooded and dynamic unity of diversity. V. I. Lenin emphasized that the greater that variety, the more reliably and the more quickly the achievement of democratic centralism and the successes in party work will be achieved.

Lenin's understanding of this problem was distorted as early as the years of the Stalin personality cult. The diversity of forms, methods, and means of activity, and of approaches to the job at hand, was reduced to uniformity, to the existence of only a single version, to methods of administrative fiat, to the artificial leveling and unifying of views and opinions. That process continued during the years of stagnation. Authoritarianism and the monopoly on the perception of the world promoted a situation in which democratic centralism began to be perceived as the monopoly of power in the hands of the party agencies and leaders, rather than as an instrument for broadly extending the active participation and initiative of all the Communists, the activity of whom guarantees the best possible development of the party and the carrying out of its policy. The party masses were viewed only as an object upon which "the people at the top" could exert their influence, rather than as the subject of historical creativity.

Another factor that developed was the stereotype of the ideas concerning democratic centralism as something that allegedly requires the party decisions to be invariably "unanimous." L. I. Brezhnev, for example, said at the 26th CPSU Congress that the entire strength of party leadership lies in this unanimity. But unanimity and unity of action were understood by V. I. Lenin not as the result of mental processes based on stereotype, or as the repetition of memorized formulas. In them he saw the multiplicity of nuances in the positions taken, and the right to make an independent search for the truth. In the 1970's the requirement for party unity was reduced to "singleness of thought." The concept of party discipline

began to be reduced to the willingness to execute commands unconditionally. Failure to agree with a superior agency or with the party leadership began to be viewed as a violation of the norms for party life and practically as a manifestation of "factionalism" or "oppositional moods."

The understanding of unity outside of variety, the reducing of unity to uniformity in organization, and to "singleness of thought" predetermined the arising of tendencies of stagnation in party life, became an obstacle to the party's functioning as a self-governing and constantly developing organizing, and oriented the Communists toward a one-sided perception of reality. The resolution of the tasks of the party's development and activity began to be viewed chiefly within the confines of the forms that already existed.

Despite Lenin's ideas, another feature that became widespread in theory and practice in the past was the view of democratic centralism as being a principle lying not only at the basis of the organization of the internal life of the CPSU, but also as allegedly being the absolutely fundamental principle of party leadership of all aspects of the life of Soviet society and the economic and social development of our country. That point of view, either voluntarily or involuntarily, substantiated and guaranteed, in the relations that the party had with various institutions in the Soviet political system, the development of authoritative methods and methods of administrative fiat, and promoted the acceleration of such a sin as the striving by party committees and their apparatus to dictate everything and to decide for everyone. And that is a sin which, incidentally, has not been overcome to this day. This was mentioned not only at the February 1988 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, but also at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Under the conditions of administration by fiat, a rather large number of the managerial cadres and Communists succumbed to the false idea concerning their own omniscience, and therefore they did not have any clear ideas not only about the essence of democratic centralism, but also about the conditions and the basic forms, methods, and procedures for its practical implementation, assuming that that principle, in and of itself, would automatically regulate the party's vital activities. This illusion made it impossible to see the contradictory tendencies or the paths for overcoming them in the party's development and functioning, and concealed the role of the subjective factors in carrying out the principle of democratic centralism. Another idea that prevailed was that it is not so much the knowledge of scientific requirements that is important, as the precise following of those requirements. However, can one precisely following the requirements of theory if one does not know their content?

The lessons of the 1970's and the early 1980's convince us in an especially graphic way that democratic centralism, like all the other principles of party building, does

not operate automatically. It will "work" fruitfully when it acquires a relatively adequate mechanism for carrying it out, a mechanism that corresponds to the natural laws and specific conditions of the party's functioning.

How this mechanism will operate depends upon the efforts of the party agencies and cadres and upon the content that is put into the basic institutions that guarantee the carrying out of democracy and centralism; upon what kind of practice will prevail for the formation and reportability of the party agencies; upon how the party decisions are fulfilled; upon how broadly and consistently the freedom of discussion and criticism is guaranteed; upon the nature of the interrelationships among various links in the party organism both along the vertical and along the horizontal; upon the degree of precision in the distribution of duties and functions among them; upon the manner in which the independence of the "lower levels" in questions of choosing the paths and methods of the specific carrying out of party directives is guaranteed; etc.

Inasmuch as the mechanism for the practical application of democratic centralism is of a historical nature, there can be a historical justification even for limitations of democracy and the intensification of centralism to the detriment of democracy, but in the interests of defending and conforming the gains of socialism. But if this mechanism is not adequate to the specific goals, tasks, and principle, then it is able to convert these very goals and this principle into their very opposites, and to cause painful distortions in the entire party organism.

A lack of coordination between the principle and the mechanism of applying it, between word and deed, between plan and action, actually occurred in our party in the recent past, when the use of the entire potential of democratic centralism in the party's vital activity was only declared, but nothing substantial changed in the mechanism of its application. For example, at the 24th, 25th, and 26th CPSU congresses, the attention was accentuated only on assertions of the importance of democracy and discipline and the importance of their "equilibrium."

One of the fundamental problems linked with the mechanism of implementing the principle of democratic centralism is the problem of subdividing the sphere of competency among the various party links, its elected agencies and the apparatus, the problem of the conformity of their rights and duties. Actually, the purposeful and effective work of the party as a complex socioeconomic organism is impossible if each of its links has not been assigned a definite role in the overall efforts, if there has been no establishing of the sector or the sphere of activity in such a way that every link does not usurp another's functions or duplicate them, but, instead, all of them together constitute a single complex whole. On the other hand, there must be a precise definition of the volume and correlation between the rights and responsibility. Large rights with small responsibility, as has

been shown by practical life, create the opportunities for administration by fiat, and for subjectivism. Conversely, large responsibility with small rights is by no means any better. In a situation such as this, even the most innovative and creative party committee or organization proves to be powerless and it is a difficult matter to hold them completely accountable for the job assigned to them.

And although these problems were in the party's field of vision and they were mentioned in special detail at the 24th CPSU Congress, theoretical clarity was not achieved there, and the practical resolution proceeded along such a path that the party apparatus began to usurp the functions of the elected agencies, and the functions of the party committees were frequently defined without taking their capabilities into consideration.

It is necessary to understand this completely, otherwise one will fail to understand something else—that degree of complexity that the party agencies encounter today as they attempt to fulfill their rights and duties as defined by the CPSU Rules.

When analyzing the functions of the party committee, one notices first of all their lack of coordination along the vertical. Take, for example, the party's ideological and educational work. Out of the 14 corresponding functions, the CPSU Rules assign eight of them to the primary party organizations; six to local ones; and not a single one to CPSU Central Committee. Although, without a doubt, CPSU Central Committee carries out a tremendous amount of ideological and educational work and has at its disposal all the necessary means for this purpose. The Rules set forth analogously the functions of the party committees and organizations in selecting, assigning and educating cadres. But no indication is given of the specific responsibility or the specific trends in cadre work.

The Rules also do not stipulate the division of the functions in the vertical structure among the party's obkom, gorkom, and raykom. Therefore, in practice, they frequently duplicate one another. This is an especially pertinent problem for the oblast and republic centers. In our opinion, the superior and the lower-level party agencies should not be granted identical powers as applicable to one and the same objects of spheres of management, also because the former begin to assume these functions entirely and thus deprive the lower-level ones of the opportunity to carry them out. It is no secret that the superior agencies are overloaded with matters that are of secondary importance for them. But with the transfer of the right to resolve specific questions to the lower-level agencies, the superior links will have the opportunity to fulfill their direct functions—regulation, coordination, monitoring—and not to overlook the strategic questions.

A substantial discrepancy between the principle of democratic centralism and the mechanism for implementing itself was also clearly visible in the past, in that the party

structure and its democratic institutions adapted not so much to the organizing of intraparty relations on principles of genuine democratism, within the confines of the requirements stated in the Rules, Leninist principles, and norms of party life, and not so much to protecting the party's interests against the encroachments and arbitrariness of various individuals and groups, or to protecting the Communists' interests and rights against official arbitrariness in the person of the party apparatus, as it did to the fulfillment of volitional orders and instructions released from the top. Therefore there was also an ossification of the party structure.

The dialectical combination of the democratic and centralist principles in the development of the party structure creates, as V. I. Lenin felt, the necessary prerequisites not only for the identical action of all the component parts of the party organism in policy and practice, and the efficient placement and purposeful use of the party forces, but also their multiplication many times over. At the same time he emphasized that "the fact that a form is undeveloped or unstable prevents taking further serious steps in developing the content, causes shameful stagnation, and leads to the robbing of forces, and to a nonconformity between word and deed." Unfortunately, people were not completely aware of this Leninist principle in the 1970's, and it was assigned to oblivion.

The party structure developed chiefly along the path of the quantitative buildup of the administrative party agencies and their apparatus. Moreover, there was a noticeable orientation on the intensification of centralism: the party apparatus grew basically as a result of the increase in the number of staff workers at the obkoms and above. In the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, for example, the number of responsible workers increased from 168 to 259 persons during the 1966-1980 period.

Distortions in the direction of centralization also showed their presence clearly in the excessive production-branch specialization of the party apparatus, which specialization actually only aggravated the departmental disorganization in the work of the party agencies, exerted an influence of having their structures oriented toward duplication of each other's efforts, and intensified their adherence toward technocratic approaches and toward methods of administration by fiat. The branch subdivisions of the party apparatus, when defending the interests of the departments for which they were responsible, frequently acted as their "plenipotentiaries" and dragged the party agencies into the resolution of current economic problems, thus weakening their role as agencies of political leadership.

The splintering of the party apparatus into branches of the national economy predetermined not only the usurpation by the party committees of the duties of the soviet and economic agencies, but also the lack of coordination among the actions and criteria in the party work itself.

The subdivisions of the party apparatus were frequently concerned only about the resolution of "their own" questions, showing no interest toward what the other subdivisions were working on. And, without taking the overall situation into consideration, some attempted, rather, to "push through" for consideration at the plenum or the buro the problems of the agroindustry; others insisted on devoting the first-priority attention to problems of culture or construction; and still others, to organizational matters. As a result, the content of the work performed by the party committee as a whole frequently seemed to be the simple sum of various kinds of questions, in which it was difficult to discern a single complex, a simple line or goal.

The gravitation toward the firmly-established stereotypes in structural organization, toward uniformity, toward rigid centralizations had an especially negative effect on the development and activities of the national detachments of the CPSU. It was generally felt that, under the conditions of the internationalization of all the aspects of social and political life, there was no need to have any special organizational forms reflecting the national factors in the party structure, and that those factors were supposed to be guaranteed not so much by the special party subdivisions, as by the intensification of the entire activities of the party's committees and organizations. Therefore their structure became less and less dependent upon the national factors. But real practice showed that the unification of the forms of party structure was not always accompanied by a diversity of the work forms of the party organizations that took into consideration the national, cultural, everyday, and other peculiarities of the country's peoples. Actually, topics of national life, of national relations, began to disappear from practical party work and from the party documents. The failure to pay attention to national aspects in party building was one of the reasons for the arising of tension in the moods of individual segments of the population and of Communist Party members, and it became the precursor of the well-known excesses.

Therefore it was completely reasonable that the 19th Party Conference assigned as one of the most important tasks the task not only of restructuring the party apparatus in conformity with the party's functions, but also of developing those state and social institutions that would engage in the entire complex of interethnic problems.

As for the restructuring of the party apparatus, an apparatus that for many years had had the monopoly on the administration of intraparty affairs, it is obvious that at the present time, in accordance with the decisions of the 19th Party Conference, it must enter into relations of partnership and cooperation, relations of joint administration with Communist Party members who are not engaged in professional party work. It is necessary for the apparatus to be made increasingly democratic both from within—by means of the renovation of the structure and the work style—and from without—by means of the effective monitoring of its activities by Communist Party members.

Continuing the topic linked with the consequences of the absolutization of centralist principles in party building, it is necessary to note that blind faith in the universal effectiveness of rigid centralization was not only one of the reasons for the confirmation of depressing uniformity in the structure and activities of the party agencies, when they became as similar to one another as though they were twins (identical structure, identical plans and measures, identical plenum and meeting agendas, and even identical shortcomings), but there was also a substantial distortion of the entire complex of intraparty relations—among Communist Party members, the administrative party agencies and the party masses, and the party committees at various levels.

The relations of identical thought and identical action, and of party comradeship, which relations were based on the complete equality among party members, and also among all its organizations, and which preclude the supremacy of any group over another, or the application of any guiding force other than authority and the collective opinion, yielded their position to relations based on official orders and execution, on the division of party members into chiefs and subordinates, and on the violation of the principle of equality among Communists and among organizations.

The party's superior and lower-level links began to think and to act most frequently within the categories of domination and subordination, rather than as self-interested Communists. The theme of coercion began to predominate in decisions: those decisions were replete with exhortations to "oblige," "require," to "intensify," to "take steps," etc.—with everything being stated in the imperative mood. But simultaneously there appeared organizations and committees that were closed with regard to analysis and criticism, as well as party members who were fenced off from responsibility.

The current search for ways to increase the effectiveness of the interaction among the party agencies at various levels and to restore in their relations an atmosphere of adherence to principles and of comradely cooperation would also be inconceivable without a consideration of the fact that for many years the relations between "the upper strata" and "the lower strata" were essentially based on such a management practice in which the superior levels were called upon always to be "vigilant," to know everything, and correspondingly to direct everything and making judgments about everything. In the activities of the party committees at all levels in the 1970's and early 1980's one could easily discern the attempt to determine, down to the smallest details, all aspects of the work of the subordinate links—from the frequency of conducting the sessions of their joint agencies to the nature and number of the questions to be discussed. That was a serious hindrance in the development of the initiative and participation rate of the local party detachments and undermined the guarantees of their autonomy in resolving local questions. In their work there was an intensification of such undesirable

features as the "dependent's attitude," the striving to coordinate absolutely everything with the superior agencies, and to act circumspectly. Simultaneously this also predetermined the low quality of the guiding effect that "the upper strata" exerted on "the lower strata," and the decisions that they made, since they were directly related with the nonparticipation of "the lower strata" and the party masses in their preparation and with the overall psychological mood that was aimed at the unconditional approval of the plans and directives that were proposed by the superior administrative level.

The central factor in the question of intraparty democracy is the question of the participation rate of the Communists, their participation in the resolving of party matters, and the basic organizational form of ascertaining the participation rate of the party masses is the elected nature of the party agencies. An analysis of the participation of Communists in elections in the 1970's and the early 1980's provides justification for saying that the considerable majority of them were kept aloof from them. Actually the only administrative level that worked on the formation of the makeup of the party agencies and on the selection of party organization secretaries was the party apparatus.

The freedom that had actually been primordially inherent in the party—the freedom of Communists to elect their representatives at will to the administrative agencies—was replaced, as a result of the spread of bureaucratism and formalism, by the kind of organization of elections in which the conference delegates and the party meeting participants were allowed to retain the opportunity chiefly to express their complete approval and support for the candidates who had been selected, practically speaking, without them. The convoking of these party forums was not preceded by the proper preparatory process of selecting and discussing candidates for election to elected agencies outside of meetings and conferences. All this was done behind locked doors, under conditions of excessive secrecy and excessive organization.

The CPSU Rules, the CPSU Central Committee's instructional guide "Conducting the Elections of Administrative Party Agencies," and all the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee that were enacted during those years with regard to questions of elections stipulated the free discussion of candidates for election to party agencies and the unlimited right to reject or criticize them, but the practice was directed at excluding a competitive selection of candidates determined the social proportions of the makeup of each party agency, down to and including the bureos of the primary party organizations, and regulated all the procedures.

All of this had to have an effect on the awareness of the party masses and the moods of the party apparatus. An indifferent attitude toward the personality of the candidates for election to the elected agencies spread among many Communist Party members. In the "apparatus

"awareness" there was a confirmation of the idea that the initiative of the party masses or the competitive selection of candidates would be a challenge to the party agencies or even an infringement upon their authority. And in the awareness of those who were elected to the party agencies, this practice was transformed into an extremely low evaluation of their own role.

When asserting the Leninist democratic traditions in forming party agencies, it is necessary to overcome the attempt at any price to guarantee in them the representation of all the social segments of Communists. During the period of stagnation that good intention was frequently replaced by an attempt to guarantee official, statistical well-being. The preference was given not to who could be the most beneficial person as part of a committee or at a party conference. The inertness of habit and of persons who have become accustomed to things is still in operation today. And it is well known that there is nothing that is more dangerous for a new truth than an old delusion.

It will also be necessary to overcome another concept that is the most stable one—the concept of holding elections—the correctness of which was justly placed under doubt in the course of the discussion on the eve of the 19th party conference. The crux of the matter is that certain Communists are elected to a party agency, as it were, mechanically, on the basis of the position they hold. Without a doubt, it is necessary elect administrators of farms, enterprises, and institutions to a party agency, but there should be nothing automatic at such time, since automatic action predetermines the fact that certain of them will begin to view their election to a party committee as a kind of honorary supplement to the position that they hold, and will not always burden themselves with the worries that are linked with active participation in the committee's work or in fulfilling party assignments. Nor can one count on the fact that, by having a large percentage in the makeup of the elected party agencies, the administrators will inevitably exert pressure on the rank-and-file Communists on the basis of their position, authority, ties, or their ability to orient themselves in the mechanism of administration, in the "corridors" of power. Therefore, it may be more beneficial for the job at hand if the party committees have their vacancies filled not by prominent specialists in various spheres of activity who already occupy administrative positions, but also by workers and kolkhoz members who have not only the necessary authority, but also have a clearly expressed calling and aptitude for political work.

The 19th party conference planned the thorough reform of political life. The reports and election that are currently in progress in the party indicate that that reform is already "working"—there has been an increase in the participation rate of Communists and on that basis there has been a rise in the quality level of the makeup of the elected agencies and a guaranteeing of the more effective, more realistic participation of the party masses in all stages of the pre-election and election campaign. It is

necessary, however, to continue the search for an intelligent resolution of the questions linked with promoting and discussing candidates for election to the administrative party agencies. In organizing and conducting elections in the party there must be no other secret than the secret ballot.

V. I. Lenin in all his definitions of the content of intraparty democracy always mentioned, alongside of the principle of conducting elections, the need for reportability. This norm of democratic centralism at one time was also substantially distorted. The organizing of real reports and the monitoring of the manner in which they were conducted were replaced by excessive bureaucratic organization. The basic emphasis was placed on the reports from the subordinate organizations to the superior ones, rather than to the Communists who elected them, that is, the monitoring "from the top" and "from the bottom" that was stipulated by the party Rules was replaced simply by monitoring "from the top," which, in addition, was completely subordinate to the executive party agencies. The principle of reportability was also violated in the sense that the superior agencies did not bear any responsibility for the decisions that they made. Therefore the increase in the number of reports was not always accompanied by the necessary effectiveness of the monitoring action. Frequently that effectiveness remained low. A typical feature of the overwhelming majority of recent meetings and conferences to hear reports and hold elections was the fact that instead of their being a rostrum for the businesslike and well-principled discussion of problems of party life and for revealing shortcomings, they were an opportunity only for advertising what had been achieved, by means of notorious reports on one's own activities. These reports on one's own activities by no means always reflected the true state of affairs, and as a result of their nonobjectivity and their onesidedness, they created an atmosphere of well-being and complacency, misinformed the party masses and the administrative agencies, thus inflicted harm not only on the education of Communists but also on party work, and undermined the democratic principles of that work.

A very important criterion for the level of the development of intraparty democracy is glasnost. "Without glasnost," V. I. Lenin wrote, "it would be ridiculous to speak of democratism." He also provided a definition of the essence of that principle. This means, V. I. Lenin pointed out, that in the party "everything is done openly."

Beginning with the Stalinist times, the Leninist idea of glasnost and openness in the CPSU was incorrectly equated with the providing of information. But these are not the same thing, although they do have much in common. Unlike glasnost, the providing of information deals only with that information which is transmitted by the mass information media and oral propaganda, or

that information which the party agency itself, in conformity with the statutes that are in effect or according to its own discretion, publishes about its activity.

But glasnost is primarily the right of every Communist to know that a particular party agency is engaged in and how it is operating. It is his right to be present at sessions and meetings being conducted by that agency, and to become acquainted with the party decisions and other documents. Broad glasnost, according to Lenin, is also the person's right to free, unhampered access to any nonsecret documentation, information, or materials linked with the work at the various administrative party levels. Obviously, not all these problems have been resolved in full measure to this day. And consequently that is why it is all the more necessary to build up the volume of the efforts to confirm glasnost in the party in the context of the corresponding resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

A practice that would seem to be instructive in its way was the practice of carrying out the principle of democratic centralism in the party's cadre work in the 1970's and early 1980's. Here the methods that received the preferential development were the antidemocratic ones—subjectivism; the taking of formal, nomenklatura approaches; the gravitation toward questionnaires to show that everything was proceeding well; and protectionism, when the knowledge of people began to be replaced by acquaintance with them, and the need to find the necessary organizers began to be replaced by the readiness to put in a good word for a friend, a relative, or a "hometown boy."

This led to many serious problems. The nomenklatura of the party committees as a specific form on the direct organization of work with cadres became a closed system. The influx of new people, especially non-party members, into it ceased. The nomenklatura workers began to be shifted up and down, but basically in a circle, flowing from the party agencies into the soviet and economic agencies, and then back again. Persons who were egregiously inefficient were rarely removed from the nomenklatura. What was formed was a vast, but closed caste of professional chiefs, who actually could not be removed and who possessed all the classic

attributes of bureaucratism: reverence of officials; official optimism; the observance of the forms and ceremonies involved in official correspondence; stagnant emphasis on routine; the fear of innovation or an opposing opinion; and bribery. This not only distorted the Leninist principles of the party's cadre work, but also the party's attitudes toward the masses, infringed upon the citizens' constitutional rights, and thus limited the cadre possibilities.

After the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 19th Party Conference, favorable theoretical and organizational prerequisites for democratizing all aspects of cadre work were created. But even on this correctly chosen path the success is not guaranteed automatically. It is very important to strive for a situation in which the cadre questions are resolved with a consideration of public opinion. However, as we have been taught by the negative experience of the past, it is even more important to define precisely who bears the personal responsibility for promoting a particular worker, to make a clear-cut notation of that in the official files, to make that information known to the public, and to assure that the person who made the recommendation is held strictly accountable in the event that his nominee fails. This is one of the most important guarantees of the correct selection, evaluation, and placement of cadres. If this procedure operated in the party, there would not have been any of those distortions in work with cadres that we have spoken so much about recently.

It must be remembered that the collective decisions of cadre questions, on which decisions the emphasis is currently is being made, without a person's individual moral responsibility can easily become a form of collective irresponsibility. And examples of this already exist.

When making conclusions from the lessons of the past, the party has currently assigned the task of completely restoring the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism. It is important for every Communist Party member to be aware that it is only on the paths of the resurrection and the complete implementation of Leninist principles of intraparty life that the mechanism of inhibition can be eliminated, and the forces of acceleration, the processes of reform and democratization that were begun in the party after April 1985 will receive the expanse that they need.

### Law on Conscientious Objection Considered

#### Soviets Urged To Support UN Resolution *18120070 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 34-37*

[Article by Bruno Koppeters: "Believers and Military Service"]

[Text] In March, 1987 the UN Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution which recognized the right to refuse to do military service in peacetime as the legitimate right to freedom of opinion, conscience and religion. Included in this resolution was the recommendation to all UN nations to introduce an alternative civil service. The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The Soviet Union abstained. A welcome surprise for many, since, earlier, the Soviet Union was always against such steps.

Several versions were used to explain the present position of the Soviet Union. Some observers considered that to prevent a serious blow at its prestige, the USSR tried to avoid isolation during voting. Really, a considerable part of the international peace movement considers the right of individuals refusing to serve in the army for religious convictions as an important criterion for evaluating the present reforms going on in the USSR. Others tried to find the explanation in the reorientation of Soviet policy in the sphere of security as well as in the new policy of glasnost. Soviet Peace Committee officials expressed the hope that new agreements on conventional armaments control are possible. That would make it possible to demobilize tens of thousands of people of call-up age, both in the East and the West, and people refusing to do military service could hope to get legal status. It is thought that the Soviet Union, by abstaining during voting, was adopting a wait-and-see policy, taking into account the possible development of events in this direction.

In any case, the resolution of the UN Human Rights Commission has become an important event for those people in the Soviet Union who refuse to serve in the army because of their pacifist views. For them this was an important step in the restoration of the right which the pacifist groups received in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution. On January 9, 1919 the Soviet government (Council of People's Commissars) issued a decree granting alternative civil service and even, under certain conditions, exempting completely from military service all religious pacifists.

#### Promising Beginning...

The adoption of this decree meant that the Bolsheviks recognized the establishment traditions in Russia of rejecting violence. Pacifist sects (Mennonites, Adventists and Dukhobors), separate members of Protestant religious communities (Baptists, for example) and followers of Tolstoy's teaching, "non-resistance to evil by

violence" were bitter opponents of the militarism of the Tsar government, and Lenin always considered them the Bolsheviks' allies. After the October Revolution, pacifist groups formed the United Council of Religious Communities and Groups which strived for legal recognition of the right to exemption from military service for religious convictions. Lenin agreed.

The tolerant attitude must strengthen the social basis of the new regime. There were also economic reasons for the union with pacifist sections. For example, the Mennonites were not only a large sect (with over one hundred thousand members) but also a wealthy one. Soviet Russia sustained serious losses during World War I and Civil Wars and could use profitably their technical experience in agriculture. More than that, this decree did not contradict Marxist criticism of religion. Lenin did not approve of the religious concepts behind rejections of violence but he did not consider that suppression was a suitable means in the struggle against such ideas. The doctrine which proclaimed the rejection of violence, as was stated then, mainly reflected cultural backwardness. Lenin supposed that this "reactionary" doctrine would gradually disappear during the revolutionary reconstruction of the whole social structure.

After the Revolution, the legal system in Soviet Russia was in disarray which was a considerable obstacle to observance of the decree. People's courts and military authorities did not always fulfill its requirements. Many people exempted from military service were imprisoned and some of them even executed. Nevertheless, thousands of persons of call-up age had the opportunity to take advantage of this decree during the first postwar years.

#### ...Destroyed by Stalin

From the beginning of the 20s there was conflict between the Soviet government and the United Council of Religious Communities and Groups which had the right to exercise certain influence on the whole procedure. That government accused the Council that, apart from protecting those exempted from military service, it abused its proxy by counterfeiting documents and launching pacifist propaganda. It was stated that such actions undermined the Soviet system. Later, the Council was removed from participation in the procedure. From 1923, only members of the pacifist sects which were against military service before the October Revolution had the right to do alternative service. Separate pacifists from other religious communities (for example, Baptists) did not have that right.

Stalin annulled the right to exemption from military service once and for all. In the eyes of Stalin, pacifism was not only reactionary, it must be rooted out by all possible means. More than that, the sects remained closed communities and, as such, did not meet the requirements of the state structure worked out by Stalin. Agricultural cooperatives formed by the members of

religious sects and followers of Tolstoy's teaching, which in the early 20s still received the support of the Soviet government, also did not correspond to the policy of collectivization of agriculture introduced by Stalin. In the 30s, many members of the sects were driven out from villages and deported to Siberia or to the barren lands in the North. Many of them were deprived of their property and died because of the hard conditions of life. Religious and cultural peculiarities of pacifist sects were considerably lost due to these repressions. At present, Soviet Christians adhere to pacifist traditions as before. Individuals who refuse to serve in the army are given long-term prison sentences. Apart from pacifists-Christians, the USSR peace movement also includes people who refuse to serve in the army for other, non-religious reasons.

It is unclear whether the new Party leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev is going to recognize the right of exemption from military service. The position of the USSR, which abstained during voting in the UN Human Rights Commission, is perhaps the first positive step in the restoration of the rights of people who refuse to serve in the army, rights they received after the October Revolution. In 1989 the UN Human Rights Commission will resume its work on the problem of exemption from military service. I would like to believe that the Soviet Union will not abstain during the voting, but support unambiguously the right of people to refuse to serve in the army.

**Lenin Decree on Religious Exemption Printed  
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[Text: "Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on Exemption From Conscription for Religious Convictions"]

[Text]

**Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on  
Exemption From Conscription for Religious Convictions**

1. Persons who cannot, because of their religious convictions, be called up, should be granted the right, by a decision of the people's court, to do, instead of military services, sanitary service, mainly in hospitals for infectious diseases, or some corresponding socially useful work of their choice.

2. Passing its decision on the replacement of conscription with another civic duty, the people's court sends an inquiry to the commission of experts of the Moscow United Council of Religious Communities and Groups about each particular case. The decision of experts must take account of the fact that certain religious convictions rule out military service and also that this person is acting sincerely and conscientiously.

3. The United Council of Religious Communities and Groups, by a unanimous decision, has the right to apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to exempt a person completely from conscription without replacing this service with another civic duty, if the inadmissibility of such replacement, from the religious or personal point of view, or that of sectarian literature, can be proved.

**Note:** The right to institute and conduct proceedings to exempt a certain person from conscription is granted both to the conscript and to the United Council of Religious Communities and Groups. Moreover, the latter is also granted the right to apply for the case to be tried at the Moscow people's court.

**V. Ulyanov (Lenin), Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Kursky, People's Commissar of Justice**

**V. Bonch-Bruyevich, Business-manager of the Council of People's Commissars**

Secretary: L. Fotiyeva

January 4, 1919, Moscow, The Kremlin

**Letters to Editor Discuss Issue**

*18120070 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 1, Jan 89 pp 34-37*

[Letters to the Editor]

[Text]

**Alternative Service**

I write to you with a feeling of sincere friendship and respect. We in Finland observe with interest the life in your country and positive changes that have been taking place in the Soviet Union. [as published] I'm worried about the fate of those young people who refused to serve in the army due to their religious or moral convictions and who get prison terms because of that. They say that they can be imprisoned up to for seven years....

As far as I know, in Poland a law is under discussions which envisages three-year alternative military service for adherents to philosophy of non-violence which prohibits them from serving in the army. Discussions on the possibility of introducing such alternative services are going on even in Hungary and the GDR. I also want to mention—with all my respect—Articles 3 and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which proclaims the right to life, freedom and security of all as well as freedom of thought, conscience and faith.

For all who regard your country with best feelings—I also belong to them—it will be a great joy to know that you also have an alternative non-violent service, this gives us hope.

I ask you to do the best to fulfill this goal.

Sincerely yours,

Lisa Toivanen Turku, Finland

**'We Are Not Allowed To Kill'**

I write to you to tell you of my concern for a young Estonian, and to ask if you would try to help him. His name is Taavi Kuusk. He was charged with "Evasion of regular call-up to active military service" and was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months imprisonment in a strict regime corrective labour colony. This young man is a Jehovah's [sic] Witness and has refused to do military service on conscientious grounds.

I wonder whether perhaps you could start a discussion in your journal about whether there should be a right to conscientious objection? And whether an alternative form of non-military service could be provided for genuine conscientious objectors? In Britain, in the last war, they sometimes worked as ambulance drivers and stretcher-bearers.

Perhaps I might mention that my daughter, Jane Kantish, recently translated a collection of Tolstoy's religious writings. It was published by Penguin publishers. I remember his account of a peasant who refused to do military service in the Tsar's army because "God forbids it. We are not allowed to kill." (I share his belief myself.) Perhaps Tolstoy's ideas would form an interesting starting point for a discussion of conscientious objection?

But, please, will you try to help this young man, who surely should be seen as a prisoner of conscience?

Yours sincerely,

Kantish Colchester, Great Britain

**Uzbek Deputy Procurator on Recent Tashkent Disturbances, Informal Groups**  
18300447 Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
25 Feb 89 p 4

[Interview with S.M. Mirsafayev, deputy procurator of the Uzbek SSR, by correspondent G. Figlin: "Protecting the Public and the Individual"]

[Text] [Figlin] Sirazhiddin Mirsafayevich, with what is the Uzbek Procurator's Office coming to the CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations? Has it analyzed the prerequisites for further development and improvement in this legislative area? How is compliance with, and implementation of, current legal ordinances assured?

[Mirsafayev] Like procurator agencies all over the country, we in the republic formulated suggestions for amending and supplementing legislation regulating national-state and interethnic relations. Discussion of the bills currently being prepared will be extensive as never before and everyone will have an opportunity to take part in it. However, judging by available data, we can already identify the basic categories of issues arousing legitimate public interest. These are, in the first place, the specific forms of implementing the principle that "strong republics mean a strong center," further perfection of Soviet socialist federalism, broadening of constitutional provisions governing national state development, and expansion of the de-facto independence of union and autonomous republics. This includes providing conditions for the development of bilingualism and multilingualism in the republics as an essential basis of mutual understanding. The population of Uzbekistan, as is known, includes more than 100 peoples and nationalities. That is why we have such a great need for such forms of satisfying national-cultural requirements as ethnic organizations, national cultural centers, clubs, and so on.

Taking into account the consequences of fomenting chauvinistic and nationalistic passions that have come to light in different parts of the country, including such grave ones as in Nagorno-Karabakh, the question of increasing penalties for violations of the law in the area of interethnic relations acquires special importance. In Uzbekistan, in particular, it is proposed to substantially expand Article 64 of the republic Criminal Code, which establishes penalties for promoting national discord and advocating racial or national exclusiveness.

So much for proposed areas of legislative action. As for compliance with and observation of existing laws and implementation of the constitutional principles of national equality of citizens, there are no major violations or distortions in basic issues of vital importance to the people of our republic. Available information makes it possible for us to refute with facts in hand those who would groundlessly assert the reverse. Judge for yourself. The Uzbek population of, say, Tashkent is 41 percent of the total, and Uzbeks make up 46.6 percent of the deputies of the Tashkent city soviet elected in 1987. Russians account for 38 percent of the inhabitants of the republic's capital and 38.6 percent of the Gorsoviet deputies. Tartars account for 7 percent of the Tashkent population and 4.8 percent in the city soviet. There are 2.5 percent Ukrainians in the population and 4.8 percent in the city soviet. Finally, 5.8 percent of the Gorsoviet deputies represent other nationalities. On the basis of these facts, can one claim any inequality of representation in government bodies?

Or take another sphere. The press has been writing a lot about problems of instructing children at school in their native language. We checked this. In Fergana Oblast, for example, there are 773 public schools; of these 647 schools teach in the Uzbek language, 35 in Russian, 36 in

Uzbek and Russian, 27 in Tajik, and 23 in Kirghiz. Furthermore, at the request of parents four schools of the oblast offer classes in the Crimean-Tartar language, which are attended by 213 schoolchildren. Instruction in native languages is organized similarly on the basis of the ethnic composition of the population in Namangan, Bukhara, Samarkand, Dzhizak, and Surkhan-Daryinskaya oblasts, which were also inspected.

There are difficulties, of course. But they are due not to the absence of schools but to the quality of instruction and shortage of textbooks and study aids, especially in the Kirghiz, Kazakh and Turkmen languages. This is a consequence of the lack of foresight and of procrastination on the part of local soviets, for which they are being held responsible.

[Figlin] Zirazhiddin Mirsafayevich, you have been speaking of a very important but relatively peaceful area of work. But the procurator's office must also react to situations which can in hardly be called peaceful. Take the events which took place in the neighborhood of the dormitories of the Tashkent Tractor Plant Production Association [TTZ]. Have the instigators been found? Has the procurator's office determined the causes of the events?

[Mirsafayev] At the root of the confrontation lie two unrelated events. In the evening of 18 February, near the supermarket in the TTZ-4 neighborhood of Tashkent's Kuybyshevskiy Rayon, there was an attempted robbery with the use of force. The victims were roomers in one of the TTZ dormitories. Criminal charges have been filed and an investigation is under way.

That same evening, approximately an hour and a half later, several people, also roomers from the TTZ dormitory, were beaten up in a route 13 streetcar. It was these two facts that sparked the response in the dormitories. The violence was put down by law-enforcement authorities. However, some people have attempted to depict the events in terms of an interethnic conflict, spreading rumors distorting the events around town.

The situation which developed February 18 in the TTZ dormitories is currently being analyzed by party, local government, and law-enforcement agencies and the necessary measures are being taken. But one thing is already apparent: the TTZ Production Association has been giving very little attention to work with young people in the dormitories. There are no public councils or counsellors in the dormitories. Dormitory roomers have nothing to do in the evening.

So what do we have? There is virtually no cultural-educational work. Even the most elementary living conditions are lacking, which causes quite justifiable resentment. Add to this the separation of young people from parental influence, and one can understand how they can be provoked into thoughtless actions.

Special attention must be given to ideological-education of young people. Speaking of its faults, we must self-critically recognize that propaganda of legal knowledge among young people still falls short of requirements. I am convinced that 90 percent of those involved in the Februry 18 disturbances weren't even aware that their actions, even in the form of a street march, but which failed to comply with legal requirements and had not been authorized by the local Soviet, were in violation of the law.

[Figlin] The so-called "informals" are asserting themselves ever more forcefully. Rallies and street marches are no longer out of the ordinary. Much has been said and written about how diversified it all is and the tact, attention and swift, error-free reaction law-enforcement authorities must display. There is probably no need to repeat this. Is a legal basis more reliable than the current one being created for such manifestations of public activism? One that would guarantee the rights of "informals," on the one hand, and increase their responsibility, on the other?

[Mirsafayev] At present a draft law on voluntary public societies and public action organizations and associations is being drawn up. This law, it is assumed, will replace the 1930 decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars on all-union associations and societies and the 1986 departmental decree on amateur interests associations. There will be a nationwide discussion of the new draft law. All I can say at this point is that the draft is much broader and more democratic than current legal regulations. In particular, it will give legal status to public associations. At the same time the new law will give the public movement a clearly socialist orientation.

The basic objective of both the legal reform as a whole and the formulation of legislation and consolidation of legality in the sphere of national-state and interethnic relations is to provide a legal mechanism that would guarantee protection of both society and the individual.

#### Doctor Interviewed on Narcotics, AIDS *18300421a Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 4*

[Interview with Director of the Georgian SSR Center for Biomedical Narcology Problems Gela Georgiyevich Lezhava, at a seminar on publicizing drug addiction problems in the press in Tbilisi, by correspondent Yelena Vlasova: "Drug Addiction Boomerang"]

[Text] My conversation partner was Director of the Georgian SSR Center for Biomedical Narcology Problems, doctor of medical sciences G. Lezhava. Your correspondent conducted this interview with Gela Georgiyevich during a seminar on publicizing drug addiction problems in the press that was held in Tbilisi.

[Vlasova] There is this parable in which a new boomerang was presented to an Australian who went out of his mind because he didn't know what to do with the old one. Does this not remind us of our present situation where "having discovered" drug addiction and prostitution in our midst, we later discovered AIDS? A certain overestimation of values has taken place. The threat of AIDS is compared with that of a nuclear war. In the meantime the prevalence of drug addiction has not been diminished nor has the rate at which it has been spreading, and the chances of surviving addiction are about the same as they are for AIDS...

[Lezhava] You are right, drug addiction is a most serious social curse. There has been a considerable growth in the number of drug addicts and toxic drug abusers in recent years. Officially, there are 65,000 addicts in the USSR, but in reality that figure is three to four times greater.

For a long time drug addiction had been viewed as "a virus from abroad," just as alcoholism at one time was considered to be a "relic of capitalism." We are struggling with drug addicts but not with drug addiction as a social vice and illness. Does this not remind you of the pathetically famous campaign against alcoholism (against alcohol, to be more precise)?

[Vlasova] Your Center is studying the effects that alcohol, toxic, and narcotic substances have on the body. Which of these three vices is the most dangerous?

[Lezhava] Perhaps some specialists might not agree with me, but the biggest problem is toxic drug abuse. We are convinced that by making some substances inaccessible we are stimulating the spread of others that are more dangerous. The current outbreak of toxic drug abuse is an illustration of that point. The action of toxic substances often results in feeble-mindedness, and sometimes to death. One way or the other after two to three years of abuse, a person cannot be returned to normalcy. Drug addicts can transition from stronger narcotics to weaker ones. That procedure is often used in the West as one way to treat drug addiction. The crude drug of "sniffers" has an identical action and different preparations can be successfully substituted for others. You might sometimes hear that well, after all we all understand the problem of drug addicts, but what can one do with under-age toxic drug abusers? You can't send them to prison, there are no statutes covering them. One can only report them to the school and parents, and let them take the necessary measures. And then it starts all over again: Are there sniffers?—then we must interdict, punish, and eradicate. Children who become toxic drug abusers experience a lack of love. Every child must feel that is needed by someone in the world. I am not talking about of children of poor parents—where can one find love and kindness there? But surely, jeans and a new tape recorder are also not quite love. There is also the factor of a lack of justice. Take the schools, for example. The demands made upon the children are identical, but their capabilities vary. In sensing himself to be an outcast in

school, and experiencing daily crises at home, a child, just like an adult, tries to "forget himself" and becomes a toxic drug abuser. The schools should have a psychotherapist who can understand the troubles of a child and who can prevent misfortune. But what can be said about this need if psychotherapy in our country is generally in the embryonic stage.

[Vlasova] According to the data of Western sociologists narcotics use is diminishing among young people. It has become fashionable "to say no." A campaign "to say NO to narcotics" is being successfully conducted in the senior classes of schools in the USA. In Hungary even ten-year olds are being shown a film about the pernicious force of narcotics. Prevention, prevention, and once again prevention...

[Lezhava] We have fallen behind both in the area of prevention and in the treatment of drug addicts and their social rehabilitation. The treatment of drug addicts abroad is largely being undertaken by non-governmental organizations. More often than not these are volunteer organizations such as Alcoholics Anonymous where everything is done from the heart and with maximum results. This is not treatment in the ordinary sense, but bringing a person out of his condition, social assistance. The person undergoing treatment stays in a clinic for 10 to 12 days after which comes the difficult period—the return to normal life. In our country the effectiveness of a hospital is close to zero. The methods for treatment are unacceptable so that there are hardly any persons who are willing to undergo voluntary treatment.

[Vlasova] Add to that the absurd campaigns like "Komsomol Guardianship Over LTP"...

[Lezhava] Drug addiction has become an exclusively police problem. The police are driving wide scale practices of criminal actions underground. We need a comprehensive state program for the control of drug addiction that would include not only the MVD and Ministry of Health, but the Ministry of Education, the mass media, etc.

[Vlasova] In Hungary, for example, that type of program was adopted in a period of just five days...

[Lezhava] To get a person to break the habit of narcotics is half the battle, although it is incredibly difficult. The main thing is to return him to society, to restore his family and vocational relationships. We need the help of psychiatrists, psychologists, teachers, jurists, and sociologists. After all it is incredibly difficult for a drug addict to get a job. In some countries there is a law that requires enterprises to hire a specified percent of persons with antisocial inclinations.

[Vlasova] Why is the attraction to narcotics so strong?

[Lezhava] Everything living is structured on incentives and punishment. The brain also has pleasure centers (incentives) and pain centers (punishments). Fifteen years ago a new class of substances was discovered, called endorphins (morphins produced by the person himself). They control these centers. Say, for example, a school pupil gets an 'A'—a morphin is secreted. The same thing happens when we watch an interesting film, eat tasty food, etc. When a narcotic is administered or injected the person gets a million dose level of morphin. The body adapts to just that dose. And then the person doesn't care nor is he disturbed or alarmed that his girl friend has left him, that his mother has become ill, or that a friend has died from an overdose of narcotics. Is everyone equally susceptible to drug addiction? I think that it all depends on the individual, just as in the case of smokers. Some get dragged into the habit at once, some become addicted gradually, some can easily quit the habit, and for others quitting is impossible...

[Vlasova] One of the myths of drug addicts is that "one can kick the habit"...

[Lezhava] Drug addiction is slavery. It is quite another thing that some can last longer than 10 years without medical assistance. In Central Asia the use of opium and hashish has been practiced since time immemorial. You will recall that in many films about the East you can see old men smoking "grass." The European variety differs from the eastern one primarily by its destructive and relentless nature. Why is there a "cultural use of narcotics"—such is what we shall call the eastern variety (which incidentally is not prevalent among our drug addicts)? I believe, and one can dispute this, that the addiction to "light" narcotics has a genetic base in the East, just like the addiction to wine in Georgia. But, I repeat, the whole horror is that our drug addicts are not at all "cultural" users.

[Vlasova] Do we have in our country examples of an unconventional treatment of drug addicts?

[Lezhava] There probably will soon be such an example in Georgia. We plan to organize the anonymous treatment of drug addicts near Tbilisi that will be followed by social rehabilitation.

[Vlasova] And what must we do to get rid of drug addiction?

[Lezhava] More socialism. When parents are occupied with their children, when a mother is occupied with her family, when we see not "a people" but a specific person and afford him the chance for self realization, when juveniles have a place to spend their free time, and who knows what else...

### Health Conditions in Uzbekistan Discussed

18300421b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
8 Feb 89 p 3

[Interview with USSR Ministry of Health Chief Specialist for Uzbekistan V. M. Cherepov by correspondent I. Khisamov: "Mission of Trustworthy Physicians"]

[Text] There were sixteen higher class specialists who underwent the All-Union multi-stage competitive examination for the right to become a trustworthy physician of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin. They initiated their mission in Uzbekistan. A description of their mission was the topic of a conversation between the UzTAG correspondent I. Khisamov and the leader of the group, Chief Special Trustworthy Physician of the Children's Fund, Chief USSR Ministry of Health Specialist for Uzbekistan V. M. Cherepov.

[Khisamov] Viktor Mikhaylovich, please explain what is a trustworthy physician.

[V.M. Cherepov] First of all this is a noble initiative on the part of the Soviet Children's Fund that is aimed at improving maternal and child care in the Central Asian region. We are all very familiar with the dramatic situation that has evolved here. Suffice to recall that Central Asia and Kazakhstan account for more than 40 percent of the children who die during their first year of life in our country. This region is marked by the highest maternal mortality rate. Among many other efforts the Children's Fund has decided to send at its own expense teams of trustworthy physicians to this region.

[Khisamov] How were they selected?

[V.M. Cherepov] The country's Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Health supported the initiative of the Fund. A national competition was announced. After the preliminary selections there were 220 candidates left. Then 55 were selected from that number. All of us were gathered for a two-week seminar in Moscow where we trained and underwent interviews.

The competitive examination commission comprised USSR deputy ministers of health and the Soviet Children's Fund, board members, and chiefs of the main administrations of the Ministry of Health. Factors taken into consideration for selection included professional knowledge, the candidates' views on the idea of the institute of trustworthy physicians itself, and problem-solving methods, overall culture, and erudition. The competitive examination commission also considered the status of maternal and child care in the regions from which the candidates originated as well as positive experience gained by them that might be applicable to the trustworthy physicians.

In short, after the selection process was completed, 39 persons were confirmed as trustworthy physicians of the Children's Fund and main specialists of the USSR

Ministry of Health. They were assigned to all of the republics in Central Asia, the Chimkent and Kzyl-Orda oblasts of Kazakhstan. The largest "team" consisting of 16 persons arrived in Uzbekistan.

[Khisamov] Please describe your own team.

[V.M. Cherepov] We have seven pediatricians, six sanitation physicians, two gynecologist-obstetricians, and a therapist. They represent the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kirghizia, Kazakhstan as well as Tataria, Bashkiria, Udmurtia, and other regions of Russia. I myself came from Karagand. In a word, our team is an international one. Our base stations have been organized in Tashkent, Nukus, Andizhan, Samarkand, Termez, Fergan, and Urgench. I will tell you right away that we were warmly greeted by the republic. We are concisely resolving all problems connected with settling all of our people and for setting up their living and working conditions. It is significant that we did not come for just one day...

[Khisamov] Incidentally, how long is your mission supposed to last?

[V.M. Cherepov] Initially, three years. Then there will be a new competitive examination for the next term. I can tell you that many years of difficult work lie ahead.

[Khisamov] Exactly what will that work entail?

[V.M. Cherepov] To describe it briefly: Our tasks include the organization of medical and inter-sector measures for the safeguarding, improvement of health, for reducing child morbidity and mortality, the introduction of advanced methods of medical services for women and children. We shall be actively soliciting trade union funds for improving women's working and living conditions and for providing medical services directly at the health stations of enterprises. We shall coordinate the activity of public organizations, particularly the women's soviets and the Red Crescent Society.

[Khisamov] But that is program for the entire ministry...

[V.M. Cherepov] But we will not be acting alone, but rather together with the local health authorities and Children's Fund divisions. The first weeks of our work in Uzbekistan have already demonstrated how very authoritative the Soviet Children's Fund is. Our Children's Fund representative identification papers are opening all kinds of doors. Our proposals are willingly considered at the enterprises. I have just returned from Bukhara. We have concluded an agreement with the director of the local cotton plant to purchase imported equipment for the oblast hospital. In Tashkent I visited the Religious Muslim Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan where I was greeted by their complete support of our efforts and readiness to cooperate.

The Red Crescent Society is contributing money to our program for the rehabilitation of children in boarding schools, children's and infant homes. And the method of our operation will be developed by the Tashkent Institute for the Advanced Training of Physicians.

[Khisamov] What the program entail?

[V.M. Cherepov] Many of the children in these institutions are suffering from a wide variety of physical, nervous, and mental illnesses. This means that we must have a variety of methods to correct their mental state and physical health. This is what we are attempting to do. In conjunction with the republic's Ministry of Health our Fund is working out a regional program to reduce child and maternal mortality. Previously, such programs were developed for the entire Union, although quite different measures were required for the various regions.

A pediatric center is being created at the Samarkand International Pedagogical Institute [SaMPI] that will serve children from all of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. A department for treating kidney diseases is already in operation. And by the end of 1990 the Center will incorporate more than 20 specialized subdivisions with clinics accommodating 1,000 beds. The republic department of the Children's Fund has allotted 100,000 rubles for the construction of this major center.

[Khisamov] Maternal and child health in Uzbekistan is not only a medical problem but also a social and ecological problem...

[V.M. Cherepov] Absolutely. As you see, our team includes several sanitation physicians and epidemiologists. We have placed two of our representatives into the republic headquarters for saving the Aral Sea. We shall try to influence decisions on ecological problems. Otherwise our efforts will not produce the necessary effect. I also should like to say this. The state is allocating increasingly larger sums for providing free food to children in needy families. However, these funds are not being utilized in all of the republic's oblasts. The variety of foods should be expanded, and the ispolkoms of the soviets should make sure that such foods reach the consumers. Otherwise, as we have seen, the foods are at the bases but not in the stores.

[Khisamov] Which problems do you think demand immediate resolution?

[V.M. Cherepov] First, a strengthening of the material-technical base of the health sector. Most therapeutic institutions, both children's and maternity homes, do not have sewer systems or hot water. And that is on top of a poor water supply problem. There is an acute shortage of pediatric beds. We need to take extraordinary, I would even say fire-fighting measures. But there is little evidence of such concern in the localities. I visited Samarkand. The oblast children's hospital is located in barracks quarters, and the new building has

been under construction for more than 10 years with no end in sight. In Bukhara they can't seem to finish building a maternity home accommodating 100 persons. At the present time up to 40 percent of all investments into the medical sector is being allotted to child and maternal care in the republic, and those allocations have been increased by several times. Therefore those funds should be utilized and undertake a priority basis construction of obstetric-gynecology stations, rural district, and central rayon hospitals.

And if one takes a closer look, then one can see that the current investments are clearly insufficient. Judge for yourself: In Uzbekistan children make up one-half of the population. Then if you add women to that number you will see that 75 percent of the Uzbekistan inhabitants fall within the area of child and maternal care. Therefore, the financing there should reflect that proportion.

The second most important problem is the low level of medical personnel skills, particularly in the rural hospitals. Much work must be done here with the medical institutes and schools and in the system of raising the qualifications of personnel.

A third problem is sanitation education. The trustworthy physicians are obligated to hold regular meetings with the public, at industrial enterprises, and on the farms. A reorganization of sanitation education is already under way. Health centers are being created at the present sanitation education homes. Those homes will combine propaganda for a healthy life style with their own rehabilitation work. The homes will have their own medical and physical culture clinics.

In the near future we will hold a republic conference dealing with medical-social aspects of a healthy family life. Participants will include supervisors of oblast health services, scientists, and practicing physicians. There will also be specialists from the All-Union Center for Maternal and Child Care. Our invitations have been accepted by clerical officials, both Islamic and Christian. We have found many points of agreement with them pertaining to views on the physical and moral improvement of the family status. Cooperation with them promises to be useful.

[Khisamov] Incidentally, there have been broad and pointed discussions in our republic about problems pertaining to family planning and birth control. There are quite a few people who believe that the regulation of this sphere is amoral...

[V.M. Cherepov] I know about those arguments. But the question does not pertain to birth control, but the observation of set periods of time to enable the mother to regain her strength. It has been proven that when the interval between births is from two to three years, the infant mortality rate decreases by four to five times. But you know we come across cases where a woman gives birth every year, and sometimes even more frequently.

This results in premature births, hypotrophy, and the deterioration of the mother's health. At the same time if one follows the recommended interval it is still quite possible to have the desired number of children. Incidentally, as I read recently in MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA, the Koran too stipulates that there must be thirty months between births.

[Khisamov] Viktor Mikhaylovich, in Uzbekistan it is not by hearsay that people know about the activity of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin. Hundreds of physicians and nurses of good will have come to us as part of the All-Union "Health Landing Force." We greatly value this fraternal international assistance. We hope that our mission in Uzbekistan will also be successful.

**Reportage on Drug Addicts at Moscow Hospital  
18300364 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in  
Russian No 8, 22 Feb 89 p 13**

[Report by Oleg Moroz: "Public Health"]

[Text] When people talk about risk groups in connection with AIDS they rarely divide them by the degree of risk. And this risk group, and this. . . As a matter of fact, the risk is not identical.

From the foreign press:

"Among the population of the United States and Europe they clearly single out contingents among whom the prevalence of AIDS is especially high. These are homosexual males and drug addicts, those who use drugs intravenously, recipients of blood, and hemophiliacs.

In the United States, homosexuals constitute 73 percent of those ill with AIDS, drug addicts—17 percent. . .

In Europe, among the sick Europeans, the same proportions of the basic risk contingents are preserved." The drug addicts, as we see, are risk group No 2.

The third narcological department of the 17th Moscow City Hospital. The department has 80 beds. . .

"Those who want to be cured here are 50 percent," Vladimir Vladimirovich Nazarov, the head, attests his department. "Although not all of them, of course, will get it." Among the other 50 are those who want to continue. And 25 percent do not consider themselves to be sick at all. They believe that they are healthy. This is their way of life. What are they doing here? They have simply surrounded them with little flags, like wolves. And they rest in bed here. . .

. . . Georgiy Z. 37 years old. Such a reliable man. Of intelligent appearance. Glasses. A splendid head of grey hair. Could go for a teacher. Or an engineer. In actual fact—a medical attendant. By education. But in terms of

work—a barber. Later on it turned out: As a medical attendant he worked for quite a short time. As a barber—for 2 years. Also an ancient business.

He thinks: What does the journalist expect of him—sincere repentance. "Life has been lived. . . . What remains? Only to punish oneself. . . . And, correspondingly—to ponder. . . . How this will be reflected in posterity."

But it is late to ponder. The 17-year old son of Georgiy is a fatal drug addict [toksikoman].

Georgiy has been in compulsory treatment several times. In so doing, he successfully simulated schizophrenia, instead of the zone he ended up in the psychiatric hospital.

In addition to narcotics, he had still another passion—"discomania." Hard drinking. Against this evil he fought again with the help of narcotics. Fire with fire. . . .

He started to inject himself in 1967—or 1968. . . . He already does not remember exactly when. Everything became confused.

"Basically I shot opiates. And what else there to shoot up? Promedol [not further identified]. If there was. We regarded it as so-so. . . . A light drug. Then there was nokseron [not further identified], and codeine. . . . Almost without prescriptions. Take it—I don't want to.

Georgiy enumerated the narcotics nostalgically and pensively.

"One could buy morphine. It cost 2-3 rubles. . . ."

Georgiy speaks slowly, with difficulty, not very loudly, as if conserving strength for rending the air.

During the past few years, as he says, he reached the end of his tether. His liver was destroyed. Disability. Cirrhosis. Lately he has been shooting up with any pharmaceutical sediment. A narcotic—if possible. But increasingly less and less. . . . Now the drugs are dirty. It is not enough that they are dirty, they are expensive. And they are becoming more expensive.

"Yes, previously they burnt this poppy-seed in the kitchen-gardens, in my childhood, I remember. It was not needed. But now a glass of such poppy-seed costs 100 rubles. What is more, you have to search for it. Moreover, even there they manage to cut it off, and so on. . . . And dilute, and cheat. . . . And they make opium out of it which makes a man shake. A person who is not prepared can simply depart. . . . Excuse me for speaking so frankly. . . . It is possible to play blind-man's-buff.

In Georgiy's speech intelligent structure and slang stuff-ing get on peacefully.

How much money does he need for narcotics? I do not expect a completely sincere answer. Considerable money is required, and at once another question is on the tip of the tongue: Where is it obtained?

"Previously, 5 years ago or so, to have about 100 rubles a day. A hundred and more. Later slightly less. Until this agiotage with poppy-seed began. Until they began to clear the fields with herbicides. . . ." "But now I make do with 50 rubles," he says modestly; indeed, a kolkhoz farmer, who receives a pension of 30 rubles a month (only recently an increment was made). 50 rubles—a day! This is for one "drug." Not to mention the rest.

However, the other needs which drug addicts have are indeed modest. With them, everything is concentrated on narcotics.

"So what, you have lowered the norm?"

"It is not that I lowered it. . . . The organism did the lowering. . . . All the same I have begun to fear death. . . . "Here. . . .," he concludes his speech unexpectedly simple-mindedly. It was too late for him to start to fear death. The doctors say: He did not have long to live. . . .

"My liver hurts very much. . . . The liver was poisoned, the liver was ruined. In a section it will crackle—cirrhosis. . . . Of reddish color. How many of them I saw! And I never thought that I will have the same."

This Georgiy knows very well. He worked as a medical orderly in a morgue. He would have us believe that even now this is his basic money earned on the side—the freezing of corpses.

"I have been engaged in freezing all my life. Previously there were simply a bit sharper thrusts. I had energy, it was easier to move. Two-three calls a day. It happened that I did not let the taxi go. Badly and poorly, you have 200 rubles. If you understand what you are doing, it is possible to set something aside for a rainy day. There are no complaints about me. Even during the summer I froze 3-4 days. You know, in the summer, how? There you feel every section. . . . You palpate it. . . . Glycerine and formalin—everything conscientiously."

The doctor, I see, is making signs, shakes his head. Afterwards he explains: All this is invention—Georgiy is not able to do any work anymore.

His family has long ago fallen to pieces. The son, it is true, lived with him the last few years. Nevertheless, looking after is needed. The 17-year old lad.

It would have been better had there not been this looking after. It would have been better had he moved somewhere else in another place during these years. He stole into someone else's room. He was caught. He is now undergoing psychiatric examination.

About all of this Georgiy tell in the same slow, dull voice. A smooth voice, without inflections. Without any emotions. As if not about his own son.

About the fatal drug addiction of his son he speaks as about something that is not serious. As about some prank, to which the district militia militia officer did not properly attend.

"Well, ten boys gathered there in the basement. . . . Sixth and seventh class. . . . The same age. . . . One can say, puerile. But the district militia man did not give a damn. The district militia man drank, squandered away the apartments on drink. . . . Then he left. And he did not go just anywhere, but left as deputy chief of the sobering-up station."

"So! That means the district militia man is guilty that your son became a toxin addict," the doctor who was present during our conversation says. "You, thus, have a full alibi?"

"Well, why?" Georgiy suddenly remembers. "I am guilty, of course. . . . First of all."

His complete spinelessness, apart from the rest, is perceptible in the absolute inability to object, to stand on his own feet. Here he would have us believe that he has schizophrenia—with this diagnosis he was in the loony bin [psikhushka]. The doctor objects: He does not have schizophrenia—they have crossed him off the register. He gladly agrees that he "played the fool." Another time he begins to tell us that his cirrhosis of the liver is from vodka, and not from narcotics. The doctor once again disagrees: Narcotics also enter your liver—among drug addicts cirrhosis of the liver is not less prevalent than among alcoholics. Georgiy here, too, lets himself be easily persuaded: "Yes, from narcotics, too."

The fatal drug addiction of his son, he noticed about 2 years ago.

"He was probably about 15 years old. I come home one time—he is sitting, with the music turned on, darkness. . . . For me, this is already suspicious, when they listen to music in the dark. Darkness—this is a big thing. It means, something here is not in order. He, by the way, is indifferent to alcohol. . . . So there, darkness. I abruptly turned the light on. He turns toward me and looks through me. The familiar stare. Thank God, I have seen them all my life. I ask: "You took what?" "Yes, I, yes, we. . . ." "All right," I say, "just don't poison yourself. You inhaled, perhaps?" "Yes." "And," I say, "how do I hurt you now! Scoundrel! So this will be the last time!" What is the use talking to him!"

Indeed, what is the use. If the father himself is a drug addict.

Here, too, he agreed.

"Yes, I talk with him about something, and he says to me: "And you?" I to him: "Our childhood was different. . . ." "What different [childhood]? How was it different?"

Yes, for the Georgiy's generation, stories about "another childhood" already do not work. There was already neither war nor post-war starvation. . . .

He takes drugs together with his girl friend.

"I have a girl friend. An old girl friend—drug addict. But she has a peculiarity: Every time after she takes drugs, she hurls and breaks everything. She shouts: "This is the last time!" But in the morning, when the "crashing bit" begins with her. . . . This is called "crashing," Georgiy explains. "The abstinence syndrome, so to speak. . . . So there, when the "crashing" begins, she starts to swear at herself: "I am an old so and so. . . ." Self-flagellation, of no use to anyone. . . .

"Yes, chuck her!" a young woman doctor, who has come for a probation period from Krasnodar, advises him.

"How do you chuck her? Who will pick her up?" Then he adds: "And who will pick me up?"

During our entire conversation, this was the most human.

I ask whether drug addicts talk about AIDS.

"No, to tell you honestly. I did not once here anything about it."

In the department, there is a special stand—How to Protect Oneself Against AIDS. However, it is of no interest to the drug addicts.

"But if something were hanging there about how to prepare some kind of new potion potion!" Nazarov gestures hopelessly.

"Yes, then only "highs" would be discussed," Georgiy confirms. "But no one there is interested in AIDS. The conceptions of asepsis are the most elementary: Took the needle, washed it thoroughly. . . . with unboiled tea. . . and let's go! What kind of AIDS is there!"

Also ineffective is the argument that abroad the illness already cutting down drug addicts in a broad stroke.

"I thought about this," Georgiy says. "Perhaps, there is a kind of sabotage there. . . ."

As regards sabotage, we know all about that.

When I first came to Nazarov's department, he was trying to sort out with his patients the next extraordinary event. Someone brought hashish into the department. They palmed it off on a lad who had not once been

convicted, for whom this gift, had the administration been less discriminating, would have been fraught with consequences (he himself, naturally, did not know about this at all).

"When a scoundrel becomes a drug addict," Nazarov says, "his baseness grows many times over. If a man was not a scoundrel, he will not become a scoundrel. Of course, some negative qualities will be added to him—falsity, irresponsibility, and something else. . . . But the baseness of the scoundrel who takes to drug addiction increases a hundredfold."

I don't know. I am not convinced that this is so. I believe that the drug addict is capable of corrupting any soul.

Not so long ago, Vasiliy L., 30 years ago, as they say, without any definite occupation, came here for treatment. During his absence, his friend and drug addict came to his apartment. He rang the door bell. At home—the mother of Vasiliy. She asks: "Who?" "Sasha. I brought a cassette. . . . I borrowed [it] from him. . . . She opened. The son's friend threw himself on her, pressed her against the wall, and pushed an iron rod against her neck. . . . This is how the murder was carried out. All for the sake of carrying off a video tape recorder. "Elektronika." Priced at 1,200 rubles.

The most interesting thing, however: The son of the murdered woman, having learned about what happened, was depressed not so much by the death of his mother, as by the loss of the equipment. When it was found, his grief vanished as if by magic.

Who, the question is, is the scoundrel? Only the murderer?

Everything gets confused in the conception of the drug addict. All vital values. The great and the little are changed here and there.

"A narcotic is like the devil," says Nazarov. "It takes a person into its hands. The person becomes its slave. His entire life becomes directed toward one thing—where to get, how to get. Whoever can obtain, he is nice. The range of relations gradually changes. Slowly everything that he valued previously passes to the background—the family, work. . . . All of this is already no longer needed. . . .

A few more patients from Nazarov's clinic.

. . . Vadim P. 35 years old. A bearded man, who enjoys indisputable authority among the drug addicts.

Absolutely inclined—to get stuck. Although just recently, during the past summer, he completed raids for poppy-seed—in the vicinity of Moscow, and in more remote places. Kharkov, Orel, Kiev, Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk. . . . In the south, as Nazarov tells it.

Two years ago, in our garden plot, a woman neighbor, who lived there permanently, complained: Someone is roaming about at night, some kinds of shadows. . . . the light of lanterns. . . . and in the mornings—the traces of meals. . . . Who needs what? Terrifying to the woman alone. She battens down the blinds and crawls into a corner. . . . After a week, everything became clear. A patch of poppy had been harvested. Drug addicts had tended it, they were waiting for the harvest.

Was it not Vadim who was there with his friends?

Last year already no one sowed poppies. It is a pity. Poppies have beautiful blooms.

Vadim's liver has also been destroyed. Stomach ulcer.

Married. Two children. He is terribly afraid, as if they had not found out. . . . It is a rare case when "criticism" is not lost, as the doctors say. He has been shooting drugs, give or take, for 20 years already. . . .

Two previous convictions. Both for narcotics. Worked as a driver. Drove a minister. Then he "flew" for the first time. Later on [he worked] as a metalworker. . . . Also earned pretty good money—over 300 [rubles]. But for a drug addict, this, consider, is nothing. . . . The last years he has not been working.

"The dose, it gradually grows. . . . I feel, I can already no longer work. . . . In the morning I got up—I had to have drugs, for lunch—drugs for sure. And in the evening—to take already. . . . In order for life to be interesting."

An interesting life, as a matter of fact: The man is of age, the head of a family, he does not bring home a single penny. Everything is up to the wife, everything is up to the wife. . . .

But this, of course, is not the main misfortune.

The dose was very great. . . . Up to 40 cubes. . . .

Yes, a large dose. Approximately twice exceeding the average dose. Why be surprised that the liver is destroyed, and the rest. . . .

True, a great deal still depends on the sort of poppy-seed. "Cubes" still do not tell everything. . . .

Vadim is one of those who prefer the extraction of drugs to purchase. "Natural economy." Expensive poppy-seed. Moreover, to obtain it is impossible.

"You know, like a squirrel stores mushrooms and cones for the winter, that's how I stored poppy-seed."

"With every year, however, the storing became more and more difficult. Several fields they destroyed. Others—they guarded more closely. They sowed undersized varieties: It is impossible to conceal oneself, everything is visible from towers and helicopters. . . . On the roads there are State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate posts everywhere."

"You were not caught?"

"If I had been caught, I would not be sitting here in front of you. . . ."

How many times during these conversations have I not heard about the difficulties with the extraction of drugs. On the one hand, that is good, on the other. . . . The demand is not decreasing! At such moments, the mafia appears on the horizon. Organized crime. In terms of the overall situation, it must arise. And the news are heard—it is appearing, it is arising in the intoxicating drug cloud.

Vadim is a decisive man. Having decided to get treatment (true, the wife played a role here, too, in this decision), he destroyed everything he had obtained with such difficulty. . . . Worth 5,000 rubles, as he says. . . .

"I left only enough to make it to the department, so as not to crash."

The "crashings" began in the hospital. They lasted for 15 days. . . .

A heroism of a sort, too.

Moreover, where was this heroism for 20 years? Closer to 40, many suddenly think. When there already is no choice. A little too late. Vadim started to shoot drugs in the camp. Before then, he managed without injection. This to the discussion of drugs in the zone.

"Do understand, hemp and poppy-seed are no problem there. And we have such masters, who can make a needle from a simple blade. . . . From foil. . . . a syringe."

Needles from a blade—this is still not amazing. Everyone, most likely, heard how zeks [prisoners] managed to build a helicopter from a chain saw, on which they deserted an "official business trip." Great is the Russian inventive genius!

And with this needle, intricately rolled from a razor, 10-15 people shoot drugs. Here it is no longer a matter of discussions about asepsis and sterility. You can't manage without infections. Vadim shows me the traces of abscesses on his legs. It pays off for a virus to strike in this turnover. . . .

The supply of drugs to the camp has been set going. The mechanism works with precision, though my interlocutor asks me not to ask him questions about either the concrete, pertinent path of its delivery, or about any "safety-valves": For the betrayal of secrets, severe punishment is imposed. . . .

"When you are prison, they "warm you up," when you get out, you "warm somebody up. . . ." In the drug zone, you can obtain everything. Everything! And where I was imprisoned, it came to the point where you went to the store and purchased poppy-seed. . . ."

Such is labor reeducation. However, the legal sale of poppy-seed—this is, of course, not characteristic. This is the objective of note of some concrete colony, of some place of our immense state. In our state, as is well known, one can encounter and see everything.

In the zone, everything is much cheaper—10 to 15 times.

Vadim has bad veins in his arms. . . .

"And they shoot drugs in their leg veins. . . . And into their jugular and their temporal veins. . . . Even under the tongue. Wherever there is a vein. Every drug addict knows, which vein works for him. Which one will absorb, which one has begun to develop thrombosis. See what has remained of the vein? . . . It is being burnt up."

He shows me his arms.

This I do not understand at all. I speak honestly. This is beyond my comprehension. If blood has to be taken from my veins, I await this procedure with horror. Recalling also that the nurses in our country are unable to do this. They don't hit. They pierce through the vein. A rare one will do it carefully. I remember that one of them put up such a fuss that I fainted. . . .

For the drug addict this is all nothing.

"They do this very well," Nazarov says. "Here, not long ago, they tried to attach a medicine dropper. The attaching was done by a physician who previously had worked in reanimation. Like he should be able to. . . . The drug addict has bad veins. The physician picked and picked and picked to the point where the drug addict became angry, pulled out the needle, took the arm slantwise like this—he demonstrates—with his teeth pulled the tourniquet tight and "in reverse" precisely hit. Into the small, narrower than a match, vein: "Here," he says, "this is how it is done, doctor, take a look!"

Sometimes the doctors ask the drug addicts to help attach a medicine dropper for their comrades.

"The pain from the prick for the sake of a drug—this is no pain for a drug addict. And at the same time, another pain he will not endure. If he bruises himself, breaks his

leg, he will wear himself completely out. And any hospital will wear itself out with him. Or appendicitis, a perforated ulcer—he will wear out the entire personnel. . .

. . . From one of the people with whom he kept company, Vadim caught hepatitis; there proved to be a man who had this disease.

"I was fourth. . . And still I became infected."

What is surprising here? A virus cannot count."

"The idea of boiling the syringe thoroughly does not enter the mind?"

"You understand. . . The situation is as follows. . . You will be looked upon like a lunatic even if you so much as mention it. . . There is extract of brick-tea, and it will wait when they boil the syringe? Simply somehow unreasonable, unreliable. The conversation is only: "Let's go, let's go!" and "Faster, faster!"

The first ones to "move" are those who have good veins. So as not to delay.

"Since I don't have them, I sometimes sit for 2 hours at a time and prick myself. You understand? To make one injection—2-3 hours. . . It came to the point that I broke the "machine." Already did not endure it: The entire "machine" into the blood. . . "Bayan" . . .

"Machine," "bayan"—these are all names for a syringe. Drug addicts, like criminals, have their own special name. Two hours—that is, of course, if a man shoots drugs alone.

"In company, they distribute everything quickly, find a vein, and someone else injects. . . I am unable to hit myself in the neck, of course. . . Or in the temple. . .

The efedronshchiki [efedron users] have large groups. Those shooting mak—2-3 people. Four.

"The efedron users are young people. There are people there who are 20. Very convenient for the militia: They pack a truck. . ."

The question like a one on a questionnaire: What is the news about AIDS, are there discussion in their midst?

"Yes, now terribly. . . There are discussion," Vadim answers. "But you know what the point is. . . All are broken up into groupings, and within each all know who is sick with what, who transmitted what, who associates with whom. . ."

Everyone has his reassuring agenda. Only not to look truth in the face.

I ask Vadim, what he thinks: The young people here, in the department, in the hospital, are they inclined to give it up?

"You know, hardly. . . The only talk is about efedron, efedron, efedron. . . Formulas, calculations, how to prepare it more easily."

. . . One of these youngest and cursed, enigmatic and mysterious. A metal rocker. . .

(Nazarov regrets that he cannot shkow me the "fascist. . ." He hanged himself.

"Yes, he had fascist signs all over his body, even a pricked SS-shoulderstrap. . . At the beach, he had better not undress. . . He has the same symbols on the arms and chest. . .

But this, too, I will report to you)

Vyacheslav D. 23 years old. Worked at a department store. Now he does not work. Smoked hashish in the toilet. They "calculated. . ." They started to pin him down, they removed him from the tray. . .

"And what, the tray—is it advantageous?"

"That is not the word—I could send my wages to the Peace Fund. In a day I obtained as much as my wages. . . They say to me: "Let's take off a 5-ruble note." For a bottle, that is. And I to them: "I," I say, "despise this business." With this drinking bout there are only troubles. In my time, I spent a term in prison—all for a drinking-spree. If I am stricken, and anyone so much as speaks a word to me, I already do not answer for this person's life."

He spent time in prison for fighting, for resistance to the militia. . . My talk with him, however, does not convince me that the replacement of vodka by a narcotic had a beneficial influence on his violent disposition.

On his chest, from underneath his T-shirt, an emblem can be seen: A skull with cross-bones and the inscription: "Heave [as published] Metal".

"Metall", I say, "is written with two "l's".

"That is in German, but in English—with one."

Educated kids.

"You show what you have on the right shoulder," Nazarov says.

Vyacheslav rolled up his sleeves: An eagle with a swastika in its claws and the three letters "K" with exact periods—"K.". Still another foreign inscription: "White Power."

However, the emblems are a souvenir of the zone.

Every night I hear the crackle of motorcycles at my home under the windows and every week on television—discussions to the effect that the rockers should be united in sports sections.

"You assemble in Luzhniki?"

"In Luzhniki, young kids get together, but serious people—in other places."

The younger the man, the more willingly they make use of this word—"young kids."

I am interested in the ideology of the metal rockers. I have already heard something, but details I don't know.

"Well, we love music—heavy rock. . . . We are fighting for the freedom of existence. . . . You understand, we have all the principles—of anarchists. We deny all authority. Any authority, as Lenin said, is force."

"Yes, there are such words. But we will still have to come to this—for it to be without authority."

"Well, we have a country that is not based on the rule of law [nepravovaya]. . . ."

"Highs don't interfere with riding on a motorcycle?"

"They do not hinder me. I do not have hallucinations, nothing. . . ."

However, later he confirms that the reaction disappears. For this reason, during the nightly races he tries to manage without drugs.

"I will not brag, but no militiaman has caught up with me even once."

How is that, in the newspapers they wrote: The militia has purchased "BMW's", in seconds it picks up break-neck speed.

"I know these "wheelbarrows". White ones, with the letters "MOS". It has two robust accumulators hanging from the back. . . . I will not run away from it directly—I go in groups, in groups. . . . And they usually fall into these groups, they captivate with the accumulators. And if I were to smoke to my heart's content and shoot drugs before these, where will I disappear to in order to get away from them? If they catch up, they take away neither the documents nor the motorcycles, they simply come out with clubs. . . . That, they say, is easier to understand."

"And there are no "fascists" among your people?"

He grins:

"Well, how not! Of course, there are."

Concerning the Ku Klux Klan emblem:

"That is the result of stupidity. At one time I was a hippie. Then the movement of the Nazis sprang up, and I liked them very much."

"Why did you like them?"

"Because of their infancy—because of their courage and insolence."

The former hippie clipped his hair and bought a brown shirt.

The enthusiasm passes, but the traces on the chest and on the arms remain.

"Well, no," my interlocutor objects, "I have had an allergy to Negroes since childhood. At one time, we even became involved in. . . . Here our Russian girl goes with a Negro. . . . We let him go, but we cut the girl's hair close to the skin. . . ."

How is this to be reconciled with the repudiation of force? He is a muddlehead.

He agrees about the muddlehead.

"Yes, and I already myself do not know how and what. I have now decided to go to the bottom. To sink in. To try a normal way of life. To see what will come of this."

From the syringe Vyacheslav was saved by chance. At the moment, when everything was to start, when he was inevitably to "sit on the needle," he exceeded the portion. His friends suggested "to sweat out". Naturally, with a small initial dose. He began to boast: "What, I drink less vodka than you? Stick me, as much as yourself!" They did stick him, as much as themselves. . . .

"I came to myself after 8 hours. The tongue pierced through with a pin—so that I would not suffocate. . . . Three more days, and I came to my senses. I did not like it. . . ."

For a long time? All these "sweating-rooms" and "warmings up" blaze with heat, swirl with steam. You jump out of one bath-house—and you get into another.

With girls, relations are simplified. True, Vyacheslav would have us believe that among his friends everyone has his own girl friend, but among others. . . .

"Basically it is the minors who bite. When they see my "wheelbarrow"—everything shines, the eagle with the swastika, everything as it should be—they fall."

"I just said: Eagle—this is due to youthfulness, out of stupidity...."

And how do others react to the swastika? Vyacheslav starts to explain to me that Hitler did not invent the swastika—it is an ancient symbol, which existed long before Hitler. Entirely correct, but few passers-by know about this. For our people, this symbol has a definite meaning. And then the eagle with the swastiaka is not related to antiquity. . . .

He again agrees.

"Correct. All of these symbols on the motorcycles of the rockers are there in order to tease their entourage a little."

I do not even ask this one about AIDS. Useless.

During my last visit of Nazarov's clini, too, an incident took place. From Sergey P., who had entered the department, they took away a hidden syringe with a narcotic. As a sign of protest, Sergey decided to raise a mutiny. He began to incite his ward neighbors. Nobody agreed. In a fit of temper, he called all of them "billy-goats. . . ." But this is already a serious matter: In prison jargon "billy-goat" is a pederast. To remain in the department was already impossible. He swallowed a thermometer. He found a way out of the situation. They brought him to the First City [Hospital], where they extracted the thermometer with a gastroscope. They intended to take him back to Nazarov's department. Not waiting for this, Sergey ran away. . . .

Such is a rather common event.

Nazarov shows me the syringe with three cubics of "sultyga" [not further identified]—a yellow, uninviting liquid. The syringe is made of plastic, for one-time use, but the drug addict, naturally, used it countless times. It is dirty, well-used, to the rod two burnt, equally soiled, matches are fastened with a piece of elastic. In order for it not to come lose. A long, curved needle. . . . With this dirty needle they get into the innermost channels of life created by nature, mixing in there a pseudo-life, and later—only death.

#### 1988 Counternarcotics Program in Turkmenia Summarized

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[Article by S. Bogdanov: "What Is Preventing Solution of the Drug Addiction Problem? The 'Poppy' Business"]

[Text] In 1988, the internal affairs organs put an end to the criminal activity of Ashkhabad resident A. Ryazayev after more than a ton of drugs had passed through his hands.

The struggle against drug addiction in Turkmenia has its own special features. Dried poppies [koknar] and opium have been used by Turkmens, as well as other peoples of Central Asia, as a medicine since ancient times. The old people not only have been using the drugs themselves in view of everyone, but have been permitting quacks to "cure" infants for them.

The youth regarded drugs indifferently until they saw a business in it. And indeed, if 1 kilogram of opium costs 8,000 rubles on the "black market" in Turkmenia, why not make some profit from this? Especially as a serious struggle against the "white death" was begun only in recent years.

But steady trading and transportation connections had already been organized before this with the Ukraine, Estonia, and other regions in the country, right up to the Far East. The "Afghan" conduit was also used intensively one time. Not only the drugs produced in Afghanistan that were confiscated, but the cases in which Soviet servicemen who were arrested for holding contraband attest to this.

The state of affairs in the republic is changing for the better today. An absolute majority of the transportation routes for importing drugs have been cut off. Medical institutions, warehouses, and even pharmacies are being particularly checked by internal affairs organs. The comprehensive "Mak" [Poppy] program, which is aimed at uncovering and destroying the illegal plantings of poppies and hemp, is being conducted every year.

#### "MAK-88"

Twice a year, in April and October, when the poppies and hemp results emerge, an active struggle begins, both against the "grass" itself and the "cultivators," who go a little farther away from the occasional sighting—high in the mountains where the inaccessible mountain slopes and ravines make it habitable.

Kinologi [possibly: teams with sniffer dogs], the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate], the Criminal Investigation Department, the OBKhSS [Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation], the agroprom, civil aviation workers, public representatives, and journalists begin taking part in the "Mak" action at the same time. MVD organs coordinate the operation. Perhaps this is the usual exaggerated campaign to which we have already become accustomed? Judging by the results, no.

In accordance with the results of "Mak-88," 71 criminal cases have been instituted for illegal use and cultivation of drug crops; five of the cases were for sales. Some 44,277 poppy and hemp plants were removed and shoots

of the "grass" were destroyed over 1.5 hectares; 128 persons were called to account administratively and criminally. Another 215 persons were exposed and called to account for using the drugs and 7 kilograms and 672 grams of drugs were seized.

There is no question that the figures are impressive. Nevertheless, the question naturally arises: why have all the attempts by the Internal Affairs Administration of the city of Ashkhabad to clear the capital of drugs been unsuccessful thus far?

Moreover, in accordance with legislation, only plantings of the opium poppy are considered illegal. They are destroyed and their "owners" are prosecuted in a criminal procedure. However, nothing is stated in the law about the oil-yielding poppy, which is also a drug-containing crop.

And one more problem. Of the 1,043 persons registered in drug treatment centers, only 41 patients were sent to a medical-work preventive clinic. And not because there were so few needing treatment. Treatment institutions in Turkmenia are simply not in a position to meet the ever-increasing demand with their meager supply.

Not in a position or simply that they do not consider this matter worthy of attention? It is not an idle question. This is not the first month that a drug addiction problem is being openly resolved in the country. However, many chiefs of ROVD's [rayon internal affairs departments] in Ashkhabad Oblast regarded drug addiction as being among the problems of minor importance, for which they were also severely punished. Isn't Turkmenia's Ministry of Health proceeding along the beaten path?

**Table 1: Distribution of Male and Female Piece-Rate Workers at Moscow Oblast Enterprises According to Level of Pay**

Nationalities	Pay (in rubles)										Total
	under 80	81-100	101-120	121-150	151-180	181-210	211-240	241-280	280 or higher		
<b>Males:</b>											
—persons	57	19	33	127	289	267	138	127	36	1090	
—percent	5.2	1.7	3.0	11.6	26.5	24.5	12.7	11.5	3.2	100	
<b>Females:</b>											
—persons	42	32	63	198	196	116	55	30	7	739	
—percent	5.7	4.3	8.5	26.8	26.6	15.7	7.4	4.1	0.9	100	

The data in Table 1 show that the difference in the levels of average pay of piece-rate workers is the result of the uneven character of distribution of male and female workers according to levels of pay. The pay of approximately one-fourth of the men and the women (26.6 percent) as well is within the same interval: 151-180 rubles. Lower pay is received by 45.3 percent of the

**Wage Inequality for Women in Industry Studied**  
*18280086 Moscow IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK SSSR: SERIYA EKONOMICHESKAYA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 89 pp 97-105*

[Article by V. N. Golodnenko: "On the Question of Female Labor at Industrial Enterprises"]

[Text] The article investigates reasons for the disparity between average pay levels of male and female piece-rate workers based on a study conducted at 45 Moscow Oblast industrial enterprises. Basic attention is devoted to analyzing differences in working conditions and labor inputs.

A proposal is made concerning the necessity of considering differentiated output norms for women, taking the fatigue factor into account.

In recent years, newspapers and journals have more and more frequently raised the question of the *de facto* inequality of women and men in the labor sphere, and in particular in the level of monetary remuneration of male and female workers. Judging by data cited in the periodical press, the average pay of women is 15-50 percent lower than that of men [1].

According to a survey of 45 Moscow Oblast industrial enterprises by the Scientific Research Institute of Labor in 1986 (that covered 3082 persons), the average monthly pay of male piece-rate workers was 184.3 rubles compared with 156.5 rubles for female piece-rate workers; for male time-rate workers—164.8 rubles; for female time-rate workers—123.2 rubles.

We attempted to examine the reasons for such a significant difference in the pay levels of (1829) male and female piece-rate workers.

As the cited data indicate, the average monthly monetary remuneration of women in this group was 15.1 percent lower than that of the men. Among time-rate workers, the disparity in the pay levels of the investigated categories was still greater—41.6 rubles or 25.2 percent.<sup>1</sup>

women and 21.5 percent of the men while correspondingly higher pay is received by 52.0 percent of the men and 28.1 percent of the women.

What is the explanation for such a disparity in the distribution of male and female workers according to the

level of their pay? How and why does this distribution and consequently the difference in the remuneration of the labor of these groups originate?

In order to answer these questions, let us attempt to examine the pay mechanism.

In most general form, the amount of monetary remuneration received by a worker is determined by two factors: labor inputs (considering the quantity and quality of labor) and normative pay for labor. The fact that the real labor inputs of a specific worker frequently do not coincide with their calculated values on the basis of which the worker is paid changes nothing in the procedure for determining the monetary remuneration of the worker.

**Table 2: Distribution of Branches of Industry According to the Share of Women Among Industrial Production Personnel**

Branch of Industry	Average monthly pay (in rubles)	Share of women among industrial production personnel (in percent)
Fish	342	28.7
Coal (mines)	342	14.3
Nonferrous metallurgy	299	32.1
Oil extracting	296	31.9
Ferrous metallurgy	237	32.0
Construction	237	17.2
Lumbering	234	18.2
Pulp-Paper	217	43.9
Machine building and metalworking	214	41.3
Electric power	210	26.4
Wood processing	206	41.9
Construction materials industry	205	32.5
Chemical and petrochemical	204	49.3
Oil refining	204	40.4
Leather	188	56.7
Glass and porcelain	188	52.4
Shale refining	186	51.5
Textile	178	68.4
Meat	178	53.9
Printing	175	64.3
Light industry	168	81.0
Sewing	150	89.6

The correlation in the pay of various groups of workers depends in large measure on the pay norm that is established as the labor norm. Thus the remuneration of an hour of labor by a piece-rate worker is 6-7 percent higher than the remuneration of an hour of labor by a time-rate worker with the same skill level. In labor legislation there is no

official differentiation of rates depending on sex, nationality, etc. However, in reality there may be such differentiation as a result of indirect factors.

If we rank branches of industry according to the level of average pay, we see a definite trend toward change in the share of women employed in those branches depending on the level of remuneration of pay (Table 2). The lower the pay in a branch, the higher is the share of women in the industrial production personnel of the branch. Naturally, it would be premature to conclude that the pay norm is lower in branches with a predominantly female work force. The disparity in the levels of average pay of workers in different branches first of all reflects differences in working conditions and labor inputs, in the quality of labor, in its significance to the national economy, etc. However the labor of fishermen, miners, workers in the oil extracting industry, etc., takes place under complex natural-climatic and production conditions that frequently require heavy physical exertion and that should be more highly paid. But it is difficult to believe that working conditions in the leather, textile, and light industry, i.e., in branches where female labor predominates to one degree or another are much better than the national average. If we assume that average pay in branches of industry reflects average branch labor inputs, it must be admitted that the labor remuneration norm in light industry is 25 percent lower than the average remuneration norm throughout the national economy as a whole (210:168=1.25), i.e., working conditions and the significance of labor in this area must be much better and higher than average in industry.

It is possible that this is how it is but we still do not have sufficiently reliable methods for measuring labor inputs of different quality and do not have scientifically substantiated methods for determining the correct proportions in the remuneration of an hour (day, month) of labor of workers in various branches of industry and the national economy. Under these conditions, a breach in the correlation of the remuneration of the labor of "significant" and "less significant" branches is entirely probable. And since branches with a predominantly female work force come under the heading of "less significant" branches, there may also be more breaches with respect to this category.

It should be emphasized that we are only discussing a lower evaluation of the quality of labor in branches with a high share of women even though in a number of jobs, this principle is advanced in more categorical form (at least in respect to light industry) (see [2]). It seems to us that without the elaboration of quite a reliable mechanism for evaluating labor of different quality, it is impossible to obtain an unequivocal answer to this question. And therefore, until such a mechanism is created, the existence of specific female and male types of activity will create the possibility that the principle "equal pay for equal labor" will be violated already in the formative stage of wage fund.

The violation of the correlation in the remuneration of different types of labor may occur not only at the branch level but also at the enterprise level. As we know, not all jobs are equally profitable to the worker since many of

them offer higher or lower remuneration for the same amount of time. By distributing "profitable" and "unprofitable" jobs, line managers are able to influence the size of the earnings of a specific worker as well as of individual groups. And even though, as the previously mentioned survey by the Scientific Research Institute of Labor shows, the administration quite widely uses this lever to influence the labor, the given factor has virtually

no impact on differences in the level of pay of the two investigated categories—men and women

Indeed as it follows from the data in Table 3, discrepancies between the group of men and women in the evaluation of the reasons behind the incongruity of their monetary remuneration and their labor inputs are negligible (do not exceed 2-3 points).

**Table 3: Distribution of Workers' Answers to the Question of the Reasons for the Disparity Between Their Labor Inputs and Their Pay**

	Number answering the question in the affirmative; in percent of the number of respondents	
	Men	Women
What do you regard as the reason for the disparity between your labor inputs and the level of its remuneration?		
The volume and quantity of work performed by me are not correctly taken into account	14.0	12.5
The wage rate for my job is too low	26.5	28.3
My pay does not take into account a number of jobs that I have to perform in addition to my basic job	29.7	28.9
The output, service norms, etc., are too high	4.0	5.3
The actual conditions under which the work process takes place are not considered	25.8	25.0

**Table 4: Distribution of Workers' Answers to the Question of Why Their Work Was Not Justly Rewarded**

	Number answering the question in the affirmative; in percent of the number of respondents	
	Men	Women
What do you regard as the reason why your labor is not justly rewarded?		
My occupation is not as well paid as others	12.9	14.3
I am paid less than other workers with my skill level	7.6	4.4
I am paid less than other workers doing the same job	6.0	6.2
The wage grade to which I am assigned does not correspond to my skill level	6.0	9.4
I am performing work at a lower skill level than I am capable of	11.3	5.0
I am given incorrect work assignments	5.7	5.0
My working conditions are worse than those of other workers	4.7	5.3

Men and women are close in their evaluation of the reasons why their labor is not justly rewarded (Table 4).

The cited evaluations confirm the previously expressed premise that at the enterprise level the violation of the principle of equal pay for equal work is possible only with respect to individual workers. No discrimination against women as a social group as a result of this factor was found.

Thus the principle of "equal pay for equal work" as regards working women can only be violated due to the incorrect determination of the pay norm for the work

norm as a result of the incorrect correlation in the level of average pay in branches with predominantly "female" or "male" types of work.<sup>2</sup>

Analysis of differences in labor inputs provides more substantive results. As already stated, labor inputs are determined by the quantity and quality of labor, which reflect the complexity of labor, its significance, a worker's skill level, etc. The quantity of labor in most general form is determined by the duration of the work performed and by the level of its intensiveness.

Differences in the quality of the labor of the investigated groups can be evaluated in several ways. First, through differences in the workers' skill level on the assumption

that the level of work performed by both men and women basically corresponds to the worker's wage grade or exceeds it to an equal degree.

As follows from the data in Table 5, the skill level of individual workers in the investigated groups fluctuates

within a wide range: from wage grade 1 to wage grade 6. However the majority of women (67.6 percent) work at jobs in wages grade 3 and 4, i. e., jobs of medium difficulty while the majority of men (61 percent) perform jobs in wage grades 4 and 5, i. e., jobs of medium and high difficulty. On the whole, the average wage grade of men is 4.3; of women—3.8.

Table 5: Distribution of Workers According to Skill Level

Workers	Wage grades						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
<b>Males</b>							
—persons:	36	56	104	335	266	186	979
—percent	3.7	5.7	10.6	33.8	27.2	19.0	100
<b>Females</b>							
—persons:	10	49	241	225	125	39	689
—percent	1.5	7.1	35.0	32.6	18.2	5.6	100

Table 6: Distribution of Workers According to Level of Complexity of Work Performed by Them

Group of Workers	Work complexity group				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
<b>Males:</b>					
—persons	58	614	221	99	992
—percent	5.9	61.8	22.3	10.0	100
<b>Females:</b>					
—persons	97	493	90	22	702
—percent	13.9	70.4	12.6	3.1	100

There is also another possible approach to the evaluation of the quality of the work performed: through its complexity which is determined by the worker himself based on the time required for its performance (Table 6).

A total of four work groups were identified: simple, medium complexity, high complexity, and especially high complexity.

*Group I.* Simple work not requiring special knowledge or training; little time required to develop skills and abilities.

*Group II.* Work of medium complexity requiring knowledge of the equipment used and special training for at least several months and a certain amount of time to master methods and skills.

*Group III.* Work of high complexity requiring vast special knowledge about equipment used, objects of labor, technological processes, etc. To obtain this knowledge workers with average abilities require not only special education but also a long period in which to acquire habits and skills.

*Group IV.* Especially complex work requiring not only a great deal of special knowledge but also a subtle understanding of the essence of the production process, the development of special skills, i. e., this work is performed by workers who possess higher abilities in addition to a great deal of knowledge.

In the given instance both men and women perform all types of jobs. Most of the male and female workers perform jobs of medium complexity (61.8 and 70.4 percent, respectively). However almost one-third of the workers perform work requiring a higher skill level. Half as many women—15.7 percent—are engaged in this type of work.

Thus the lower level of vocational training of women and the consequently lesser complexity of the work performed by them are among the principal factors that cause a considerable disparity in the pay of the investigated categories. According to our calculations, this disparity, based on the average wage grades of workers in

the respective groups (4.3 and 3.8) is 11-13 points, i.e., the given factor is primarily responsible for the difference in the level of their pay.

Women on the average spend less time at work. First, their working time is less than that of men primarily because they must take care of sick children or other members of the family. Second, women perform less overtime work [than men]. Thus in the investigated aggregate of piece-rate workers, no overtime work was performed by 13.6 percent of the men and 26.1 percent of the women; frequent overtime—24.5 and 21.8 percent; and occasional overtime—by 59.6 percent of the men and 47.7 percent of the women.

The high additional work load of female piece-rate workers is noteworthy. Three out of four of them stay after work to one degree or another; one-fifth of them do so frequently. And even though female workers perform overtime work less frequently than men, the difference in time expenditures is slight and according to our calculations is 5-8 hours a month for the given category. Among time-rate workers, this difference in the level of overtime work is considerably greater and totals 12-17 hours a month because female time-rate workers perform overtime work considerably less frequently than men.

Thus it can be considered that the considerable differences in the labor inputs of the two investigated groups are the principal reason for the differences in the average monthly levels of their wages.

Let us try to answer the question: what is the basis for the difference in labor inputs? It is known that the size of the latter depends on the worker himself (his potential, the degree of interest in their complete utilization, etc.) and on the conditions under which the production process takes place. Idle time for various reasons, the lack of challenge on the job, marginally productive equipment, etc., do not permit many workers to make full use of their labor potential, which directly influences the size of the monetary reward received by the worker.

Working conditions (in the broad sense of the terms) were evaluated on the basis of three groups of factors.

1. Production conditions: (a) the level of technical equipment in the work place; (b) the availability of tools and accessories; (c) the availability of supplies, raw materials, components, etc.; (d) the quality of raw materials, supplies, etc.; (e) the timeliness of repair and setup operations; (f) sanitary-hygienic working conditions.

2. Conditions characterizing the production infrastructure: (a) the organization of meals; (b) the possibility to rest during the lunch period and regulation breaks.

3. The psychological climate in the collective: (a) interrelations in the collective; (b) interrelations with superiors.

All factors were evaluated by the workers themselves on a five-point scale.

It should first of all be noted that all workers regardless of their sex assigned a very low rating to production conditions (from 2.3 to 2.9 points; average: 2.7) and to the production infrastructure (from 2.5 to 2.8; average: 2.6 points), and gave an especially low rating to sanitary-hygienic working conditions (2.3 points), i.e., the latter were simply evaluated as bad.

The highest rating (3.7 and 3.8 points) was given to interrelations in the collective and interrelations with superiors, but they too were rated no higher than 4 points.

As regards differences in the evaluation of working conditions by male and female workers, in the majority of the investigated examples, they are slight and do not exceed 0.2 points. A higher rating to all indicators characterizing production conditions is given by women than men even though the differences are also slight (0.1-0.2 points). On the other hand, female workers give a slightly lower rating than male workers to various aspects of the production infrastructure (by 0.2-0.4 points). It can be assumed that women on the whole were more demanding toward the organization of production life while men made higher demands on the organization of labor even though appreciable changes were not observed.

The fact that none of the groups gave any particular preference to securing more favorable working conditions in the work place is also confirmed by the workers' responses. The question "Do you have all conditions in your work place so that the volume and quality of the work performed by you depend entirely on you" was answered in the affirmative by 39.2 percent of the male and 40.7 percent of the female respondents and in the negative by 45.9 percent of the men and 39.9 percent of the women. The others were unable to answer this question.

It should be noted that women use their production potential more completely. Thus 77.1 percent of the women believe that their skill level corresponds to the complexity of the work performed and only 20.2 percent of the respondents believed that they were capable of performing more complex work. These indicators for men were 67.7 and 29.9 percent, respectively.

And finally both groups also evaluated the potential for professional advancement approximately the same.

Thus it can be concluded that the disparity in the level of pay reflects only differences in labor inputs. This conclusion is also confirmed by the respondents' answers to questions concerning the appropriateness of their monetary remuneration and its correspondence to their labor inputs.

A large number of the female workers (55.5 percent) gave a positive answer to the question of whether they were being justly paid; 29 percent expressed their conviction on this point. Twenty-one percent of the polled female piece-rate workers felt that they were not being justly paid, including 6.7 percent who expressed their conviction on this point.

Forty-five percent of the men gave an affirmative answer to this question, including 17.1 percent who were convinced of this; a negative response was received from 29.7 percent of the respondents, including 11.6 percent in categorical form.

A similar picture is also seen in the distribution of answers to the second question. Here 65.2 percent of the women believe that their earnings totally (22.3 percent) or basically (42.9 percent) correspond to their labor input. This position was endorsed by 57.2, 19.2, and 38 percent of the male respondents, respectively.

Approximately one-fourth (26.9 percent) of the female workers believe that their earnings are not commensurate with their labor input; 33.2 percent of the male workers are of the same view.

From the foregoing it follows that it is not appropriate to speak of the violation of women's rights as a social group in the area of labor and pay. Male and female workers work under approximately the same conditions and have approximately the same potential for developing and using their labor potential, their abilities, their knowledge, and skills, etc.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, I would like to note that the same earned ruble evidently is "dearer" to women than to men. The fact of the matter is that women are physically weaker than men and hence the same load is perceived differently by male and female workers.

As is evident from the data in Table 7, both groups rate the level of nervous strain approximately the same; as regards physical exertion, however, major differences are seen. The level of physical exertion was noted as being very great by 40.6 percent of the male and 63.4 percent of the female workers.

As a result, women are more tired after work than men. Thus, more than two-thirds of the women (69 percent) noted that they are very tired after work.<sup>4</sup> The share of female time-rate workers noting heavy fatigue was considerably lower but still quite high—40.1 percent compared with male time-rate workers—28.4 percent.

**Table 7: Distribution of Workers According to the Level of Physical and Nervous Exertion**

Type of exertion	Group	Responses		
		very heavy	moderate	slight
Physical	Men	40.6	56.6	2.8
	Women	63.4	32.8	3.7
Nervous	Men	47.1	45.7	7.2
	Women	48.6	46.5	4.9

In this connection, a number of economists and sociologists have proposed the use of output norms differentiated by sex. The legitimacy of such an approach as one of the possible variant solutions to the problem of easing the plight of women in the sphere of social labor is beyond question but in our view its practical realization requires the stricter substantiation and search for alternative solutions of the problem.

The introduction of easier norms for female workers without reducing their working time will make it possible to increase their pay but will not reduce their fatigue level. On the one hand, the reduction of working time by even half an hour and the corresponding lowering of output norms will require considerable resources and time. On the other hand, considering the uneven degree of fatigue among various groups of women, there will evidently be a need for differentiation on the basis of other features and this will be more difficult. Finally, if the fatigue factor is considered in the process of determining women's work

norms, why should this factor not be considered for other social groups as well, in particular, elderly workers, workers who are physically weak, etc.

We believe that this problem can be solved more effectively in another way: through the dramatic improvement of sanitary-hygienic working conditions. First, this factor has a most powerful impact on the way the worker feels [*samochuvstviye*], and, second, the workers themselves rate the state of working conditions very low (2.3 on a 5-point scale).

Radical improvement of working conditions eliminates the cause of heightened fatigue and does not merely compensate the consequences of irrationally organized labor activity. Figuratively speaking, the disease heals itself and not its consequences. What is more, this approach makes work easier for all workers and not just selected groups and hence is more in keeping with the

socialist principle of justice. The improvement of working conditions must therefore be viewed as the general direction in resolving the problem of making women's work easier.

It seems to us on the whole that a ruble invested in improving working conditions produces a significantly greater effect in reducing women's fatigue than the introduction of preferential norms for them. Nevertheless, all measures require precise calculation because only then is it possible to select the most effective way of improving the plight of women in social production.

But obviously there can also be compromise solutions in which most of the resources are used to improve working conditions while the output norm may be differentiated according to sex in certain branches or types of activity where the participation of women in the production process is objectively necessary.

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#### Footnotes

1. The question as to why there are greater differences in the wages of men and women working on a time-rate basis than in the pay of men and women working on a piece-rate basis is very curious because the basic factors—educational level, age, skill level, etc.—do not allow us to make any assumptions in this regard. This is a question that obviously requires special study.

2. However this hypothesis requires careful verification.

3. The reference is only to the labor sphere. The activity of women outside this sphere is not considered.

4. Some authors attribute the greater fatigue of women to the fact that in addition to the job they also have work to do at home and that they are unable to get their full rest.

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## Tashkent Conference on Interethnic Ties

### Information Report

18300443 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
24 Feb 89 p 1

[UzTAG report: "Urgent Problems of Improving Interethnic Relations": "Regional Scientific-Practical Conference in Tashkent"]

[Text] On 23 February a regional scientific-practical conference of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan began work in Tashkent on the theme, "Urgent Problems of Improving Interethnic Relations under Conditions of Glasnost and Democratization of Social Life."

Invited to the conference were scholars; party, soviet, trade-union and Komsomol officials; administrators of a number of party committees, ideological ministries and departments; social organizations; and journalists. Taking part in the conference are responsible officials of the CPSU Central Committee; delegations from Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia; representatives of the Institute on Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU Central Committee, the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee, and a number of institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Uzbek CP Central Committee Secretary M.Kh. Khal-mukhamedov opened the conference with introductory remarks.

"Our conference," he said, "convenes on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which is faced with examining the question of improving interethnic relations. It joins wholeheartedly in the context of the processes in this sphere, which are being actively and avidly discussed in working collectives, at gatherings of communists, and in the mass information media.

"Our initial positions on this question are firm. Firm in the sense that socialism is striving to eliminate the deeply-rooted causes of all sorts of inequality and oppression for ethnic reasons, and provides the possibility of resolving in a healthy manner problems which spring up, as the experience of past years confirms.

"However, in speaking about the truly historic achievements of our social system, we look upon them not as the pinnacle of possibilities, but as positions from which we must move ahead.

"In our time we have said a great deal, and on the whole correctly, about the solution of the national question in the form in which it was inherited from the past. But in practice, this sphere has become, I believe, virtually closed to honest and businesslike analysis. And wherever we have failed to give it sufficient attention, or have forgotten it, it has perceptibly called attention to itself.

"Glasnost and democracy are not the reasons, but the conditions which have permitted expressing the feelings which had been festering for many years. And this is why we must analyze in depth the entire aggregate of factors which have brought about a certain amount of tension in interethnic relations, and we must skillfully distinguish between the actual problems and the far-fetched. It is especially important to bear in mind that ethnic problems do not exist in a pure form: they are closely interwoven with economic, social, spiritual, and other problems.

"V.I. Lenin stressed that, "...Only the greatest attention to the interests of the various nations will remove the soil for conflict, remove mutual mistrust, and remove the danger of all kinds of intrigues, and create that trust, and especially among the workers and peasants who speak different languages—without which, neither peaceful relations among the nations, nor any kind of successful development of all that is precious in modern civilization, are altogether impossible."

Confidence was expressed that the forthcoming dialogue at the conference would promote a more in-depth analysis of the problems, and a collective search for ways to solve them in a democratic manner and to make interethnic relations more harmonious.

The floor was next given to R.N. Nishanov, Uzbek CP Central Committee first secretary for his report on "The 27th CPSU Congress and Perfecting Interethnic Relations in Uzbekistan Under Conditions of Democratization and Restructuring of Economic and Social Life." (The report is published in today's issue of the newspaper.)

A.A. Zazonov, deputy chief of the Interethnic Relations Division of the CPSU Central Committee State-Legal Department, next delivered a report on "The Development of National Relations in the USSR: Trends, Experience, Problems and Ways to Solve Them."

In his own co-report, Kazakh CP Central Committee Secretary U.D. Dzhanibekov spoke about party leadership of interethnic and patriotic education of the working masses.

"Social Justice—the Foundation of the Policy for Satisfying the Spiritual Needs of All Nations Dwelling in Tajikistan," was the topic of the co-report by Tajik CP Central Committee Secretary A.D. Dadabayev.

The activity of party and Soviet organs for satisfying the socio-cultural needs of all ethnic groups in the republic's populace was illuminated in the co-report of Kh.D. Durdyev, Turkmen CP Central Committee secretary.

**Kara-Kalpak Oblast Party Committee First Secretary K.S. Salykov delivered a co-report entitled, "Equalizing the Levels of Socio-Economic Development of Various Regions of the Country—the Most Important Condition for Solidifying the Unity of the Soviet Multinational State."**

In his co-report, Doctor of Historical Sciences L.U. Yusupov, a leading scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History, spoke about the peculiarities of developing national relationships in regions which have passed from feudalism to socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage.

National aspects of implementing cadre policy at the contemporary stage of societal development were illuminated in the co-report by Osh Oblast Communist Party Committee Secretary S.B. Bakhapova.

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.I. Doronchenkov, senior scientific associate of the Institute on Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU Central Committee, described the scientific and methodological bases for management of interethnic relations and international and patriotic education.

B. Rispayev, chairman, Kirghiz SSR State Committee on Publishing delivered a co-report entitled, "Equal Rights and Cooperation—the Foundation of Friendship and Fraternity."

The conference will continue its work on 24 February, when sessions will be held by sections.

**Uzbek CP Central Committee's Nishanov**  
*18300443 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian*  
*24 Feb 89 pp 1-4*

[Report by R.N. Nishanov: "The 27th CPSU Congress and Perfecting Interethnic Relations in Uzbekistan Under Conditions of Democratization and Restructuring of Economic and Social Life"]

[Text] Comrades!

Allow me first of all to warmly greet you in the name of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, and the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers.

Our conference takes place at an exceptionally responsible period in the life of the party and the people. Today work has been commenced on an enormous scale in the country for the all-round revolutionary transformation of society. The consolidation of the forces of renewal is taking place under the influence of innovative ideas and the cause of perestroika, and the energies of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsiya are being unleashed.

Democratization and glasnost are making fundamental changes in the ideological-political and social situation. The affirmation of truth is purifying the moral atmosphere and is stimulating energetic activity. The process of healing has begun in the economy, turning it toward satisfying the daily needs of the people. Spiritual life is becoming a powerful factor for progress.

It has also become obvious that perestroika is a many-faceted, long-term and contradictory process. Interethnic relations represent a very complicated and complex sphere of social life, which demands constant attention on the part of party, Soviet, economic and social organizations.

Our party is soberly analyzing the situation which has come to pass; it staunchly affirms and is creatively developing Lenin's principles on national policy on the basis of the political course worked out at the 27th CPSU Congress, which combines the satisfaction of the interests of all the nations with the common interests and needs of the country. The 19th All-Union Party Conference, which adopted the special resolution "On Interethnic Relations," took a major step in the theoretical and practical grounding of national policy in the contemporary period.

The entire history of the establishment and development of the Soviet state convincingly affirms the genius and sagacity of V.I. Lenin, who laid the foundation for national policy, and the international cohesion of all the nations and nationalities in the country. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, their mutual assistance and cooperation played an enormous role in the transition of the nations of Central Asia to socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage of development. The party has accomplished a vast amount of work on eliminating national oppression, on overcoming interethnic animosity, and on restoring and developing national cultures. An integral national-economic complex has evolved in the country—the material foundation of the unity of the Soviet peoples. As a result of steadfast ideological-educational work, the ideas of internationalism, which have passed through severe trials and have withstood the test of time, have become firmly implanted in the consciousness of millions of people.

All of this indisputably comprises our priceless capital. Nevertheless, one can hardly presume to assert that the national question in the country has been completely removed from the agenda, once and for all. The very fact that many nations and nationalities are living and working together in a single state gives birth to new problems and tasks. A great deal remains to be done to correct the distortions of national relationships committed in the past.

It goes without saying, that such a fine and delicate question as interethnic relations has specific nationwide, regional and local aspects. Along with the other republics

of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, they occupy an important position in the economic, social and spiritual life of the country; they are an organic part of the entire national-economic complex; and they are applying their efforts toward further growth of their contribution to the solution of nationwide tasks.

How can this contribution be multiplied to realize the party's slogan, "A Strong Center and a Strong Republic"? By which approaches should the economic, social, ecological, demographic and other problems characteristic of every republic in the region be solved? Having common roots, traditions and customs and an age-old way of life, we must also give collective thought to the prospects for further development and mutual-enrichment of our cultures, and their organic interaction with the extremely rich intellectual potential of all the nations of the USSR.

There are also quite a few other questions on which the need for joint discussion has arrived. I believe that this would serve the cause of further improvement of interethnic ties, strengthening our friendship and fraternity, and improvement of mutual understanding and cohesion within the framework of a unified Soviet multinational state.

#### The Role and Position of Uzbekistan in the Country's Unified National-Economic Complex

Comrades!

The prospects for development of national relations are inseparably connected with all the processes of renewal in our unified union state. The party is proceeding from the premise that consistent conduct of Lenin's national policy and round strengthening of the friendship of nations are integral parts of the perfection of socialism and the necessary condition for socio-economic and spiritual progress in our multinational socialist Motherland.

Having defined the basic directions for national policy, the CPSU is striving to achieve more effective development of the economy in all regions of the country, and in accordance with this has improved the conditions for socio-cultural development of all nations and nationalities, in order that the contribution of every republic in developing a unified national-economic complex would improve, and would correspond with their growing economic and spiritual potential. "...In such a multinational country as ours," noted M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to the Ukraine, "it is necessary to consider the interests of all the republics, and this is an extremely large and responsible matter."

Allow me to dwell on certain aspects of this problem. In the fraternal formation of the nations of the USSR, Uzbekistan has a developed economic potential. In terms of production volume our republic occupies fifth place in the Union, and manufactures a wide variety of

products—from consumer goods to aircraft and tractors. Machine-building is represented in about 40 branches, among which there are over 100 major enterprises.

The republic's agro-industrial complex comprises about 2,000 kolkhozes and sovkhozes and hundreds of processing enterprises. Uzbekistan produces almost two-thirds of the raw cotton, more than 60 percent of the silkworm cocoons, and over one-third of the astrakhan [fur] in the nation. Production of fruits, grapes, vegetables and melon crops is of nationwide importance.

However, this potential has been used most inefficiently in recent years, and especially during the years of stagnation. In the 10th and 11th Five Year Plans, returns on investments declined by one-third, and the Uzbek SSR's share in producing the national income showed practically no increase.

What are the reasons for the situation which has come to pass? The roots here are deep. As the 19th All-Union Party Conference established, the dynamism inherent in the initial stage of formation of the multinational state of Soviets was largely expended and subverted by the departure from Lenin's principles on national policy, by violations of legality in the period of the personality cult, and by ideological and psychological stagnation.

For an extended period of time it was unacceptable to speak about the mistakes which had been committed in the sphere of national relations. The development of socialist nations and nationalities was hindered by the fact that the decisions taken on problems of correlating the principles of democratic centralism and socialist federalism and those of centralism and democracy were not always the optimal ones. Insufficient consideration was given to the need for socio-economic and cultural development, both within individual republics and autonomous formations, and in ethnic groups.

These are the general reasons, so to speak. But there were also our own. The phenomena of stagnation of recent decades, which was characteristic of the entire country, appeared in a most severe and monstrous form in the republic. You know that a portion of the officials given the greatest authority had taken the path of dissolution and moral degeneration, and inflicted severe damage on the republic. Rashidov and the Rashidovites, who were nominally fighting for internationalism and equal rights, were in fact cultivating regionalism, protectionism, and the mores and customs of Medieval bishops. Ostentatious measures and congratulatory toasts in honor of Friendship of Nations were substituted for analysis of the real processes going on.

As a result the rate of national economic development slowed down, there were increasing lags in the area of production of modern machinery and equipment, and a

multitude of economic conflicts piled up. And the problem of employment of labor resources made itself known. The low proportion of workers of indigenous nationality in heavy industry is cause for serious alarm.

These and other distortions and disproportions could not but have an exacerbating effect on social problems. The spiritual needs of certain national groups living in Uzbekistan—Tajiks, Koreans, Uighurs, Crimean Tatars and others—were not considered. This abnormal situation offended national feelings, caused public dissatisfaction, and exacerbated interethnic relations.

It goes without saying that the critical and exacting approach to the analysis of our own history which has been taken in our society in no way diminishes the work of enormous historical significance which was accomplished in the years of Soviet rule. Perestroika has not only shed light on the seamy side of the interethnic sphere, it has at the same time created the conditions for overcoming it by means of democracy and glasnost.

We have drawn the proper conclusions from the just criticism leveled at us at the 27th Party Congress, at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and in other party documents. With the help of the CPSU Central Committee and the party organizations of all the fraternal republics, the workers of Uzbekistan shall work purposefully and steadfastly to heal the moral-political situation. The tasks for strengthening party and state discipline and increasing the responsibility of cadres in all sectors of economic and social construction have been and continue to be very urgent ones for us. With the enterprise and support of the working collectives, we are solving the problems which have for a long time caused concern not only among the communists and workers of Uzbekistan, but among the entire party and the entire Soviet people.

Recently the CPSU Central Committee has adopted several very important documents relating to our republic, including documents on questions of reception in the party and strengthening the party ranks in Tashkent Oblast party organizations; on eliminating serious shortcomings in the cotton-growing and other branches of agriculture; and on improving the economic situation. The republic is being rendered enormous assistance in utilizing its productive potential.

Especially great concern is being shown on questions of cadre policy. We have been given the opportunity to strengthen all sectors with competent officials and to train a cadre reserve, utilizing all regions of the country. Measures have been taken to purge the cadre corps of corruption, permissiveness, clannishness and mutual protection. A fierce struggle is being waged with pilferage, bribery and padding of figures. Forms and methods of ideological work and international education are being updated.

The economic mechanism has begun to change radically; democracy is becoming more deeply-rooted in production, and the economic role of Soviets of People's Deputies is expanding.

As a result, certain positive achievements have been noted. In 1988 the national income increased by 5.1 percent as opposed to 0.8 percent in 1987, and industrial production increased by 3.3 percent. The scale of construction of housing, schools, kindergartens and medical establishments has expanded.

Knowing that the best display of internationalism is working for the common good of the entire country, the working collectives have begun to pay greater attention to the discipline of contracted deliveries. We have taken control over orders from the union republics, which has permitted improving the fulfillment of economic agreements.

There were certain advances in the republic's agrarian sector in 1988 as well. Above all this is a result of the fact that cotton farming, as well as other branches have been purged, on the whole, of inflated figures, pilferage and other negative phenomena. The measures taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the national government to bring procurement of raw materials into line with real capabilities and modern agricultural technology have played an enormous role here. To a certain extent the purposeful work of the republic organization on strengthening the state of organization and discipline, the transition to the contract form of labor organization, introduction of intensive technologies, making proper adjustments to the harvest process, and extensive shunting of equipment, have had an effect. All these things permitted raising a good crop, gathering it in at the peak period without strain, and procuring more than 5,360,000 tons of raw cotton, mostly of the first and second grade. According to calculations, it is possible to derive no less than 1,700,000 tons of cotton fiber from it; whereas in the past, at the very peak of Rashidovite mania with records, 1,600,000 tons and less were processed.

In comparison with 1987, there has also been growth in production volumes of grain, potatoes, vegetables, melon crops, fruits and berries, meat, milk and eggs; as well as deliveries of vegetables, fruits and grapes to the general union fund. On the whole, the growth in gross agricultural production amounts to about 800,000,000 rubles.

Nevertheless, the national economy is still under the influence of the distortions of years past. In spite of the great progress in the years of Soviet rule, Uzbekistan lags behind a number of other republics in terms of the level of per-capita production of national income, labor productivity, the technological level of enterprises, and other parameters.

The diktat of departmental interests has led to serious distortions in the national economic structure. The unrestrained pursuit of gross cotton output has led to the ignoring of the scientific basis for managing agriculture and the mindless use of chemicals—which has not only exhausted the soil, it has also chased cotton-farming itself up a blind alley, has significantly worsened the supply of foodstuffs to the populace—and has dealt severe harm to the environment.

Certain demographic tendencies and aberrations in the distribution of the populace of the republic by sphere of employment and area of residence, disproportions in consumption of material and social blessings among republics and among city and country-dwellers, have made their mark on the already complex situation.

The main question facing the communists and all the people of Uzbekistan is—how to more rapidly master the situation on the way to overall perestroika. And the people are striving for this. "The strongest impression," Gorbachev stressed, speaking last year in Tashkent, "is the activeness of the people, their openness, and their desire to discuss serious questions. For us the conclusion is a principally important one: the mood of the people in the republic is now such, that if the people are presented with a good program, they will move on to greater things."

In order to accelerate socio-economic development in the republic, a program of comprehensive measures has been prepared for the remaining years of the current five-year plan, and for the period of the 13th Five Year Plan. Key significance in this work is attributed to increasing in every way the republic's contribution to the unified national economic complex in accordance with the following basic directions:

These are chiefly forced development of the branches engaged in output of highly labor-intensive products at the maximum degree of completeness. The production volume of machine-building in the coming five-year plan can be expanded almost twofold. Serious efforts are required to solve the problem of manufacture of consumer goods. Without large expenditures, their manufacture can be increased by 7-8 billion rubles as early as 1995.

The central direction of our work was and remains supplying the country's needs for cotton and processed cotton products. Union and republic-level organs are taking measures for gradually introducing plans for cotton procurement in accordance with actual capabilities. In comparison with 1983 the plan has already been reduced by one million tons. A qualitative increase in the level of cotton farming, eliminating single strains of cotton plants, and fundamental improvements in crop rotation and the condition of the soil will promote both the resolution of the Food Program and a significant improvement in the ecological situation.

The Karakalpak ASSR has begun to pay greater attention to developing the forces of production. In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on measures for accelerating the economic and social development of Karakalpakia, the volume of construction of housing and facilities for socio-domestic purposes is growing.

Measures are being taken for restoring the financial health of the entire economy. Farms operating on a low profit margin are being pinpointed for specialization, and the production of storage and processing facilities in the localities is being developed intensively. Certain bankrupt sovkhozes are being transferred to industrial enterprises or are being attached to economically-strong farms.

We are placing our major stake on new cost-accounting forms of labor organization—contract and leasing—and are cooperating in every way in the development of production cooperatives. With proper adoption of the new economic mechanism, the financial indicators will improve. Therefore, whereas last year 80,000 hectares were offered up for lease, this year the amount will be 900,000 hectares; and 500 agricultural production cooperatives are already functioning.

We have a great deal to do in order to eliminate the consequences of the technocratic approach of the departments, which have been making economic decisions without consideration of the ecological consequences. These manifest themselves in the severe shortage of water, and its pollution by industrial, agricultural, transport and municipal-domestic wastes; and, in the increased pollution of the atmosphere, and as a result—in the high level of illness among the public. Soil fertility is rapidly declining, and the land is being subjected to water and wind erosion and to secondary salinization. At this time, in accordance with a resolution from the CPSU Central Committee and the republic government, measures have commenced to preserve the Aral Sea, and to improve the epidemiological and sanitary situation in the Aral Littoral.

Solution of these and other socio-economic conflicts is connected primarily with increasing responsibility on the part of both the republic and the Union organs for the comprehensive development of every region, with decisively crushing the administrative-command system of management, and with the reform of the economic mechanism.

The most important lever is the step-by-step transition, taking local conditions into consideration, to regional economic accountability and programmed planning; here, it seems to us, it is important to avoid extremes and excesses. We believe there is no basis to strive for self-isolation in certain areas, nor for attempts to set up customs barriers between republics. Under conditions in which a unified national-economic complex has been

formed in the USSR on the basis of nationwide ownership of the basic means of production, when a common market and a unified financial and credit system have been set up in the country—there can be no such thing as economic independence for a republic, and autarky cannot exist. Moreover, practical experience in the world testifies to the striving of independent states for economic integration.

It is also obvious that increasing the economic independence of regions and intensifying the economic principles and levers for their vital activity will lead to the rise of powerful stimuli for raising social labor productivity, self-interest, and a proprietary attitude toward business. At the same time all of this will promote the intensification of the integrational processes in the country, combining of efforts, and striving for increased specialization and division of labor.

Experience shows that further strengthening of ties among the republics of the region is very important for the successful solution of the accumulated problems. The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, just as our entire multinational country, live like members of one large and friendly family, sharing their joys and sorrows. And when misfortune befalls someone or other, all the fraternal republics will hasten to his aid. Such was the case after the Ashkhabad, Tashkent, Gazli, and Gissar earthquakes. The Soviet people took as their own the misfortune which befell Armenia and Tajikistan, and are doing everything to alleviate the suffering of the people who were subjected to the ravages of nature.

But it is not only in extreme situations that the friendship of nations is manifested. The growing economic, scientific and cultural potential of each union republic establishes the basis for ascending to a qualitatively new level in their cooperation in all spheres of life.

The possibility and the necessity for activation of political, economic and cultural ties among the fraternal republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are defined in the uniformity of their natural-geographic conditions, in their economic life, and in the commonality of their historic destiny, and the spiritual and everyday traditions of the nations. Uniting the efforts of our republics and a joint quest for effective forms of cooperation, will undoubtedly promote acceleration of their socio-economic and cultural development and timely solution on a genuinely democratic and international basis of the existing problems in the sphere of interethnic relations.

In our view, the recent meetings of the leaders of the fraternal republics, at which questions of political, economic and cultural cooperation and ways for further strengthening friendship and mutual understanding among the peoples of the region were discussed, promoted the strengthening of economic, scientific and cultural ties among the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and raising them to a new level.

Taking into consideration the principles for restructuring the economy and the social sphere in the union republics worked out by the USSR Council of Ministers and examined by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the governments of the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen SSR's are discussing questions of intensifying inter-republic regional cooperation for the purposes of accelerating the socio-economic development of each republic and for multiplying their contribution to the country's unified national-economic complex. Recently a meeting took place in Dushanbe between the chairmen of the Council of Ministers and gosplans of the fraternal republics, at which the basic directions were defined for strengthening mutual ties in the spheres of production, science, public education, ecology and health-care; for raising the well-being of the workers; and for more completely satisfying the national-cultural needs of all the nations and nationalities who dwell in the region.

Thanks to the measures being taken, economic cooperation among the republics is being developed and is growing stronger. For example, analysis of the territorial structure of the import and export of products, according to data from the inter-branch balance for 1987, shows that our republic has a positive balance in inter-regional economic relations with Tajik SSR, and with the rest of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan—a negative balance.

Among the new forms of cooperation, it is important to note the recently widespread practice of direct friendly relations among enterprises, farms, ministries, departments and social organizations.

We believe it is sensible to expand the practice of all-round cooperation among the border oblasts of the union republics in which large groups of the representatives of the peoples of the neighboring republics live. In this connection the experience of party committees—in Tashkent and Syr-Darya Oblasts with Chimkent and Leninabad Oblasts, and also Andizhan and Osh, Tashauz and Khorezm, and other oblasts which have carried out various kinds of work to strengthen economic and other ties, and is worthy of our attention.

Under conditions of growing interest in the lives of other republics, such ties are an effective means of informing the populace on the affairs, concerns and problems of their neighbors; and they help find ways for jointly solving standing problems: for example, questions of methodology of economic analysis and price-formation, which are not sufficiently reliable for the present day, require the closest attention. In our view, the study of such problems as expanding the economic independence and responsibility of the union republics is of great scientific and practical interest as well. Harmonizing national, republic and nationwide interests and variants

of possible transition of republics to principles of self-government and self-financing and developing direct ties among themselves, with clear-cut specification of their contribution to the solution of nationwide programs, and so on.

### Certain Questions of Further Development of the Soviet Federation and Socialist Democracy

Comrades!

While perfecting national relations, the party is directing the people's energy toward further strengthening the Soviet socialist state, which embodies the revolutionary will and aspirations of the multinational family of peoples with equal rights. Speaking at a meeting with scientific and cultural figures, Gorbachev stressed that, "Today the Soviet Union represents a unique phenomenon in the world community—a state in which, with all the complexities and difficulties in this process and with all its accumulated and acute problems, there are truly genuine and enormous achievements in the solution of the national question."

The experience of socialist construction in our country has shown the effectiveness of the soviet national-state system. But life does not stand still, and under conditions of perestroika questions are arising on further development of the Soviet Federation, the legal status of the union and autonomous republics, expanding the republics' independence and responsibility in the economic sphere, social and cultural development, and nature preservation.

Putting into practice the reforms of the political system outlined at the 27th CPSU Congress and worked out in depth at the 19th All Union Party Conference is of key significance in the matter of harmonizing interethnic relations. It opens the prospects of implementing in practice Lenin's principles of democratic centralism and socialist federalism in national-state construction.

The USSR Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution (the Fundamental Law) and the USSR Law on Election of People's Deputies of the USSR, which were opened to nationwide discussion, are landmarks in the first stage of reform of the political system.

The election campaign commenced on their basis is being conducted in an atmosphere of genuine democracy and broad glasnost; an atmosphere of mass political enthusiasm, strengthening in fact the unity of the party and the people and workers of all nations and nationalities in the country. An intensive process of accumulating political experience and raising the democratic culture of the masses, is going on. Ardent proponents of perestroika, representatives of various nationalities, have been nominated as candidates for People's Deputies of the USSR. For broad circles of the public it is

exceptionally important who will be resolving their problems in the Supreme Soviet and adopting new laws which would reflect our lives today and would lay down the prerequisites that would permit the process of perestroika to gather strength.

At the second stage of reform of the political system, questions will be resolved on delimiting the competence of the USSR and the union republics, transferring a number of administrative functions to the local authorities, and others. These questions have already been discussed at a session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and at a specially-convened commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

In this connection I would also like to remark on the usefulness of appealing to the history of national-state construction in the USSR in the quest for solving contemporary problems. I shall illustrate this with concrete examples.

The 1924 USSR Constitution, which was drawn up with the participation of V.I. Lenin, contained a special section, "On the Sovereign Rights of Union Republics"; however, the 1936 Constitution and the existing Fundamental Law do not contain such a section. In our view it would be sensible to restore the indicated section to the USSR Constitution—naturally, in consideration of the new requirements, and at the same time stipulating appropriate articles relative to guaranteeing the protection of the rights of union and autonomous republics.

Another example: In the 1920's, national rayons and rural soviets were created on the territory of our republic in places where the representatives of certain nations and nationalities were concentrated. One would think that this practice deserves attention in consideration of the contemporary level of political, socio-economic and spiritual developments of the rayons. This would permit more accurate determination of the legal status of national groups, including their representation in state organs, the right to training in their native language, the development of national culture, and so on.

Of course, the appeal to experience is not an end in itself. It is not a question of mechanical execution of the forms and methods of national-state construction of years past. But, it is important to study the methodology of approach to the solution of problems of national policy at various stages of socialist construction, and to take the valuable experience of the past for energizing the institutions through which national interests should be manifested and harmonized.

The role of socialist democracy in strengthening the unity of the fraternal nations is growing. The more democratic the life of a society, the greater the force which unites workers of all nationalities. The party set the task of ensuring the active participation of citizens of every nationality in the work of all links of power and government.

A principled cadre policy is a significant factor in a truly Leninist solution to interethnic problems. Uzbekistan is consistently conducting a policy to ensure that the make-up of the leading cadres and the elected organs reflects the national structure of the republic. The nomenklatura of the party committees includes representatives of various nationalities; and, among the deputies of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th Convocation, there are representatives of 19 nations and nationalities, while the make-up of the local Soviets includes more than 50 nations and nationalities.

Of course this does not at all represent a mechanical distribution of positions on the basis of nationality. While the national make-up is taken into consideration when selecting cadres and formulating the composition of elected organs, priority is given to political, business-like, moral and internationalistic qualities, and the ability to work with people. It must be noted that we still have a large amount of work to do here. As already noted, during the period of stagnation, the shameful practice of promoting people to leading positions on the basis of regionalism and mercenary considerations was prevalent. Those guilty of recidivism in such factors shall be decisively rebuffed in the republic. We are trying to ensure that the spirit of internationalism permeates all forms and methods of cadre policy, and all of our work.

The spread and deepening of democratic processes and the radical restructuring of the economy and the political system is significantly invigorating the civic activeness of the people. This is manifested in particular in the creation of amateur associations and movements, which through their activity reflect a wide circle of interests of the workers and the student youth. For example, internationalist-soldiers are taking an active part in raising the upcoming generation.

Of course, not everything here is flowing smoothly and painlessly. The lack of experience and necessary habits in this rather complex matter is having its effect. Foam of various kinds has appeared on the mighty wave of perestroika. There are instances of irresponsible attempts to divert the processes of democracy and glasnost into the nationalistic streambed, to weaken our fraternal unity, and undermine the internationalist foundations of the Soviet state; and there have been attempts to create a political structure in opposition to the party.

Negative trends are appearing in the activity of certain persons and a number of informal associations. Hiding behind slogans in support of perestroika, self-proclaimed leaders are speaking out, not for uniting our efforts to solve the problems facing us, but to discredit party and Soviet organs, incite nationalism, and urge the people onto the path of lawlessness and anarchy. Out of contact with reality, they are calling for economic exclusiveness; they over-emphasize the language problems and speak of halting the exchange of cadres, and so on.

We must bluntly state that in a number of places nationalist-oriented and corrupt people have managed to attract groups of insufficiently-educated people, and have had a negative influence on the young people. Their actions quite often turn into extremism, and into organizing demonstrations, which in many instances go beyond the bounds of the law. They take upon themselves a heavy burden of responsibility, and their actions may lead to unforeseen consequences.

The republic leadership is far from removing all restraints on democracy, and on glasnost as the self-proclaimed freedom fighters put it. In Uzbekistan there is a mass of acute, unresolved problems in all spheres of the economy, social and cultural life. We are not trying to conceal this. But we are striving to resolve them gradually, step-by-step.

For all of us, a calm, businesslike and critical analysis of the perestroika processes, and a search for practical means of resolving the acute, burning problems is a political necessity—not endlessly whipping up in sensational, distorted information about shortcomings in our development: we have spoken openly and honestly of this in party documents and in the press.

Party committees and all communists must decisively repulse the extremists, and must ensure an enterprising, aggressive approach in posing and solving the acute questions; and they must nip in the bud attempts to divert the people's growing activeness into an anti-perestroika channel. In so doing, we must be guided by the decisions of the party organs and the corresponding acts of legislation. The people must be taught to live and work under conditions of democracy, which presupposes a high level of political culture—in which irresponsibility and indiscipline are unacceptable. Right now it is very important to objectively disclose the still-existing shortcomings, blunders and other elements retarding the republic's socio-economic development; and most important—take a practical role in eliminating them.

In this matter there is an increasing role for all means of ideological influence, and especially the mass information media. Unfortunately, one still encounters mistakes, an excessively peremptory tone, and an excess of emotion in the press and on radio and television. We must provide broad publicity for all the positive things which perestroika brings to people's lives, and constructively criticize the shortcomings; events must be depicted in all their depth, diversity, complexity and contradictions.

The party, by its actions, has summoned a mighty mass movement in defense of perestroika. And we must all answer for ensuring that this movement follows the a constructive path:

#### Develop Cooperation in the Sphere of Culture

Comrades!

The economic and social progress of our peoples is accompanied by the flourishing and convergence of their cultures. Each of the national cultures is a priceless heritage, which must be augmented in every way.

But culture by its very nature cannot endure being hemmed in. In Uzbekistan, just as in the entire country, on the one hand there is support for the flowering of national culture; but on the other hand, a process of internationalization of spiritual life is going on as well. The national is continually being renewed, as it is enriched with the cultural achievements of other nations.

The cooperation of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the spiritual sphere promotes the intensification of these processes. In Alma Ata representatives of the republics' radio and television broadcasting committees in our region have signed an agreement on improving the effectiveness of the joint television program, "Ekran Druzhby" [Screen of Friendship]. A meeting was held in Tashkent among the leading officials of cultural ministries and state committees, and theatrical figures of the fraternal republics, at which a resolution was adopted to set up a coordinating council on problems of developing and mutually enriching the cultures.

Cooperation among the creative collectives is growing stronger. A friendship festival held under the theme, "The USSR—Our Common Home," was a success. Performances by Uzbek amateur folklore groups organized by the republic Ministry of Culture met with great interest in Leninabad, Osh, Tashauz and Chimkent Oblasts. The first friendship festival under the theme, "The Power of Perestroyka is in the Friendship of Nations," will be held in Tashkent in April.

Cooperation is expanding along the lines of the academies of science and popular education, publishing and the book trade, and among newspaper and magazine editors.

The contemporary practice of mutually enriching cultures requires that changes be introduced to the traditional forms of communication. In our view, the conduct of Literary and Arts Days and other forms of intellectual contact requires re-examination. In place of episodical familiarization of the populace with the culture of neighboring peoples, there must be a transition to systematic introduction to their moral values. And this promotes the search for new forms of cooperation.

It seems to us that in order to further improve interethnic relations, greater in-depth study is required of the general processes and peculiarities in the cultural sphere taking place in the republics: uniform approaches must be worked out for them on the part of party, soviet and economic organs and ideological institutions; and, there must be a search for effective ways of satisfying the national-cultural needs of the populace which dwells beyond the limits of their own territorial formations, or which do not have any.

Questions of language policy have become especially acute of late in the country, and in our region and republic as well. Like a touchstone, our attitudes toward it reveal our culture, our patriotic and international feelings, our ability to separate the wheat from the chaff, and our ability to see the prospects for development of our own nation and state as a whole.

As is well-known, the principal direction of language development in the USSR lies in attention to in-depth study of both one's own native language, and Russian. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons the decline in interest for in-depth study of national languages in the schools has led to a situation in which many young men and women have not properly mastered them. This is the case in Uzbekistan too. A part of the scientific-technical intelligentsiya and leading officials of party and Soviet organs also have difficulty communicating in their native language, which leads to a certain alienation from the masses, and a drop in the effectiveness of organizational and political work among the indigenous populace.

Therefore, public concern in the republic about the state of affairs with respect to the study and function of the Uzbek language is entirely understandable. While looking to the public for support, party and Soviet organs and popular education and cultural institutions have a great deal to do in order to correct the situation.

We have set ourselves the task of radically restructuring work on studying the Uzbek language, especially for the representatives of other nationalities living in the republic—naturally, and on a voluntary basis—and above all for children and young men and women. In the republic, training for teachers of Uzbek language and literature for schools where Russian is the language of instruction is organized poorly, as is the development of methods for teaching Uzbek. The scientific-methodological level of academic literature is also low. We feel the need to work out a special-purpose comprehensive Uzbek Language Program, and have issued instructions to do so.

We also deem it important that all leading officials of party and Soviet organs and specialists on the national economy, gradually attain mastery of the language of the indigenous nationality. We also consider it desirable that, when selecting and posting officials to supervisory responsibility in the republic, their work experience in the national regions be taken into consideration. It would also make sense to re-examine the preparation of this category of officials at the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee and at party schools, and to stipulate that the academic programs include study of the colloquial language and the history of the culture, arts and traditions of the indigenous population.

At the same time, objective consideration of questions of Russian language study remains a principally important task. We are very much disturbed by the fact that many

graduates of national schools, and especially the rural ones, do not demonstrate proper knowledge of the Russian language—which as a result has a detrimental effect on their training, their work activities, and their military service.

The republic is experiencing an acute shortage of Russian language instructors in the national schools, especially in the rural area. The popular education authorities do not always approach the shortcomings here with the proper sense of responsibility.

These and other gross miscalculations were discussed at one time at the Uzbek CP Central Committee Bureau, and a Comprehensive Russian Language Program was approved. In accordance with this program, a certain amount of work has been accomplished on perfecting the training process and on propagating the language of interethnic intercourse.

At the same time we cannot but be disturbed by the occasional manifestation of attempts to resist certain national languages. Voices of firebrands are raised here and there, calling upon pupils to sabotage Russian language studies. People are inspired to write letters to the Central Committee, to include collective letters, containing allegations that the Uzbek language has all but died out owing to the domination of Russian, and other such nonsense. Such nationalistic outbursts should be duly rebuffed. For all aspirations to ethnic isolation lead to economic and spiritual impoverishment. And this is not in the interests of our people.

Allow me to remind you of the fact that even in the darkest tsarist days the finest sons and daughters of our people were attracted to the Russian language and Russian culture, and selflessly called upon their countrymen to study it in depth. In the works of Abay and Akhmad Donish, Makhtumkuli and Toktogul, Furkat and many other democratic poets and educators of the masses, one encounters many splendid analyses of the role and significance of the Russian language.

Khamza Khakimzade Niyazy, the founding father of Uzbek-Soviet literature and a herald of the revolution, whose centennial the people of the Soviet Union will observe this year, said: "One of the principal reasons why our local Muslims are still extremely backward, is their lack of attention to the study of the language, customs and culture of Russia, with whose people we are fellow-countrymen."

Thus, the progressive functions of the Russian language at the present time principally derive from the fact that it is the language of inter-ethnic communication, voluntarily chosen by all the nations of our country by virtue of the predominance of the Russian-speaking populace in it, and also because of the historic role of the Russian proletariat and the Russian intelligentsiya in the revolutionary transformations on the territory of the former colonies of the tsarist empire, and the establishment of

the rule of the working people there. After all it is primarily with the aid of the Russian language that we have had the opportunity to come into contact with the achievements in economics, science and technology and with the political and cultural life of other nations of our socialist Fatherland; and yes—to a large extent with foreign countries as well.

The study of the Uzbek and Russian languages and the development of Uzbek-Russian bilingualism is proceeding hand-in-hand with the development of the languages of other nations and nationalities which dwell in the republic. Yet we must frankly acknowledge that during the years of stagnation this problem was not given proper attention in Uzbekistan—and Tajik, Kazakh, Korean and other schools were shut down under various pretexts.

We are currently striving persistently to eliminate such distortions. During this academic year in the republic, at 259 schools subjects are being taught in the Tajik language; at 491 in Kazakh; at 52 in Turkmen; at 40 in Kirghiz; at 12 in Greek; and seven classes are being taught in Korean. The structure of a number of VUZ's provides for departments in which subjects are taught in Tajik, Kazakh, and Crimean Tatar.

The question of providing simultaneous translation into the basic languages in the republic for sessions, meetings and plenums of the Communist Party Central Committee and for sessions of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet is now under discussion. Careful consideration must be given to the question of training cadres of professional translators, and that of organizing a special department at one of the VUZ's. In our opinion these measures will promote further strengthening of inter-ethnic contacts, and mutual enrichment of the national cultures.

In a word, the language problems must be resolved with the utmost of thought and care, taking into consideration the opinions of both the indigenous population and the rest of the international populace in the republic. We must speak of this, inasmuch as a certain portion of the creative intelligentsiya today is proposing that the Uzbek language be given state language status. Another proposal presented is to make two languages the state language: Uzbek and Russian. Numerous suggestions are coming in on the inadvisability of establishing a state language at all. I believe that these questions require all-round consideration. We must not forget that they are not confined to themselves, but are extremely closely interwoven with political, economic and international questions.

Here the social scientists bear heavy responsibility, for they are called upon to provide scientifically-based recommendations on language policy; to define the historically-evolved regions of dense settlements of representatives of the various nationalities, their needs and wants, and to think out appropriate measures.

It goes without saying, that questions of the development of national cultures cannot be confined merely within a framework of language. The way of life, traditions, native crafts—all these deserve concerted attention and concern. Currently, proposals are being considered to set up inter-ethnic cultural centers in the republic, taking into consideration the needs of various national groups.

We still have a great deal to do to more fully satisfy the spiritual needs of all the national groups dwelling on republic territory. We intend to open additional departments in the VUZ's for training national cadres of instructors; organize effective exchange of textbooks, works of fiction, children's literature and so on between the republics; organize publication of books; and devote more attention to visual agitation and informing the public in the languages of the national groups in places where they have settled densely.

Party committees and organizations are also devoting special attention to questions of reviving the traditional forms of culture; making effective use of positive spiritual resources; and the potential of national traditions, rites and popular holidays.

Unfortunately, in recent decades, holidays and rituals once widely-popular in Central Asia and Kazakhstan—Gul Sayli, Khosil Bayrami, Kovun Sayli, and others—have been forgotten, or nearly so. The ancient Maskharaboz-kizikchi, Kugirchokbozy and Dorboz popular theater presentations are disappearing; as are the Mushoira poetry and prose contests, Askiya matches of wit, national sports games, and so on.

And the attempts to replace the Navruz holiday, long celebrated in the Orient, with the artificially-contrived Navbakhor celebrations have provoked clearly justified public dissatisfaction in the republic. After all, Navruz originally signified the start of the new work year for the nations of our region, who possess an ancient culture of agriculture, have profound traditions of respect for the land, toward nature, and toward labor and moral upbringing. It is worth noting that in the past, wars were halted and disputes forgotten during the Navruz celebrations, and people used to strive for a peaceful and neighborly community.

In a word, the moral-aesthetic and humanistic potential of the traditional forms of national culture of every nation must be utilized to the maximum in restoring a healthy spiritual-psychological atmosphere, developing the culture of inter-ethnic relations, and the international upbringing of the masses. The Ideological Commission of the Uzbek CP Central Committee has organized a working group on questions of further development of revolutionary, battle and labor traditions, on restoration of popular holidays and rituals, on increasing their role in communist upbringing, and strengthening the friendship of nations of the USSR.

I would like to emphasize the importance of working out well-thought-out strategy and tactics for atheist work and a politically-proper approach to religion and believers. What sort of errors and neglect are found here? First of all, propaganda on the constitutional clauses on freedom of conscience and legislation on religious cults is still being waged badly; moreover, not only among believers and unbelievers, but also among party and Soviet cadres. Secondly, quite often administrative red tape prevails in solving the problems which arise. Meanwhile, excesses committed in the recent past—when under the guise of intensifying atheist propaganda, popular traditions were forcibly quashed, and centuries-old rites and rituals were forbidden—brought nothing but harm.

Presently these excesses are being corrected. Upon request of the believers, certain previously-closed houses of prayer have been re-opened; questions of publishing religious literature are being resolved positively; and the clergy and believers are being enlisted for cooperation in humanistic social organizations.

Party committees must have a clear-cut conception of the level of religiosity of various groups in the populace, and decisively reject an administrative-bureaucratic approach to religious questions; be more energetic in working at places of residence; and give increased attention to the peoples' needs and to raising the standards of everyday life.

At the same time, we must not relax our demands on communists and Komsomol members who directly participate in religious rites, or for philosophical duplicity. After all, the approval of new political thinking with respect to religion does not signify ideological compromise with it.

Comrades! The formation of a socialist and international way of life is a matter for the entire party, and the entire people. Political experience, labor morality and the moral potential of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia and their profound devotion to a neighborly community of different nations have been mobilized to resolve this noble task.

A special role in this work belongs to the intelligentsia, which is the bearer of the ideals of national consciousness, and has an active influence on its formation. The overall climate of interethnic relations depends to an enormous extent on the civic maturity of the intelligentsia and its depth of understanding of the root interests of its nation, and society as a whole. The overwhelming majority of the republic's scientific and cultural figures hold high the banner of internationalism, and are genuine conduits for its ideals, and faithfully and truly serve the cause of strengthening the friendship and brotherhood of our nations.

Unfortunately there are also those who display ideological instability; who with their irresponsible statements are inflaming unhealthy passions and emotions on nationalist soil. It would be well for such hotheads to cool off, take full responsibility for their actions, and recognize their civic duty to their people.

It is also worth mentioning, that the retreat of certain representatives of the intelligentsia from their internationalistic positions testifies to shortcomings in ideological work with them on the part of party organs. We have drawn the proper conclusions from this, and are striving to beef-up contacts with the creative intelligentsia. Regular meetings are held at the party central committee with scientific and cultural figures, at which urgent problems of perestroika are discussed in an atmosphere of openness, and specific tasks are set for energizing the work of the intelligentsia.

These meetings indicate how much remains to be done in order to achieve radical changes in intellectual life. Measures have been taken to expand the party stratum in creative societies. We must place more faith in artistic feelings and the social vigilance of the creative intelligentsia—and at the same time help them more fully recognize the contradictions and complexities of life.

Experience shows that under conditions of growth of national consciousness and growing interest in problems of culture and history, adjustments must be made to ideological-educational activity; everything positive that serves to humanize international relations must be supported and developed in every way; and everything that leads to inflaming national passions and national exclusiveness, must be consistently opposed.

A great deal can and must be done here by the party organizations and the Komsomol. They have been summoned, in accordance with the glorious traditions of the party and the people, to bring up the people—and above all the upcoming generation—with noble feelings of Soviet patriotism and a clear understanding of the fact that the fulfillment of one's patriotic duty today signifies a high degree of commitment to creative work, and redoubling of our efforts in all sectors of perestroika.

The formation of the internationalist consciousness of the masses presupposes effective utilization of all existing means of ideological influence—political and economic training; the press, radio and television; lecture propaganda, and other forms. Coordination of the international educational work of various organizations on the basis of a unified comprehensive program will permit varying its forms and methods, and eliminating duplication.

Speaking of the work of party organizations in the realm of increasing the effectiveness of forms and methods of international education, one must not forget that it must

be built on the basis of reliable information, study of public opinion and other factors, which will make it possible to take the proper decisions.

Perfecting inter-ethnic relations is not possible without enriching the theoretical basis of the party's nationality policy. Purposeful coordination of the work of research groups is necessary, and party organs must implement the practical recommendations of scientists in the cause of enriching the moral potential of society. Special attention must be devoted to working out a complex of problems which provide direct access to the practice of directing inter-ethnic relations and international upbringing.

#### In the Struggle for Peace and Social Progress

Comrades!

You know full well that the process of perfecting inter-ethnic relations concerns more than domestic politics: it is directly associated with Soviet foreign policy. Today we are reaffirming the efficacy of Lenin's principles on socialist federation in this important area as well. The union republics—including Uzbekistan—are becoming more and more involved in the international community and the international division of labor. The goal of this activity is to make a contribution to realizing the policy of the CPSU for strengthening international peace and security; and, by means of mutually-advantageous trade and economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation, accelerating the republic's socio-economic development—and thereby that of the country as well.

Such an approach permits us to find harmonious forms of combining the foreign-policy and economic interests of the unified Soviet state with the capabilities and needs of each union republic. One can see via the example of Uzbekistan and the other republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan as well, that the direct contacts and bilateral relations being developed with foreign countries are beginning to have an ever-greater effect on society and on the welfare of the Soviet people.

The withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was recently completed. The soldiers of the Fatherland have come home. They have fulfilled their patriotic and international duty honestly and bravely. And our republic, together with our entire multinational country has done and continues to do everything possible to assist our southern neighbor—the Afghan people—to choose the path of peace and concord; for only such a path can put an end to the bloodletting, and can promote the establishment of tranquillity in the ancient land of Afghanistan.

The Afghan people must determine their own ultimate fate. However, no matter which choice they make, the proximity of our peoples is a reality that is not only

geographical, but historical as well. Together with all the republics, we will continue to render the necessary assistance to our southern neighbor.

Our cooperation with the great land of India is actively developing. Economic and trade ties are expanding, and the question of establishing joint enterprises is being worked out. A direct air route has been established between Tashkent and Delhi. Indian companies are constructing modern hotel complexes in Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara; and a branch of the Indian cultural-information center will be opened in the republic's capitol.

Contacts with the socialist countries which are members of CEMA are of priority importance for us; these ties are developing both in the traditional forms, as well as through new forms of immediate, direct cooperation.

Ties between the Uzbek SSR and the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SFRY) are indicative; this year they have assumed a durable legal basis in the form of programs for bilateral contacts along party and state lines—and cooperation in the areas of economics, trade, science and culture.

Direct contacts with the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC are increasing; border trade is increasing, and a project for creating joint enterprises is being worked out.

Highly-promising contours of cooperation have been noted between the Uzbek SSR and Malaysia, the Brazilian state of Serra, the West German state of Lower Saxony, and other countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and Central America. Active ties are being maintained along the lines of sister cities—Tashkent and Seattle (USA), Tashkent and Skopje (Yugoslavia), and Bukhara and Cordoba (Spain). Under these conditions there is an increasing role for the Committee on Foreign Economic Ties of the Presidium of the republic Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Uzbekintorg Association, and the Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, as the coordinators of foreign-economic, scientific-technical, cultural and other international contacts with republic departments and organizations.

Another reflection of the interest in cooperation with Uzbekistan is the increasing number of diplomatic delegations from foreign countries in Tashkent, and requests to open offices representing foreign firms in Tashkent. Sovplastital, a joint Soviet-Italian firm is operating successfully; as is Variant, a Soviet-Bulgarian enterprise. And the volume of services in the cooperative sphere is expanding.

As we can see, the foreign ties of the Uzbek SSR are beginning to take on a new quality; and consequently—like domestic political questions—they require re-thinking, taking into consideration the overlapping jurisdictions of the union-level and republic-level authorities. In the course of preparations for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Improving Inter-Ethnic Relations, we must also keep this important sphere of international activity in mind, and establish new prerequisites to ensure that the processes of perestroika, democratization, economic reform and new political thinking are viewed on a broad, worldwide scale; and that they remain on the track of mutual understanding and progress, peace and friendship. Comrades! Only a few questions on improving international relations in our regions at the contemporary stage have been elucidated here.

Considering the nature of the conference, we believe that each of its participants understands full well that the various forms of direct economic and intellectual ties between our republics elucidated in the report will promote the inculcation of high standards of inter-ethnic relations, and strengthening the internationalist consciousness of the people. At the same time, contacts are being developed, and there is an on-going exchange of spiritual values among the peoples of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Transcaucasus and Baltic republics, and Moldavia. Contacts have been established with the krays, oblasts, cities and rayons of various regions of the country. All of this makes our lives even more sanguine and dynamic, and it permits us to equip ourselves with all the new and progressive things that perestroika brings.

History has shown that both our present and our future depends on the flourishing of the consolidation and unification of all the nations. Our patriotic and international duty is to preserve and multiply everything that serves to unify Soviet society, as the basis for the free development and prosperity of all the peoples in the country, and to strengthen the might of our Motherland.

Thank you for your attention.

#### Tashkent Conference on Interethnic Ties Continues

CPSU State Legal Department  
18300444 Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
25 Feb 89 p 3

[Speech by A. A. Sazonov, deputy chief of the subdivision of inter-national relations of the State Legal Department of the CPSU Central Committee: "The Development of Nationality Relations in the USSR: The Tendencies, Experience, Problems, and Ways of Their Solution" at regional scientific-practical conference]

[Text] The introduction, into the discussion of the regional scientific-practical conference of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, of the urgent problems

of the improvement of inter-national relations in our country underscores the aspiration of the Central Committees of the communist parties of the union republics of the region, scholars, and ideological workers to make their contribution to the preparation of the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Taking into account the detailed report of R. N. Nishanov, which illuminated not only the problems of republic scale, but also the urgent problems of in the sphere of the inter-national relations of the region and the country, I believe it to be expedient to dwell only on some questions of the development and improvement of the national relations in present-day conditions, the problems and difficulties arising in inter-national relations, as well as to comment on some theoretical and practical problems. I think that the basic discussion will be developed in the sections. This will allow us to accumulate and utilize the suggestions of the participants of the conference.

**Thus, some problems of the development of national relations: Trends and experience.**

It is well known, all of our experience of socialist construction confirms that, in analyzing the state of affairs in the sphere of inter-national relations, we are turning to the economy, politics, social and legal aspects, ecological processes, questions of language, culture, way of life, traditions, habits, and psychology. This means that, whatever sphere of social life in our multinational country we would analyze, we are sure to face the national relations that affect both levels—the social and the personal.

The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU provided the answer to many theoretical and practical questions and confirmed prognoses and perspectives for the renewal of society in conformity with the policy of the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress. This found reflection in the materials of the conference on the questions of inter-national relations.

Analysis shows that without revolutionary transformations in this sphere it is impossible to solve the tasks of perestroika successfully. This is why the CPSU Central Committee considered it necessary, in the preparation of the Plenum on this question, to listen to the views of scholars, party and soviet workers, and supported the idea of holding a number of regional conferences. Yours is the first to be held.

The report in sufficient detail noted the achievements of nationalities policy for the country as a whole. Without this, it is impossible to assess objectively the current state of our society. But we would not be objective if we would not answer the question: What has happened in our common house?

To what conclusions will we be led by the events in Alma-Ata in December 1986, the events of the past few years in Nagorno Karabakh and around it—in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the autonomy movements of the representatives of a number of peoples, and the processes in the Baltic, the Ukraine, and Moldavia.

Without detracting from the historic achievements, we must make a critical analysis of the state of affairs. The reasons for the aggravation of inter-national relations and the splashes of nationalism and chauvinism in a number of regions during the past few years reach with their roots into the past decades. The answer to this question—what has happened in our common house—was given by the 19th Party Conference:

- The dynamism inherent in the first, initial stage of the formation of the multinational state of Soviets was lost;
- a deviation from the Leninist principles of nationalities policy occurred;
- a violation of legality took place during the period of the cult of the personality, right up to repressions against a number of peoples of the 1930's-1940's and the beginning of the 1950's;
- the results achieved in the solution of the nationalities question were absolutized;
- negative tendencies in this sphere were hushed up;
- manifestations of national egoism and conceit, parochialism and parasitic attitudes did not receive the requisite party assessment.

As a task of historic importance, the 19th Party Conference defined the task of consistently, persistently, and creatively developing the Leninist norms and principles of nationalities policy, of resolutely cleansing them of deformations and artificial layers. The internationalist Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is irreconcilable with any varieties of chauvinism and nationalism, serves as the basis for this.

It should be noted that in numerous letters to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the central mass media during the past 1 1/2 to 2 years many proposals of workers on questions of nationalities policy and the improvement of inter-national relations have been received. Many of them have been taken into consideration in the materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. More than half a year has passed since it was held. Now the country is attentively following the preparations for the Plenum, in pointed discussions on radio, television, and in letters the following propositions are being sharply debated:

- On the Soviet people as a new historical community;

- on the resolution or non-resolution of the nationalities question in the USSR;
- on whether it is correct to introduce the term "parasitic inclinations" with respect to some republics;
- on a measure of decentralization and delimitation of the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet republics;
- on republic and regional khozrachet;
- on the sovereignty of the union republics;
- on nationalities-state construction;
- on nationalities living outside the boundaries of their own state-territorial formations or not having such;
- on national languages and bilingualism;
- on the Russian language as a means of inter-national intercourse;
- on nationality consciousness and cultural distinctiveness;
- on the correlation of the inter-national and the national;
- on the national and the nationalistic;
- on the national and the religious;
- on structures for the management of nationality processes and others;

Let us dwell on some of them.

In a number of party documents and in the USSR Constitution, it is stated that in our country a new historic, social and international community of people—the Soviet people—has been formed.

In the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, the following formulation was given: "A new historic community—the Soviet people—has become a reality."

It must be said that in a number of regions, some citizens regard this formulation negatively. Thus, at a plenum of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, one of the well-known poets called it a "stagnation-Brezhnev" formulation. A negative attitude to it has also been expressed in a number of creative unions of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

It should be taken into account that the non-acceptance today of the concept of "the Soviet people" here and there is closely linked with the demand for the introduction of a divided citizenship for the USSR and the union republics. In essence, such a formulation of the question leads to discrimination on a nationality basis.

A few words on the nationalities question and the degree of its solution. V. I. Lenin always warned about the inadmissibility of a formal approach to the nationalities question.

In the decades that have passed and today as well, several points of view have circulated. The problem of the essence of the nationalities question, its resolution and non-resolution, remains at the center of attention of the discussion of the scholars.

A number of points of view are known:

- The nationalities question is solved fully and definitively;
- it has been solved in the form in which it was inherited from the capitalist past;
- the conclusion about the solution of the nationalities question is premature, and the nationalities question is a reality of present-day Soviet society;
- the nationalities question will exist as long as nations exist;

It is well known that the founders of Marxism-Leninism use the concept of "the national question" in the assessment of antagonistic, exploiter nationalities relations.

And on this plane, on the plane of the elimination of social-class and inter-national antagonism, the nationalities question in our country has been solved with the victory of the October Revolution.

In the course of the construction of socialism, a powerful national economic complex and a multinational Soviet culture was formed, and socialist national cultures were preserved and developed. But socialism itself still does not fully solve the tasks of overcoming the socio-political, economic and cultural inequality between nations and nationalities, between people.

Full equality between nations has not been attained up to now. In many respects, this is still the result of the deformations of nationalities policy during the past decades. Although in so doing we must still emphasize that the principles of the equality of all peoples were not only proclaimed after the October Revolution, but also realized to a significant degree. None of us can object to the historical facts which indicate that remote national districts of tsarist Russia, which previously were backward in socio-economic and cultural respects, have become industrially developed as the result of the fraternal assistance of the Russian people. Peoples that were liberated from social and national oppression, in their

turn, made a contribution hand in had with the Russian people in the solution of the tasks of creating the foundation of the socialist economy.

During the years of the construction of socialism the internationalist foundation was laid, which made it possible: To form the USSR as a voluntary federation of equal socialist republics;

—to unite the socialist nations and nationalities within the framework of the USSR in order to proceed to the solution of the problems of the equalization of the levels of their political, social, economic, and spiritual state;

—to develop every republic through both the realization of its own potential and the joint efforts within the framework of the entire national economic complex;

—to cultivate internationalism and to strengthen the friendship of peoples, which made it possible for all nationalities of the USSR to defend the socialist achievements of the entire Soviet people.

Behind these conclusions is the real experience of our country.

About the deformations in nationalities relations and the reasons for the manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism.

As we have already noted, a large part of the distortions of the nationalities policy was manifested in the Stalin years, which found expression:

—In his idea of "autonomization," subjected to sharp criticism by V. I. Lenin;

—in the dismantling of the mechanism of the administration of nationalities affairs;

—in the change and contraction of the sphere of activity of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet in comparison with the activity of the USSR Central Executive Committee;

—in the repressions of the 1920's and 1930's, both against [non-Russian] nationalities and Russian cadres under the pretext of the struggle lagainst bourgeois nationalism;

—in the repressions of the 1940's against a number of peoples (the Crimea, the Volga Area, the Northern Caucasus, the Transcaucasus);

—in the persecution of whole social groups of the population at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's (the "Doctors' Plot" and the campaign of the "struggle against cosmopolitanism").

It should be noted that, at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's, attempts were made to restore the Leninist principles of nationalities policy, but this activity was not developed.

During the period of stagnation, there was no resolute condemnation of the Stalinist repressions and the unjust attitude to our peoples, and the scholars did not demonstrate activeness in the objective assessment of history and the present. The practice of the reduction of rights and infringements of the interests of a number of union and autonomous republics on the part of the central departments, and on the part of the local party and soviet organs—the inability to defend their positions, were observed. The economic interests of some nations and nationalities were disregarded.

A situation has developed in the country, where in the Baltic, for example, the indicators of national income per capita are much higher than in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia.

Payments from public consumption funds per capita are highest in the Baltic, Georgia, Belorussia, and Moldavia. The lowest—in the republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

At the same time, in terms of the level of higher and secondary special education, the indicators in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan are higher than the all-union indicators.

This is indicative of the fact that in the socio-economic development of the republics there are substantial disproportions, which also affect the state of inter-national relations.

In their work, the party committees still are not always attentive to national traditions, to the fair representation of various nationality groups in the elective and executive organs. But, you see, outside the boundaries of their republics there live about 60 million people.

The intensification of attention to this question is an extremely important task, which is not always and everywhere fulfilled correctly. The growth of the nationality consciousness of cadres has both positive and negative manifestations.

On the one hand, it calls forth the activation of nationality cadres, the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia in the process of the struggle for perestroika.

On the other hand, it can call forth, and this is being manifested now, splashes of nationalism, chauvinism, and separatist tendencies in some regions.

The conditions of glasnost and the expansion of the democratization of society have called forth the intense activity of tens of millions of Soviet people, who previously were silent, inactive, and had lost the desire to reveal their position and to defend their views.

The ecological situation is having an increasingly strong effect on the character of inter-national relations. Indisputable harm was done to the inter-national unity of peoples by the underestimation of the multi-confessional character of the country (more than 40 religious denominations). As a result, there are cases of the manifestation of nationalism that are nourished on religious soil.

**Territorial-nationalities problems.** During the past 2-3 years, initiative groups representing various nationalities have become more active, coming out in support of the restoration of their national statehood, the return to the former place of their residence (Germans, Meskheti Turks, Crimean Tatars, Chechens-Akkintsy, and others).

**Cultural and Language problems.** Serious problems have accumulated in this sphere: Problems of bilingualism and the national status of the state language.

In the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Belorussia, and a number of oblasts of the Ukraine, the situation with respect to the study of the native language is extremely unfavorable. The contradictions between the objective process of the internationalization of public life and the valuable reference points of the population, which in a number of regions at times take on nationalist forms, have become aggravated. The nationalities living outside their state-territorial formations do not everywhere have possibilities to realize national-cultural needs.

The diversity of national cultures and their distinctiveness—this is a historical, social achievement of the country.

In letters of workers to the central mass media, the desires are expressed to grant real independence in the solution of the questions of national culture, education, the press, and other questions of the spiritual life of the union republics. To overcome more quickly the administrative-command method of management from the center in questions of the formation of cultural and language policy in the provinces.

Certain achievements in the development of bilingualism are well known. But there are still many unsolved problems. The poor knowledge of the Russian language in a number of regions of the country makes inter-national intercourse more difficult, narrows inter-national contacts and the possibilities of joining the culture of other peoples.

The experience of our country is testimony to the fact that the basic form of language development is national-Russian bilingualism. It is necessary to create favorable

conditions for national-Russian bilingualism, and this is connected with the demand to improve the teaching of the national languages of the peoples of the USSR and the Russian language in the national schools. A democratic approach to the choice of the language of instruction—this is the condition and the demand which is expressed in the discussion in the mass media.

I would like to inform the participants of the conference about some questions, the solution of which was outlined by the 19th Party Conference and is being realized. A mechanism for the management of inter-national relations is being created. Our subdivision for inter-national relations and the sectors in the communist parties of the union republics, as well as individual officials in the CPSU obkom and raykoms, the department in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet—these are only first steps in the formation of such a system.

We hope that, in the course of the preparation for the Plenum, an All-Union Scientific Research Center for Questions of Nationalities Relations will be created, an all-union journal illuminating the problems of the life of nations and nationalities, that conditions will be created for the purposeful training of specialists.

We will have to solve a number of questions aimed at the real, legal guarantee of autonomies, which requires elaborations of new legislative acts. It is proposed to change the activity of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I would like to hope that the participants of the conference, having discussed the problems, will make their contribution to the preparation of the Plenum.

(This report is published according to an abbreviated stenographic record)

**Kazakh CP Central Committee's Dzhanibekov**  
18300444 Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
26 Feb 89 p 3

[Speech by U. D. Dzhanibekov, secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee: "Party Leadership of the International and Patriotic Education of the Working Masses"]

[Text] Our approaches in the sphere of national and inter-national relations, inter-national and patriotic education, as well as the party guidance of these processes, are determined today not only by the conditions that have been changed under the influence of the ideas of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, but also by the non-ordinariness and complexity of the problems being solved in connection with this.

I do not conceal, I have more than once had to listen to a reproach to the effect that supposedly we have encountered so many negative phenomena because of the extreme expansion of democracy. What can one say

apropos of this? People who are accustomed to reason according to the old stereotype, apparently, do not understand that the problems which we encounter today have become ripe precisely because of the lack of democracy in the past, when a pseudo-internationalist approach was manifested in the theory and practice of the nationalities question. Not so long ago, it seemed to us that we are building the "bright building of the future," we are increasing the level of its floors—knowledge and skills, we are improving general secondary and higher education. And all of a sudden it turns out that the walls of the building being erected by us had a defect and cracks, secondary education was turned into average, higher—slightly higher than secondary, and the reform turned out to be proforma.

And now again we have to reorganize the guidance of public education, to create new programs, textbooks, and visual teaching aids, since, having been occupied with increasing the stories of our building, we, it turns out, we have forgotten about the foundation that is laid in the general education school, especially in its elementary link. You, most likely, will remember how, beginning with the 1950's, from five-year plan to five-year plan the task was set of universal secondary education, which gave rise to a great deal of formalism in raising the education of the population. The so-called poly-technicalization of the school, not fortified with material resources, also did not lead anywhere. About 4 years ago, we launched another cause—the instruction of children from age 6, without having the requisite material-technical base for this. Now we are compelled to reduce it as well.

A better state of aesthetic education of the youth remains to be desired. Today we are dealing with a phenomenon which has little interest in history, the culture of its people, reads little or not at all, cannot speak the language of its parents, if we talk about the children of Kazakh, German, Uighur, Ukrainian, and Korean families living in the cities. He cannot sing, dance, take pleasure in the world of the beautiful.

I exaggerate, possibly, but this is a fact which we cannot escape. In Kazakhstan, unfortunately, in the presence of its own Ministry of Education, Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, and the "Mektep" Publishing House, during the 70 years of Soviet power, no strict system of aesthetic education of pupils with regard to national peculiarities and local conditions was created.

We are now compelled to single out 79 rayons, where few schools, clubs, libraries and public health facilities were built. During the past year, the majority of graduates of the pedagogical VUZ's were sent into these rayons, they were given more school equipment, instructional and visual aids, and computer equipment. The best teachers of the republic have visited them, having extended necessary methodic assistance.

However, quick results are not to be expected, for the activity of the party committees, organs of public education and schools is affected by the weight of the old stereotypes that have been formed by the years, by the habits of acting in the tried and tested regime of "from above to below", in which the lower links began movement only by command from above.

We have learned our lesson well from the Alma-Ata events of December 1986 and to not need moral admonitions from the outside, as some authors of one television film shown recently on Central Television tried to do. Every republic has quite a few problems of its own.

Three fundamental conclusions we consider to be the alpha and omega: Not to overemphasize and not to ignore national distinctive features; to foresee and anticipate, not to accumulate problems, not to pander to negative phenomena; to be bolder in meeting difficulties that arise and to find unusual solutions for the eliminate tension. Thus, the Germans raised the question of opening a pedagogical institute in their language and the transfer of the German Theater from Temirtau to Alma-Ata, the Uighurs—of the introduction of VUZ entrance examinations in the Uighur language for graduates of nationalities schools, the Turks—of the recognition of their nationality membership through change of entries in their passports, the Kurds, Greeks and Crimean Tatars—of the study of their languages as native ones, the Koreans—of the construction of a theater in Almaty, etc. These questions have been solved and are being solved in accordance with established procedure. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of the Kazakh Republic Party Organization on the International and Patriotic Education of Workers" also points us to this.

Proceeding from the situation in the republic that has taken shape during the many years of stagnation, we are striving to create a harmonious system of managing the tendencies and directions in the sphere of national and inter-national relations. In the apparatus of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, a sector for national and international relations has been created, and in the party obkoms—the posts of consultants. For the purpose of involving in the work on the inter-national education of the officials of the party aktiv, the executives of the mass media, the officials of the creative unions, scholars, as a rule from representatives of the various nationalities who enjoy authority in the republic, commissions on national and inter-national relations have been formed. They are studying and analyzing the state of affairs in the region, they inform the party committees, and they develop practical recommendations.

This system of managing the improvement of international relations also includes the public formations of the Soviets of People's Deputies, the trade unions, and the Komsomol organs. Moreover, for each of them a sphere of activity, goals and tasks have been defined. Thus, for example, the Permanent Commission of the

KaSSR Supreme Soviet guarantees the strict observance of the constitutional rights of every nationality group living in the republic and follows the application of normative act in the sphere of national and inter-national relations. In its study groups, people of different nationalities are represented, who also keep an eye on the satisfaction of the national-cultural needs of the population, the requests and wishes of the workers.

Permanent deputy groups have been formed in the oblast and the Alma-Ata City soviets, under which 56 deputy groups have been created, representing the interests of the Meskhetin-Turkish, Azerbaijani, Greek, Dungan, Uighur, German, Korean, and Polish population.

In order not to create a great multitude of cultural centers that are withdrawn into national frontiers, a republic socio-political for the propagation of Leninist nationality policy was opened in Alma-Ata, which coordinates the activity of all departments and organizations in the matter of the improvement of inter-national relations. It includes the Alma-Ata branch of the V. I. Lenin Museum, the department of scientific research in the sphere of inter-national relations of the Academy of sciences, the methods study room for the study of nationality languages of the Ministry of Education, the studio for television films in nationality languages, music lounges, and video salons.

Inter-national relations are a delicate sphere, which requires special tactfulness and attention to problems of one sort or another. Since we are moving toward the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which will examine the questions of inter-national relations, we would consider it expedient to reflect in its documents an objective characterization of the history of the development of the socialist nations and the formation of the USSR, in order to arm us, the practical workers, with basic materials defining the approaches of the CPSU to nationalities-problems with regard to the situation that has taken shape during the years of Soviet power.

Further. The time has come to make a fundamental assessment of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Meskhetin Turks, and the Kurds, whose resettlement from their long-occupied places was a manifestation of Stalinist arbitrariness.

Numerous discussions are not being conducted about the representation of the various nationality groups in the socio-political structure of the country. This is correct. A great deal has already been reconsidered. Today, the workers of 80 nationalities are represented in the Soviets of People's Deputies, the trade union and Komsomol organs, and in the people's control system of Kazakhstan.

In the interest of the undertaking, we should provide for the greatest possible representation in the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It would be advisable to have, in the government of the USSR, a USSR State Committee for Nationalities Affairs (Goskomnats).

Nationalities problems, as is well known, do not splash out at once. In this connection I would like to underscore that the scholars and social scientists must competently and dialectically study the reasons and the character of contradictions in nationalities relations, the ways of overcoming them, and the forms and methods of international and patriotic education of the workers with regard to the distinctive features of the various categories of the population.

It is necessary to have an all-union periodical publication devoted to nationalities questions, special programs on Central Television and All-Union Radio with broadcasting in the languages of the peoples of the USSR. To grant to the union republics the right to themselves to establish any publications, especially in languages of the nationalities, satisfying the needs of the nations, with regard, it goes without saying, to their self-financing. To significantly increase the output of films in the languages of the nationalities and to practice the translation of the films of the republic studios with subtitles. To organize in a centralized manner the output of textbooks, methods aids, dictionaries, and phrase-books in the languages of the peoples which do not have their own national-territorial formations

"We cannot, of course, permit for even the smallest people to disappear, for the language of even the smallest people to be lost," M. S. Gorbachev said at a meeting with leaders in science and culture on 6 January 1989.

The question of language is put by the party in precisely this way. However, the discussion of the various aspects of national-state construction in our republic by a number of specialists and even by high authorities in this sphere, it seems to us, not quite legitimately is being narrowed to the legal, and even only the constitutional solution of the question—the conferring of the status of state language either to the Kazakh language alone, suggesting quite seriously that this is more than sufficient for its development, or to the Kazakh and the Russian languages simultaneously, proceeding from the situation that has developed in the course of many years.

One after the other, the Kazakh language has lost many links of its social basis. It did not begin to fulfill many of the social functions characteristic of the languages of Soviet nations equal to it. The social prerequisites for its functioning were ruthlessly destroyed by the voluntarist and command-bureaucratic machine, which stood in the path of the young people who aspired to the heights of contemporary science, culture, and socio-economic activity on the basis on the basis of the education they received in their native language.

This trend has received powerful legal, social, economic and ideological support. How much exaggeration there was until recently with respect to the question of which man married which woman, which woman married

which man, how many representatives of various nationalities work in one collective or another, passing these facts off as the "merging" of nations.

And behind this screen we tried not to notice the serious errors in the nationalities question, for which we now have to pay. In the 1950's and especially in the 1970's, the legal positions of the Kazakh language were significantly cut, and its legal position in comparison with its official status according to the KaSSR Constitution of 1937 was limited. Adhering to the positions of genuine inter-nationalism, we are obliged to take large-scale steps and far-reaching steps of both legal and socio-economic order that are aimed at the development of the social functions of the Kazakh language, as well as the languages of the nationalities of other union republics.

In connection with this, we consider it possible to introduce an amendment in Article 45 of the USSR Constitution about the right of citizens to education, having set it forth in the wording: "This right is guaranteed... by the possibility of instruction, education, and socially useful activity in the native language."

We have discussed language problems with scholars and students, workers and leading cultural figures. Not long ago, at a session of the Central Committee Buro, which discussed questions of the preparation for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a decision was unanimously adopted about the necessity of the recognition of the Kazakh and the Russian languages as state languages of the KaSSR. I would like to underscore once again that this does not in the least contradict the free development of the other national languages of the republic. In the republic a good deal is being done for this as well. In the schools, instruction is being conducted in the Kazakh, Russian, Uighur, Uzbek, and Tajik languages, 9 other languages—German, Korean, Azerbaijani, Meskhetin-Turkish, Kurdish, Polish, Greek, Dungan, and Crimean-Tatar—are studied as native languages. Books, newspapers, and journals are published in 6 languages, television and radio are broadcast in 5 languages. We will conduct this work further.

Practically everywhere, where the population expresses the desire for the study of its native language, whether this be Kazakh, Polish, German, or Meskhetin-Turkish, we try to create for this the necessary conditions, proceeding, of course, from the local possibilities.

Nevertheless, as the analysis shows, the people who speak languages of the nationalities fluently have not become more. Why? The whole question turns on the failure to set going a method for the rapid assimilation of languages.

In the republic, an integral system of measures is being put into effect for the improvement of the study of both the Kazakh and the Russian languages, the consolidation of real bilingualism on the condition of free choice, the development and equal use of all other languages being

used by the population of Kazakhstan. We are deeply convinced that precisely such an approach has a beneficial influence on the moral atmosphere and on the cultivation of high standards of inter-national relations.

But life prompts the necessity of the composition, for the country as a whole, of a state program for the development and equal use of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, which would be based on a linguistically-developed ethnic map, reflecting the demands for every language, the concrete type of bilingualism in this or that milieu and spheres of public life.

The prestige of a language is not raised by slogans or by decrees, but by its concrete carriers—people. It is necessary to train people to use their native language and to treat with respect the language of other peoples.

In so doing, we proceed from the fact that, regardless of where a person would go, wanting to receive services in his native language, he would satisfy his needs. We now have begun to receive telegrams, parcels and letters in the Kazakh language as well.

The most important political result of the first years of perestroika is the growing social activeness of people, the development of their creative initiative. Today, political methods and political approaches are being advanced into the center of party work on the study and management of the trends and directions in national and inter-national relations, although the process of the correction of the extremes and deformations in this matter is protracted and extremely complex. Here the scientific approach is dependable. Long ago the necessity ripened for the development of scientific foundations for national and inter-national relations, and to carry out this responsible task is our honorable and difficult task.

**Tajik CP Central Committee's Dadabayev**  
18300444 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
26 Feb 89 p 3

[Speech by A. D. Dadabayev, secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee: "Social Justice—The Basis of a Policy to Satisfy Spiritual Needs"]

[Text] Perestroika has exposed and illuminated quite a few acute questions of public life. Among them are the problems of inter-national relations, which, during the years of stagnation, proved to be excluded from theoretical comprehension and practical development.

In so doing, it is impossible to forget that, thanks to the Leninist nationalities policy, based on the principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, our country, in spite of all the deformations, has attained considerable successes in the solution of such very difficult problems as the nationalities question.

"One of the greatest achievements of socialism," M. S. Gorbachev underscored at the 19th Party Conference, "is the union of equal nations and nationalities that took shape in our country. This makes it possible today to say with the most profound conviction that in the future, too, the consistent implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy can be the only sound basis of our development."

The enormous work carried out by the party during the years of Soviet power in the sphere of the solution of the nationalities question has laid a strong foundation of socialist internationalism, on which the unity and friendship of our peoples stands and will stand.

However, we also cannot close our eyes to the gross violations and various deformations of the practice of Leninist principles of nationalities policy that took place during the period of the personality cult and the stagnant years. In nationalities relations, arbitrariness and dogmatism were frequently permitted, and at times the interests of different nations and nationalities were ignored. Administrative-command methods penetrated into this delicate sphere of social life as well.

Considerable damage was also inflicted by the unthinking repetition, the massive introduction, into the public consciousness, of the dangerous stereotype of the unproblematic character of nationalities relations, and the dogmatic thesis of the full and final solution of the nationalities question.

Meanwhile, insufficient regard for the needs of the socio-economic and cultural development of the individual republics, autonomous formations and groups of nationalities led to the increase of public dissatisfaction and the origin of conflict situations on inter-national soil.

The situation of window-dressing and the far-fetched unproblematic character of nationalities relations, which held sway in those years, did not allow the discernment of the appearance and development of national egoism and conceit, parasitism and regionalism.

Extracting lessons from the mistaken practice of the past years, the party organization of Tajikistan, in the spirit of the ideas of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, is setting and solving the task of the comprehensive development of inter-national relations with the fraternal union republics in the economy, science and culture, and the maximum satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the representatives of the other nations and nationalities living in the republic in the sphere of language, culture, religious confession, and the fair solution of cadre, social and other questions.

Of course, not all of these questions are solved at once fully and comprehensively. For this, time is needed, and funds, and, as they say, good will and constant efforts. The party and soviet organs, the public organizations, and the ideological aktiv of the republic are analyzing in

detail the real state of inter-national processes, in a timely manner they introduce correctives into the practice of inter-national and patriotic education. We are striving in this work to reach every labor and educational collective, every settlement. All this requires its close coordination with the solution of the socio-economic, consumer, ecological and cultural tasks.

In the republic, an integrated program for the inter-national and atheistic education of the population has been developed and is being put into effect. All of this enables us to see the long-term, to conduct the work more single-mindedly. With regard to the current situation, we are introducing the necessary correctives.

An important element here is control over the course of the realization of the outlined measures.

An important task has been set by the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference—to secure, for all nationalities living outside the boundaries of their state-territorial formations, or not having such [formations], greater possibilities for the realization of their national-cultural needs in the sphere of education, intercourse, popular creativity, the creation of centers of national culture, the use of religious and other requirements.

As other union republics, Tajikistan in terms of the composition of its population is multinational. On its territory, in a single harmonious family, live and work representatives of over 80 nationalities, including Uzbeks, Russians, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Tatars, Germans, and the representatives of other peoples.

After the Tajiks, the Uzbeks constitute the greatest proportion. From the very beginning of the formation of the republic, Uzbeks have been regarded in Tajikistan, not as one of the large ethnic groups, but as indigenous population. And this is no coincidence since the historical roots and fates, the customs and the culture of both of our peoples were closely interwoven.

The Uzbeks are widely represented in the elective party, soviet, and Komsomol organs, in the apparatus of the Tajik CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the TaSSR Supreme Soviet and the TaSSR Council of Ministers, the Tajik Trade Union Council, and the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Tajikistan, they manage enterprises and kolkhozes, public and creative organizations.

For example, among the deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet, Uzbeks constitute 16.8 percent, of local Soviets—23.8 percent, and in the composition of the party committees of Leninabad and Khatlon Oblast, where there is a dense Uzbek population, their proportion comes to 24-28 percent. Among the kolkhoz chairmen, Uzbeks constitute 28, sovkhoz directors—21.3, and directors of inter-farm enterprises—21.7 percent.

In the republic, the name of the chairman of the largest kolkhoz in Tajikistan, the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin of Proletarskiy Rayon of Leninabad Oblast, the twice Hero of Socialist Labor, and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Abdugafur Samatov, is well known.

For the Uzbek population of Tajikistan, besides the daily republic paper SOVET TOZHIKISTONI of PRAVDA format, pages in two oblast newspapers are published, as well as 2 rayon newspapers and pages in the Uzbek language in more than 20 rayon and city newspapers.

The republic daily receives, in full volume, the broadcasts of Uzbek television. Tajik television has begun to come out with a monthly literary-journalistic TV broadcast for the Uzbek population under the name of "Kamalak." There has also been increase in radio broadcasting in the Uzbek language.

The constant inclusion of the appearances of Uzbek performers or Uzbek songs, melodies, and dances performed by Tajik artists in concert programs of Tajik television and radio has become a good tradition. In rayons of dense Uzbek population, all measures are usually carried out in the native language. Here operate collectives of amateur art activities, various clubs and amateur interest associations, and local radio broadcasting.

In the Tajikistan Union of Writers there operates a section of Uzbek literature. In the schools of Tajikistan there are more than 11,200 classes with Uzbek language instruction, where 274,000 children are studying. These schools are supplied with educational and methods literature and teaching personnel. Many young boys and young girls from Surkhan-Darya and Fergana oblasts are being taught in the VUZ's and tekhnikums of Tajikistan.

Uzbek is the third language in which discussion is conducted in the plenums of party committees, sessions and permanent commissions of the republic Supreme Soviet and in sessions of its Presidium. The documents of the Supreme Soviet are also published in three languages—Tajik, Russian and Uzbek.

Those are only some measures being put into effect in Tajikistan with respect to the satisfaction of the national, cultural and language needs of the Uzbeks, with the majority of them being traditionally inherent in the nationalities policy being conducted by the republic party organization. In our view, this is the only way of strengthening the friendship between all peoples—a respectful, considerate attitude to their spiritual and national needs.

Important changes have taken place in the satisfaction of the national, spiritual and cultural needs of the Tajiks who live in Uzbekistan. This has become possible thanks to the bold deviation of the new leadership of Uzbekistan from the policy of the stagnant years being conducted with respect to other nations and nationalities.

For a long time, with respect to the Tajiks living in Uzbekistan, infringements of their national rights and interests were permitted. Echoes of such a "policy" have even reached even into our time and are exerting a harmful influence on the relations of our peoples. This has been subject of a very pointed discussion among the intelligentsia and the young people in the recent past.

The trouble lies in the fact that all the negative developments of the past stagnant years are even now perceived by part of the intelligentsia as real, present-day principles of the interrelations of our peoples. And to remove them, these errors, can be done by only one thing—by practical steps to establish fair and equal rights and possibilities for all nations and nationalities. And another thing—by the broad information of the population in regard to these steps.

Measures are being taken by the leaders of both republics to normalize relations, and a personal example is given in the matter of expanding cooperation and strengthening the friendship between the peoples of the fraternal republics. And this yields positive results for mutual satisfaction.

Relations in the sphere of economics, science and culture are being expanded and strengthened, a plan of joint actions has been developed that is aimed at the expansion and deepening of the friendship and cooperation of the workers of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

I would like to talk about something else today. During the past year, a large group of leading officials of Uzbekistan were in our republic. According to numerous testimonials from the workers of Tajikistan, this was a significant event in the mutual relations of the two republics. In Tajikistan they remember these meetings and discussions, they believe that those general problems which accumulated during the stagnant years will be solved.

After these meetings, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan went to the union government with the proposal to eliminate the obstacles existing in the instructions on the passport system to the satisfaction of the legitimate needs of citizens to have a record of the nationality to which they belong. This pertains not only to the Tajiks and Uzbeks, but also to the Crimean Tatars living in our republics.

Perestroyka needs concrete deeds. Now people understand very well that its chief goals fully answer their vital interests. And among the intelligentsia the aspiration is becoming more intense to move from mutual reproaches and resentments to joint actions and to joint work on the solution of the accumulated problems. We are completely for such a path, which brings people together and gives them clear reference points to a common future.

This, in particular, can be served by the preparation of joint scientific works on the ethnic origin and history of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, an objective analysis of their historical past, and the creative generalization of the many-centuries-long experience of international intercourse.

Such a fundamental work under the aegis of the USSR Academy of Sciences would put an end to the disputes and speculations around these questions conducted for many years, and would become a good foundation for the further serious study of the history of every people and every republic of our region.

To take the problem more broadly, more realistic steps are necessary in regard to the elimination of ethnographic illiteracy of the Soviet people and in regard to the cultivation of high standards of inter-national intercourse among them. Only a knowledge of the culture, customs, and traditions of the representatives of the various peoples living in a concrete region, in the country, can lead to better mutual understanding.

Such work must penetrate all the spheres of our life, must accompany a person from his earliest years. This also pertains to the knowledge of the languages of one another. Because the knowledge of a language—you see, this is respect for the people, for the land on which your house stands. In Tajikistan considerable work is also being conducted on the satisfaction of the national-cultural and spiritual needs of the other nations and nationalities living on its territory. The third nationality in terms of numerical strength is the Russian. Naturally, we have many schools with Russian language instruction. Instruction is also conducted in the Kirghiz, Kazakh, and Turkmen languages.

The representatives of these nationalities, who have been graduated from Kirghiz, Turkmen and other national schools are sent in accordance with their desire, by way of cooperation, to the VUZ's of the fraternal republics of Central Asia. In addition, Kirghizia and Turkmenistan, by way of mutual assistance, send graduates of pedagogical institutes to work in the national schools of Tajikistan.

Measures are being taken to satisfy the national-cultural needs of the Crimean Tatars and Germans.

To improve the coordination and effective solution of the developing problems, the Tajik CP Central Committee and the TaSSR Supreme Soviet have created commissions for questions of inter-national relations and inter-national education. In the solution of any inter-national questions, the real state of affairs and the real general state of every nation and nationality must be the chief criterion in the assessment of their effectiveness.

The Tajik CP has repeatedly underscored that party and soviet organs in the provinces, ministries and departments must solve the existing problems effectively and finally, must not in any manner permit formalism in this matter.

We believe that the realization of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum on questions of the improvement of international relations in the USSR will inevitably lead to a genuine consolidation of the friendship of all nations and nationalities, their all-round development, and the flourishing of the Soviet peoples in a single family.

I would like to express a few considerations about the observance of the principle of social justice on the scale of our whole country.

To remove the tension among the numerous ethnic groups representing national minorities in the republics, it is necessary to declare publicly that the party leadership is perturbed by the incidents of the infringement of national interests of various sorts of ethnic groups, basically minorities, that have come to light. Declare that the party considers as harmful the practice where in some republics the nationality of the numerically strongest people is forcefully imposed on other peoples. To underscore that cases of that sort are punishable.

Assurance should be given that the full right for any ethnic group to establish education in its own language is recognized and guaranteed.

It should also be confirmed that the party and the government have always been for the development of the national culture of every people, including the national minorities. Unfortunately, in a number of republics the past leadership has disregarded these Leninist principles. It should be announced that every ethnic group, regardless of where it lives, no matter how small in number it may be, has the right to maintain the cultural traditions of its people. And the party and soviet organs are obliged to promote this. Cases of the disregard of the cultural interests of national minorities will be condemned.

In general, national cultural centers (clubs and organizations created for the purpose of maintaining cultural traditions) could to a significant degree satisfy the needs of the population for intensive cultural activity and remove the tension called forth by the indifference of local organs to this aspect of life.

History itself prescribes to us to live on common land in peace and friendship, to solve all questions in a practical manner, without clamor and mutual reproaches, creating for every [nation], and thus for all nations and nationalities, equal and just conditions of life and all-round development that are worthy of a socialist society.

**Press Conference on Estonian Language Law**  
*18000569 Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian*  
*20 Jan 89 p 1*

[Press conference conducted by MOLODEZH ESTONII special correspondents L. Glushkovskaya and G. Sapozhnikova on Estonian Language Law: "From Comma To Period"]

[Text] We studied the Law on Language during the period of its discussion, and those questions which remained we presented at the press conference.

On the day of the session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet which was to decide the fate of the Law on Language, journalists were invited to two press conferences. And, although one of them was held during a 5-hour long recess associated with debates in the editorial commission, while the other started in the evening after the Law on Language had already been adopted, in their theatics, tonality and mood they were both quite similar. Therefore, we believe we can combine them in a single report. The people who participated in them were, of course, long familiar to our readers. They were scientists, public and state leaders, and Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies, who were all well known in the republic. The press conference was "aired" by the popular radio commentator Tynis Avikson.

Elza Payumaa, chairman of the expert commission and scientific secretary of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Language and Literature, reported in her introductory address that extensive work has been done on clarifying the draft of the Law on Languages. The attitude toward this law was not everywhere favorable, but as it seemed to her, the final variant took into consideration the wishes of the Russian-speaking population. Nevertheless, today it is necessary to continue propaganda on the Law among Russian-speaking as well as Estonian-speaking audiences in order to ensure the application of the Law in deed. In 5-6 years it will be necessary to return to this discussion and to see how the Law is working.

In the opinion of Maryu Lauristin, the very fact of adoption of the Law on Languages is a turning point in national relations in the republic. Why has the struggle for the Law become a serious source of conflict? Because the non-native residents, M. Lauristin believes, were mobilized against the Law by certain organizations.

[Question from the ETA correspondent] How can you comment on the speech which Deputy P. Panfilov presented at the session?

[M. Lauristin] There are many factors behind this—meetings and letters whose goal is such: Not to regulate linguistic relations in the republic prior to the adoption of some kind of all-union documents. But where is the

guarantee that these documents will not be oriented toward the Ukraine, where the native language is already not used? We are not striving toward assimilation of the Russian population.

[Question from MOLODEZH ESTONII] As we know, Estonia is not training specialists in an entire series of specialties. This means that we will still have to invite them from abroad for some time to come. Yet, according to the Law, we will not be able to conclude a labor agreement with them because they do not know the language. How does the republic intend to cover these "bottlenecks"? Does the Law provide exclusions for such cases?

[E. Payumaa] First of all, we can send our own school graduates, who will come back to us, to study in other republics. Secondly, if the republic requests young specialists, that means that it takes upon itself the responsibility of teaching them the language over a certain period of time. This should not present a problem for the intelligentsia.

[Question from MOLODEZH ESTONII] Today various supplemental language courses and even cooperatives are being organized. We have received information that often they are being taught by unqualified instructors. Can it be that in a year all of them will fall apart, and those who want to learn Estonian will again find themselves without help?

[M. Lauristin] Yes, we know that many non-professionals have entered this field. Unfortunately, even the speech by V. Rayangu, chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee on Public Education, does not present the full picture of how all these problems will be solved. On Saturday we will meet in Tartu at the language forum, where we will discuss all the practical possibilities of teaching Estonian to the population.

In the opinion of M. Lauristin, the Law on Language will help us to "make our way in life", to go out into the great wide world. Of course, some will have to adapt to the Latin script, which is currently used by the entire world community.

Specialists believe that we must change the situation and the attitude toward the Estonian language primarily in the schools where Russian is the language of instruction. Specifically, Lepo Sumera, who was recently ratified at the session as deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee on Culture, presented the following example. During a sociological study conducted in a number of Tallinn schools, Russian school children named V. Kingiseppa as the best-known Estonian writer.

Enn Pyldroos, chairman of the work group on language, spoke at the evening press conference about the mutual enrichment of cultures.

"I believe that the decision of today's sessions is the next step on the road to the rebirth of the Estonian people. It is unimportant who has made concessions to whom today. That is not the point. We are speaking here of hope for the future. Whatever language we speak, we must understand each other. If today we still do not always find this understanding, tomorrow it will come to us under conditions of the democratic system which is more open and more worthy of each of us. I would like to hope that I am not wrong in my predictions."

"The day of 18 January 1989 will go down in the history of our people," said Ayn Soydla, first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. "Like the amendments to the Constitution and the Declaration of Sovereignty, the Law allows us to resolve many long-neglected problems in our little republic. We were unable to really explain the Law on Language to the Russian population. Some articles are astonishing. They may only have an ambiguous interpretation, but without them it is impossible to normalize the linguistic situation. The main thing is that a citizen has the right to select for himself the language of communication. Many have still underestimated this fact. The introduction of the Law and its practical realization still lie ahead for us. No material expenditures should become an obstacle on the path to this end. We must help everyone to master the Estonian language and be extremely tactful."

[Question from NEW YORK TIMES correspondent] Excuse me for addressing you in English, which is not your state language. How, in your opinion, will your Moscow colleagues react to your adoption of the Law on Language?

[A. Soydla] The law does not prohibit asking questions in English... I think that my colleagues will not reproach me. We find complete understanding on a number of questions. These problems are currently being solved not only here, but in numerous republics throughout the Soviet Union.

[Question from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent] To what degree is the Law on Language tied with the preparation of the next law—on citizenship?

Yes, indeed there were proposals to tie the status of citizenship with the knowledge of the Estonian language and the permanent residency qualification. But the discussions are still in progress, and specific requirements have not been established.

This question was asked at the first, daytime, press conference. At the evening meeting it was raised once again.

Arno Almann, chief of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Councils Section, stated: The Law on Citizenship has in principle already been prepared in the form of a legal draft. Yet, as we had supposed, it is very difficult to regulate all the legal relations. After all,

citizenship must be dual—Estonian and Soviet. The adoption of the Law, of course, will be preceded by a widespread public discussion. There may also be alternative projects. This is quite natural.

[Question from the OGONEK correspondent] What conflicts can arise in the near future in the course of implementing the Law on Language?

[E. Pyldroos] It is impossible to foresee all the conflicts. The discussion of the Law on Language evoked many rumors and legends. Many people are agitated and expect the worst. We must be patient. The greatest difficulties are associated with the organization of Estonian language instruction.

[Tynu Laak, first secretary of the Estonian CP Tartu Gorkom] First of all, we must change the psychological attitudes. Internal conflicts are the most tormenting. We must overcome our prejudices and understand that at first, due to inertia, there will be protests and complaints to the superior central institutions.

The press conference participants also asked questions about the alternative draft of the Law proposed by the deputies from the city of Narva, who suggested introducing two state languages on Estonian territory. "We cannot put an equal sign between the Estonian and Russian languages," explained E. Pyldroos. "With two state languages, the 'big' language threatens to expand and supplant the weaker one."

[May Kolosova, first secretary of the Estonian CP Valga Raykom] Our city of Valga is divided in half, and we have historically become accustomed to speaking Estonian on one side and Latvian on the other. If we suddenly had to change over to a language of international communication, this would be simply unnatural.

[Question from ETA correspondent] The editorial commission met for several hours. Was this a struggle or a businesslike discussion?

[E. Pyldroos] It was both one and the other, but where the boundary was—that is difficult to say. It reflected the tense situation in the republic. Most of the paragraphs evoked no doubt in anyone's mind, but on many articles there were arguments, and therefore it was necessary to vote each time.

[Toomas Kork, first secretary of the Estonian CP Rakvere Raykom] It is the administrators who speak Russian that are most afraid of the Estonian language.

[E. Pyldroos] If the phrase "management workers" were removed from the list of professions from the very beginning, the Law on Languages would have been adopted in its first variant.

[Question from MOLODEZH ESTONII] This fall, during which we were so long and painfully unable to adopt one single law, should teach us much. Specifically, that two Russian language republic newspapers and two journals are clearly not enough to illuminate all the fine points of these painful questions. Are there any plans to increase the number of Russian language publications?]

[A. Soydra] I believe that we must find additional channels of information in the rayons and cities in order to better clarify the Law on Language. Life will show whether we need some other newspaper. In Tartu we started a city newspaper for the Russian-speaking population.

Edgar Savisaar, for his part, noted that the republic's Russian language press was not objective and hindered more than it helped the correct understanding of the Law on Language.

If we have understood correctly, the representatives of the People's Front are giving the Russian language press one more chance to "correct itself", which we did not forget for one moment when we wrote this report. We might add that Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Yuri Kraft, first deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee on Industry, told at the press conference how in light industry the articles of the Law on Language are being realized not merely in word, but in deed. In order for the managers of the light industry enterprises (and not just these) to find a common language, the "Maynor" company is planning to expand its intensive Estonian language courses. Next to "management workers", the professional list of the Law on Language cites the no less responsible non-management workers. We hope that Edgar Savisaar, the Maynor company's deputy director of science, will also not overlook them.

**ESSR Council of Ministers Discusses Language Proficiency Required Under New Law**  
*18000609 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 11 Feb 89 p 1*

[ETA report by P. Raydla: "For the Realization of the Law on Language—Four Years"]

[Text] Several weeks have passed since the moment the Estonian SSR Law on Language, adopted on 18 January at the session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, has gone into effect. Those who think or hope that the Law on Language, like some previous laws, will remain merely on paper are mistaken. This is evidenced even by the fact that on 9 February the representatives of the state committees, ministries and other central institutions were invited to the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, where the course of realization of the Law on Language was being discussed.

In his introductory address, Estonian CP Central Committee Buro Candidate Member and Estonian SSR Council of Ministers First Deputy Chairman A. Soydra

stressed the extreme importance of achieving a breakthrough in the linguistic situation in favor of the state language. We must blaze a trail which does not yet exist in any union republic. At the same time, it is quite evident that, just as a knowledge of Estonian will be required of the Russian-speaking population, so the Estonians will also be required to have an adequate mastery of Russian. We also cannot forget that many officials are either already required or will be required in the near future to know English, German, Finnish, or some other language. Life itself dictates this. The preliminary task, however, is the restoration of the rights of Estonian as the state language.

Four years are being allowed to bring the Law on Language to life. In order to meet this deadline, we must begin today. The state committees, ministries and other central institutions must create the appropriate work groups. No later than 1 May, in accordance with Article 4 of the Estonian SSR Law on Language, they must determine and compile a list of professions and duties at enterprises, institutions and organizations within their systems which would require a knowledge of Estonian, Russian or other languages. Estonian SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] Section Chief I. Moss told about this in greater detail at the meeting. On 8 February, the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the first priority measures for implementing the Law on Language, which will be sent to all the departments in the next few days. It is true, in the opinion of the author, that this resolution should also be published in the press.

This resolution states, specifically, the need to ensure, in conjunction with the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Language and Literature, the development of specific professional requirements for a mastery of the languages specified for the corresponding categories of workers, and to submit them by 1 June of this year. The Institute of Language and Literature will give a paid expert evaluation. Six categories have been established. The deputy director of the institute, M. Remmel, commented on them in greater detail.

Category A is the understanding of the state language. It relates, for example, to the profession of carpenter-fitter, who is performing repair work on a house. He must understand the people with whom he has to speak. He does not need to have any particular mastery of the language, but such a category does exist as one of the degrees of knowing the language.

Category B is the mastery of the spoken language. This means the ability to understand and converse in the state language within the limits of professional necessity. For example, a newspaper kiosk operator must know how to answer in Estonian that today a certain newspaper is not available for sale, etc. He does not have to write anything.

Category C is the limited mastery of the spoken and written word. Here as an example we may cite, let us say, a lady who takes in laundry at the cleaners, who must know how to converse with clients in the state language at her workplace, and also to fill out forms and other documentation of a limited character.

Category D requires a mastery of the spoken word and a limited mastery of the written language. A typical example of this may be a doctor. He must have a good mastery of the conversational language in accordance with his profession. He does not have to write any arbitrary texts, but he must be able to write down a case history and to make other physician's notations.

The mastery of the spoken and written state language—Category E—comprises a rather good knowledge of the language. The ordinary state employee falls into this category. He must know how to converse on the job in the state language, and also to compile the documents necessary for his work, as well as to give explanations of them.

Finally, category F is the mastery of the language in its entirety, which is required of leaders at the state and governmental level. They must be able to answer any question and carry on a conversation, for example, with kolkhoz workers, on any topic.

Evidently, the greatest problems will be caused by the requirements which will be presented for production managers at the central and upper segment. What category will they be related to?

The foremen and shop chiefs, evidently, must have a mastery of the language at the level of categories E or D, depending on their duties and the necessity of mastering the written language. Writing down descriptions already requires a sufficient mastery of the written state language. The managers of enterprises or institutions, of course, should know the language at the level of category F, but evidently it will be realistic to require only category E of them. The Estonian CP Central Committee and the Estonian SSR Council of Trade Unions, as far as I know, will in the future require their workers to have a knowledge of the language at the level of categories E and F.

A number of problems were discussed at the meeting. Specifically, the question was raised as to when and through what means the language instruction is to be presented. The representative of the Estonian SSR State Committee on Labor answered this question briefly and specifically:

"As one of the component parts of economic instruction, language instruction may be conducted during work time as well as during off hours. The payment of lecturers and

remuneration of other expenditures associated with language instruction has been determined in the resolution of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee on Labor Affairs] and the AUCCTU secretariat dated 27 December 1987, No 755/32-5."

#### Chemical Plants in Ventspils Endanger Lives, Environment

18080034 Riga CINA in Latvian 6 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by CINA correspondent J. Trops: "Reason And Lack of It"]

#### 1. Stick And Carrot

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Disaster has come to Ventspils. It entered the town like a syringe enters a drug addict's vein, unnoticed and without pain, causing a feeling of intoxication with exclusivity. And why should it not feel this way? A quiet town in Kurzeme at that time felt undisputedly flattered by the offer to become the largest oil exporting port in the Soviet Union, by expanding its railroad station and bringing in a branch of the oil pipeline Druzhba [Friendship] from Polock.

This happened during the 50's and 60's, when the word ecology was mostly known as a scientific term rather than a disturbing everyday reality. In addition, the new enterprise, an oil transfer terminal, offered to compensate the inconveniences caused by its presence by building housing, a large boiler house, and a water line from the Puze Lake, which could also be used for the town's needs; it also promised to help in school construction and provide hard currency to buy foreign medical equipment. At that time, only a few people would question the nature of the economic policy of the powerful All-Union authorities, namely,—through their operations. First, to indirectly take away from the town and the republic their rights and theair material potential to resolve their own social problems, and then to give it back like a present, in spite of the fact that it had to be given to the people of that sovereign territory for their work anyway.

In the early 70's, when salmon and lampreys stopped going upstream through the Ventspils estuary and the port's approaches were full of slimy oil, the excitement over the huge oil tankers, oil reservoirs, and the trans-republican oil pipeline Druzhba began to go disappear. During this time, Ventspils, sobering up from the euphoria of "world's port" fame, has received another shot of departmental dope. This time, the town was offered the chance to become a modern chemical industry's city by building a storage base for chemical products export. The All-Union authorities indicated that in the nearest future a huge complex for exporting chemical products and producing liquid fertilizers could be built with the participation of the world's most famous foreign firms.

The outlook seems to be even more realistic, because during the oil handling terminal construction a specialized construction base was formed and its respective personnel were trained.

Should not we also mention the fact that to cover up its further plans, the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production delivered the Danaians' gift? The future industry of the port promised to build three viaducts, a high-voltage power line, and facilities for biological waste processing; to assign large funds for construction of new housing developments, kindergartens, schools, and ambulatory clinic; at the same time they alleged that the technology for processing and handling the proposed chemical products has been proven many years ago, is absolutely safe, and does not endanger either people or the environment. Of course, the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production did not stress that the above-mentioned facilities would first be built to benefit the new enterprise itself. It did not matter that they opened their pockets, because the construction materials for social facility construction has to come from the limited republic funds. By the way, the whole oil handling terminal was built from materials assigned for the needs of the republic. On the other hand, all profits and hard currency received from exports are transferred to the All-Union budget. The same is true for the port's chemical facilities. Finally, after delays and compromising of quality, Ventspils received its new facilities. And this and that fell off from the departmental cart to the town's benefits, namely, apartments, improved transportation, and places in kindergartens. No, I do not think that the former leaders of the republic and Ventspils sold the safety and health of 50,000 Ventspils residents to the departmental authorities for this crummy piece of sandwich. However, because of the promised benefits, they almost killed off the local nature and knowingly contributed to the already aggravated ethnic relations, which increased directly in proportion to the growth in the volume of construction work volume and the town's increase in population. It is possible that some of them did not object to the construction of oil and chemical facilities because they honestly believed that they are pushing the town through the gates of economic and social progress opened by the highly publicized departmental benevolence. The leaders of that period were not and did not try to become competent in the proposed technology, since it was much easier like an ostrich to hide their heads in the departmental promises.

Of course, I am simplifying the way the construction in Ventspils, which cost hundreds of million rubles, occurred, and the sequence in which the departmental authorities offered compensation. In reality, everything happened in a much more chaotic manner, totally unexpected by the republic leadership. I assume that such an organizational and technical confusion was created consciously in order to prevent the local people from recognizing and assessing the results of the departmental aggression as a whole. I tried to explain in the above-mentioned examples the stick and carrot policy, which,

when used by the All-Union ministries has always provided the desired effect (it is still in use: just recently Ventspils was offered a natural gas pipeline in exchange for permission to build an environmentally dangerous chemical plant near the town...)

I have already mentioned the carrot. In the past, the stick was a document signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexey Kosygin about the terms of the port's industry complex construction. From the documents of perestroika we know now who Leonid Brezhnev was in reality. In the past we knew only one thing, namely, what will happen if the local authorities obey his orders. Of course, a hole in the ground or Siberia did not threaten them because times have changed. However, it was enough to get the hint that one may lose one's office. As far as I know, nothing of that sort has ever happened in Ventspils. To the contrary, many were decorated with State medals.

At the present time, the medals are rare. However, that does not mean that the chains of the socialist bureaucracy which were used by the All-Union ministries to tie up the local Soviet authorities are broken. Only a naive person may be misled by the statements that they will be pulverized during the meetings and will dissolve in the sugary water of democracy.

People used to say that after some time has passed everybody gets smart. And that many people are brave in waving their fists after the fight is over and the winners are known. Today, people are reproached for this reluctance to fight and those hind-sighted writers and journalists, who in the past diligently served the apostles of stagnation, are at the present time busy swarming around the real and fake prophets of perestroika with the same vigor. While we are throwing the proverbial stone of delayed hatred in their garden, we should not forget at the same time that the administrative bureaucratic system has always been and still is smart enough to protect itself from the blow. On the contrary, by calling upon the highest economic and political interests of the state, it counterattacks each time, when the interests of any link of the system are endangered. The newspapers' articles and plywood podiums should not be in places, where the departmental authorities may force others to take a stand and, even more, where they may win. I am reminding everyone of this because during the recent years, encouraged by the activity of certain groups of people and their small victories, we began naively to believe that the departmental authorities may be easily defeated. And we are waving our straw hats, berets, and lists of collected signatures in the direction of Moscow. And we do this instead of directing all our efforts to the main cause, that is, the work to win the economic and political sovereignty of the republic and to create a state based on laws; because without these preconditions the departmental authorities will grow back like a chopped-off tentacle.

## 2. Secrecy and Lies

The power of departmental authorities is in lies and the still existing opportunity to keep a certain part of their

activities and future plans in secrecy. Until now they could operate only in such manner, and I have no doubt that with the strong winds of glasnost blowing and people's activity growing, the departmental authorities will be ready to use even night sticks and tear gas. I also do not doubt for a moment that even during the years of stagnation the people's protests would sweep out from Ventspils the Trojan horse of departmental authorities in the shape of oil reservoirs and storages, if... If only these people would know that the first one will be followed by a whole bunch of others, only much worse and more dangerous.

Yes, the so-called average Ventspils resident could only guess the existence of such, we shall not shun this word, terrible possibility, but he could not know it. The specialists from ministries and, based on their words, the mass information media in the beginning were assuring us of just the opposite. If during that time somebody would have had the courage to tell us what we know now, namely, that even in the case of a limited accident, the chemicals escaping from the reservoirs of the port's plant or railroad tank-cars could literally in several minutes kill or maim half of the town's residents, he would have been considered a person provoking a panic.

Well, we will discuss the real dangers and the environmental situation in Ventspils a little bit later. Now, we will ask another question. Let us assume that an average resident did not clearly understand the far reaching plans of the departmental authorities and their dangers, and to know them was not his duty anyway. His duty was to entrust his future to the leaders of the town and the republic, who would be able to understand them and, when necessary, to oppose them. Then why were the deputies and the Party leaders silent. Their duties were to prevent the construction of facilities with unpredictable operational and developmental results? Well, now we are brave in reproaching their silence. However, even then they were at least able not to participate in the furthering this questionable environmental meanness. But, not a single person in the republic and town's governments has resigned! The inertia of Stalin's intimidation worked faultlessly even after 20 years since his death. It is possible that the descendants of the present Ventspils residents will pay for this cowardice with undesirable genetic mutations in the next 100 or more years. Scientists warn that this will be the price. And we are not discussing here the price for moving the chemical storage from the town's living area or its vicinity somewhere farther away, or to change its purpose. There is no alternate solution, that is, either this poisonous production leaves the town, or Ventspils must be relocated.

The last solution is exactly one that the departmental authorities in their cynical arrogance want to impose on the local people. The LaSSR Minister of Justice V. Skudra said during the People's Forum: "When Ventspils residents approach the respective ministry and categorically demanded a stop to the pollution of air and

environment, they received the answer that if they cannot live in Ventspils, please, get your compensation and move somewhere else."

Shadows of Stalinism continue to cover the departmental authorities. These shadows have been there a very long time, ever since the total spy mania and class enemies hunt period. The departmental authorities were always interested in keeping their activities in secret, because the methods of voluntaristic and authoritarian power can be used only under such conditions. At the present time, nobody seriously believes in provocations. However, bureaucrats have invented another bogey man, that is, commercial secrets and the interests of civil and military defense. Hiding behind them, one may justify the unawareness of our own people concerning our interior situation, which has been known to the rest of the world for a long time. For example, all activities of the Ventspils transportation junction, port, and petroleum and chemical enterprises are geared toward export and import. However, the responsible authorities with great unwillingness provide journalists with data on the total volume of the oil and fuel storage tanks, accumulation of poisonous chemicals, possible accident results and safety devices, etc. When these data are given, the journalists are warned that they are not for publication. Certain, especially critical situations that may take place at the chemical or petroleum enterprises, are not even prognosticated under an excuse that... they are not possible! I need not explain to readers who benefits from such an attitude.

Secrecy penetrates the departmental system from top to bottom. Thus, this fall an authoritative commission of the LaSSR Council of Ministers was working in Ventspils to examine the ecological situation in the town, including releases of poisonous chemical products into the atmosphere. For example, data on acryl acid nitrile (an especially poisonous compound!) releases submitted by the port's plant were compared with the commission's control data. The maximum allowable concentration was registered only once during 105 analyses performed by the plant. The commission performed 8 analyses of which 6 measurements have shown concentrations above allowable values. In one of these cases the maximum allowable limit was exceeded 80-fold, and in 4 others it was exceeded from 9-fold to 12-fold. For methanol concentrations in air: the plant's laboratory data registered only 2 violations from 60 measurements, the commission found excessive releases in 3 of 4 cases.

Here we must add that instruments in the plant's laboratory and its specialists conform with the highest requirements, which means that the analyses made by the laboratory were biased.

But let us return to the general situation in Ventspils.

Commissions of various ranks examined the situation in Ventspils already three times, but there is no real improvement. In 1987, during one of such meetings with

participation of approximately 20 representatives of the All-Union and republic authorities, a highly ranked manager of a sanitary service said that a person's health is being ruined not so much by the dangers themselves, but by the constant awareness that they may become real at any moment. This Damocles' sword has been raised over Ventspils for years. The potential disaster is even more terrifying, because the people may not have even several minutes to prevent it. The blade is literally touching the town's heart.

North-west of the town, at the right bank of the Venta River, are located storage tanks with a total capacity of 50,000 to 100,000 tons of poisonous ore, highly flammable chemical products belonging to the port's plant. The enterprise for exporting oil and petroleum products (a former oil handling terminal) capable of storing many tons of highly flammable fuel and oil is located to the north-east. From here over 30 million tons of these products are exported annually, and since the beginning of operation in 1961 the enterprise has exported almost half a billion tons of oil and petroleum products. Huge pipelines go from the reservoirs to the oil piers crossing under the area of land the port's plant, which is saturated with poisonous materials. It is easy to imagine, what may happen if one of them is flooded or an explosion in the area of the plant should rip the ground. The town is divided into two parts by a railroad track, along which day and night tank-cars with ammonia and acrylic acid nitrile, and other chemicals are delivered to the port's plant. It has been established that 177 technically defective tank-cars passed through the town in 1985, 198 in 1986, 118 in 1987, and 55 during the first 6 months of 1988. Across the Venta River, in the territory of the Ventspils sea port opposite the Old City, there is located a gigantic facility for loading potassium salt with a capacity of 2.5 million ton per year. Prior to the dust collecting system installation last year, approximately 8 kg of dust generated during the handling of this products were released per each resident of Ventspils. Most of this dust settled directly in the town's center, killing more than 600 trees.

Practically all products handled in Ventspils are poisonous and, with exception of potassium salt, are flammable and explosive. All of these products are covered by regulations specifying the allowable norms for evaporation, spills, and leakage during transportation, handling, and storage. It seems that nobody has ever accurately calculated (and if somebody wanted to, he could not, because our state does not have accurate scales and instruments) how many tons of these products passed over the heads of Ventspils residents and were lost under their feet. If one calculates only the amounts allowable by the norms, the numbers are grim: only the port's plant releases more than 50 tons of poisonous compounds annually, that is, 1 kg per each Ventspils resident. As a result of oil and fuel transfer, approximately 2500 tons of light fractions enter the atmosphere. In addition, during the same time, workers of the oil terminal release about 40 tons of oil into the sea and the Venta River, but taking

into account the spills during loading near the ships and at the piers, this number should be doubled. The oil and petroleum products exporting enterprise is also the largest atmosphere polluter, namely, because from from 11,400 tons of dangerous substances entering the air over Ventspils, 64 percent is attributable to the oil industry workers.

Even at the first glance, one may see how the presence of all these harmful substances degrades the nature in Ventspils and harms the health of its residents. It is interesting to note that during the 70's, when the Party and government decision to build the port's plant was adopted, no measures to prevent the ecological crisis and protect people's health were mentioned in this document. Obviously, the departmental authorities knew how to persuade the highest authorities that by observing the process of specification and labor safety, nothing harmful will ever happen to Ventspils. The people, who were in power during that time, had to know about the danger, but regardless allowed the departmental authorities to irresponsibly proceed in this direction. The conclusion is simple: we must defend ourselves and rely only upon ourselves!

### 3. Grim Optimism

Even now, when they are partially unmasked in their expansionist efforts, the departmental authorities continue to insist that they bring to the town and the republic only help and good things. Here I must say that the main fault is not theirs, but rather of the laws, which do not allow restriction of their activities and their subordination to the public interest.

Recently, I had an opportunity to participate in the final meeting of the complex commission for ecological expertise headed by Academician Rita Kukaine. The meeting summed up the results of the research carried out in Ventspils. Representatives of the port's plant were invited to participate in this meeting, and they did not admit to a single conclusion of the commission, which objectively characterized the situation at their plant! The position of the oil enterprise and sea port representatives was much more reasonable. It was, maybe, due to the fact that they have worked in Ventspils substantially longer and, at least partially became more aware of the local environment and culture, and better understood the local needs. To the contrary, a typical consumers' attitude dominates the recently organized port's plant.

The port's plant continues to insist that production is almost absolutely safe, in spite of the fact determined by the experts that 6 accidents took place in 1987, and 5 in 1988. At the same time, the oil handling enterprise had 10 accidents in 1987, and 9 in 1988. The plant's chemical engineers argue against even the obvious facts, insisting that those were not accidents, but simple technical errors. They even do not consider to be an accident that in December on the way from Riga, 400 kg of ammonia leaked in the Ventspils-2 territory. And the

case in November, when a pipeline broke at the port's plant loading ramp and 150 kg of ammonia escaped into the atmosphere. They would not call it an emergency, when a tank-car full of acrylic acid nitrile derailed several years ago in the plant's territory, since there was no spill. Even the tragic explosion of the tanker ship *Ludvig Svoboda* in the winter of 1985 in the direct vicinity of the chemical storage tanks could not throw them out from their unjustifiable positions, in spite of the fact that it was determined after the investigation of this fire that during the explosion pieces of metal weighing up to 15 tons were flying a distance of up to 600m. At the same time, scientists calculated that the total contents of the 27,000 ton ammonia storage tank located at the plant would escape through a 1 sq. m large hole within 1 hour! If the wind should blow in the direction of the town, Ventspils would be totally eliminated. An explosion of a large methanol tank would destroy everything within approximately 2.5 km radius.

We must think about such accidents. However, the hope still remains that the disaster somehow will pass us by. However, the town has already entered the slow elimination period which cuts down not only trees but people as well. The number of children with congenital deformities has increased in Ventspils during the past 10 years 3.5-fold, abnormalities during pregnancies have increased 10-fold, the rate of allergic dermatosis has increased 3-fold, bronchial asthma cases among children and adults have increased 2-fold, etc. The list compiled by the scientists is very long. Representatives of the departmental authorities challenged the connection between the operations of their enterprises and the increase in the rate of illnesses, claiming that their workers are presently more healthier than in the past. Scientists do not argue this fact, since these large enterprises with their special regime and high wages hire mainly young and healthy people. Meanwhile, the poisoned environment attacks first the pregnant women, the newly born and yet unborn children, and those, who are already weakened by diseases. The departmental authorities demonstrate yet another side of their economic meanness in their attitude toward these facts, namely, instead of recognizing and correcting the negative results of their activities, they force people to prove that they are indeed harming the environment and people. And until it is no done, they walk around with an expression on their faces of wrongly accused people. As it is well known, to unmask a sophisticated, demagogic meanness is neither easy, nor simple, and expensive to do. Similarly, as to the data on the increase in the rate of illnesses, the departmental authorities must be shown that their test data on environmental pollution cannot be trusted. Therefore, either the town, or the republic will be forced to organize their own independent laboratory and monitoring service!

I have already made an attempt to describe the tactics of the powerful ministries, that is, to step-by-step penetrate some locality and than secretly, without asking anybody

for permission, to expand in all directions. Today, during glasnost and the time of people's activity, it becomes more and more difficult to do, and the departmental authorities begin to use different methods. While partially accepting their fault for ecological problems, they solemnly promise to eliminate them by improving technology, modernizing production, and compensating for inconveniences. They do anything possible to imitate compliance and to remain in their existing positions while Ventspils residents participate in meetings and the town's new leaders, who are braver than those in the past, try to restrict the activities of the departmental authorities... They develop plans for enterprises' modernization and expansion with participation of foreign firms. And then they would later put the local authorities in front of a fact that has already happened, namely, that they cannot shut down their modern facilities and plants on which they just recently spent such huge sums of money. And which, by the way, produce in Ventspils one-tenth of all hard currency for the Union... Scared by the mass indignation, they even agree to give the town some small change from this hard currency, which during one of the meetings caused the Ventspils doctor Andrejs Eizans to ask the port's plant managers about how much would according to their estimates a life of a child killed or disfigured within his mother's body cost?

The large ministries' greed is fantastic: the enterprises built in Ventspils have long ago paid for themselves, but they are categorically against any capital investments required to relocate the port and the storage facilities somewhere else to a more proper place. Yes, they agree that the existing terminals and the plant are technically and technologically obsolete, that they are similar to a crooked and improperly located tower, and they continue with a fantastic persistence to spend money to support them.

But not only that. The departmental authorities are ready to build more and more of them here if only society will weaken its control. They have plans to build a 138 km long pipeline Mazeiki-Ventspils and an oxygen plant with a 750,000-1,000,000 ton per year capacity with an estimated price of 150 million rubles. There is another plan to build an ammonia pipeline Jonava-Ventspils with a capacity of 3,000,000 tons per year and a price tag of 300 million rubles. There is also a plan to build a butadiene transfer terminal in Ventspils for its shipments to the German Democratic Republic. And definitely that is not all. The deputies and the town's leadership managed to prevent some of these projects. But do we have a guarantee that by appealing to the State's highest interests the pressure will not be repeated? There are no doubts that the departmental authorities have already damaged nature and human lives in hopes of not straining their brains and opening their wallets.

The existing compliance with their expansion has increased their arrogance. When they were building similar facilities in other cities, as for example in Odessa, the ministries also assigned means for the solution of

social problems. In Ventspils they paid only for the construction of housing and kindergartens. True, the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production was offering almost unlimited sums of money. However, these sums had to be administered to the town's construction force and resources, which was completely unrealistic.

Not a single architecturally and architectonically significant building was built with the support of the departmental authorities. On the contrary, the industrial buildings and structures look like grim foreign objects in the town, a town which has the largest number of sunny days in Latvia.

I understand that everything said above may spoil the mood for a long time, therefore, some optimistic notes follow.

Last year the Environmental Protection Club invited Ventspils residents to a mass demonstration to protest against the dangerous ecological conditions in the town. The notices were pasted all over the town including the premises of the oil and petroleum products exporting enterprise. I happened to be there, when one of the employees tore off one of them in accordance with an order given by the enterprise's director and took it to his office. Aleksandr Gutenov philosophically pronounced: "We have a democracy here. Some have the right to paste them on, others to tear them off..."

In spite of similar actions at other enterprises with the All-Union subordination, the demonstration did take place and Ventspils residents think that it was the largest in the entire history of the town. A resolution adopted at the meeting to a great degree influenced the town's leadership, its ispolkom's chairman during that time Jazeps Marnauzs, and the deputies to give an energetic counterblow to the monopoly of the departmental authorities. On 18 Dec 88, a large protest meeting took place at the gates of the port's plant. Of course, only this meeting will not solve the fate of Ventspils, however, it is obvious that the balance of forces is swaying toward reason.

However, I could not end this article on an optimistic note. Optimism would be simply sacrilegious, when one knows that in the town there is a shortage of gas masks even for children in case of an accident, and the available masks are practically unusable anyway. The tanker Ludvig Svoboda had to explode in order for the town's civil defense headquarters to finally get a direct telephone line to the explosive area. Demonstrations of tens of thousands Ventspils residents, pickets, and collection of signatures were necessary for the ministries to get off their throne of arrogance and to start a dialog.

What is needed to remove the abscess of departmental authorities from the body of Ventspils? Is it indeed that this industrial Moloch could be fed only with human lives? And it has already taken them, so how many more

will he require? A call not to allow any more poisonous tank-cars in Ventspils was sounded during the meetings and demonstrations. Will the unreasonableness of the brave be able to save the town? I do not believe so. I believe that it will be achieved by the reason of the brave.

### Residual Effects of Chernobyl Accident on BSSR Examined

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[Article by A. Kryzhanovskiy under the rubric "Morality, Ecology, Law": "The Person on the 'Diseased' Earth"]

[Text] "We are the poor souls you wept for," is a sentence I heard in Belorussian in Khoynikskiy Rayon, at the border with the Chernobyl zone, that startled me. How can people think of such things? But they do...

#### I. "They're Tired..."

Having visited her eldest son, Nadezhda Iosifovna Mikhe, rushed home on the morning bus to Tulgovichi—a village on the Vit River about three kilometers from the quarantine zone. We traveled together to Khoyniki, where I had been sent on a spring business trip. The woman was glad of the company—someone to pass the time with. Little by little the story of a sick person also came out.

"The chief calls the city, but we are afraid—we're used to our own place. They young are taken away. It is difficult at the farm. The animals must be kept on clean feed, and where can you get it? After the accident they laid a water pipe through the village—the water fountains are quite useless... There are too few good specialists, and here are not enough people at all, they are more and more temporary. The new huts were distributed to them in strict order before, but now they don't want to take them. No one wants to..."

She was silent for awhile, seemingly collecting her thoughts, and summed up. "The greatest misfortune has receded, but the other ones, smaller ones, aren't even noticed. Maybe people are tired of fighting them..."

In parting with Nadezhda Iosifovna, I did not suppose that her thoughts on her native village, like a mirror, reflected the problems of all the suffering lands.

A team of leading medical workers and radiologists of the country was working in Khoyniki that spring. Summing up what was accomplished at a meeting with residents of the rayon center, the deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Food Institute, Professor V. Tutelyan, was talking about vitamin deficiencies, about shortages of fruits and vegetables in the children's ration. A question sounded from the audience: why aren't there enough of them?

"You are too playful here," came the reply of the Gomel Oblast Ispolkom representative. And he began a scrupulous enumeration of the benefits offered to these people, who were shocked by this unexpected turn of the discussion, and he ultimately reproached them for their poor awareness. A murmur swept the hall: "Reproaches us for our benefits, and we wouldn't even need them if you could provide more humane conditions!"

Unfortunately, I have had occasion to encounter many examples of such an attitude toward our common misfortune as being a personal burden, plenty of them today as well.

Although some will possibly find excuses in the nervous disruptions of leaders in the enormous burden that they had to bear immediately after the accident. Almost ten thousand square meters of country-style houses, nine schools and over twenty children's pre-school institutions were constructed in Gomel Oblast alone, in what were then considered to be favorable population centers in regard to the radiation situation. The complete laboratory observation of the population moreover began from the very first day of the accident. Radiation dosage monitoring of thyroid iron was conducted for almost four hundred thousand people, fifty thousand residential buildings and three hundred and fifty three schools were decontaminated, hundreds of kilometers of asphalt roads were laid along with tens of kilometers of water lines, about a hundred and forty artesian wells were drilled, and some five thousand square meters of roofing were replaced along with three hundred kilometers of fencing. Expenditures have totaled almost 50 million rubles over the two years in all. And you can't take away what has been accomplished.

Now all of this looks kind of simple and humdrum. But then... Just one example. The danger of radioactive nuclei getting into the drinking water of Gomel residents arose in the first spring after the accident. It became clear that by the beginning of the spring thaw it was necessary to drill artesian wells with a capacity of a hundred thousand cubic meters of water a day and to lay down additional kilometers of water and electrical-transmission lines. In February, notwithstanding the severe weather conditions—a snow cover of over a meter, strong wind and freezing temperatures—the work, which was expected to require more than one favorable month, was completed on time.

Yes, it was difficult, very difficult, but the first and most dangerous wave of the radiation disaster had been repelled. They were tired, they could relax, weaken, just that the invisible enemy did not retreat, but remained, and now we have gotten a little contented...

Thus it is that the order of the republic Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee] on the supply of pure feeds from other oblasts to the suffering regions, so that at least several months before the slaughter the livestock is maintained using "uncontaminated" rations and that

the radioactive nuclei in the organism be removed, is not yet being fulfilled. There have been instances of grasping as well, where their countrymen demanded equipment and tripled their prices "as a reward" for selling their own feed. The introduction of increased amounts of the argillaceous mineral zeolite and dolomite powder for decreasing the transfer of radioisotopes from the soil into vegetables has also been noted. This measure, however, which was among the paramount ones, has also not been entirely fulfilled, there is no zeolite in the republic and their Ukrainian neighbors are disrupting the deliveries.

And what if they didn't? The need for additional mineral fertilizers is such that it is necessary to receive, distribute and bring it out to the fields and subsidiary plots by railroad cars to satisfy it. The republic cannot manage such an operation. Discussions are underway for the second year among the scholars and specialists of Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom on the necessity of a complete rather than partial re-specialization of the afflicted regions. There are areas where pure feeds, and thus meats and milk and other high-quality agricultural produce, cannot be obtained in the near future. Why shift funds for nothing? But we continue to do so with enviable doggedness. Count up how much is being spent for nothing.

All right, so that's money, what about people's health? The Minsk tractor builders, immediately after the accident, devised a tractor cab that radioactive dust could not penetrate, but they couldn't set up broad-scale production because there is not yet enough hermetizing equipment. Almost every machinery yard will complain to you about the lack of special clothing and normal conditions for cleaning it. Even the mechanics themselves cannot always find a shower or a sauna. And after all, the discussion concerns the creation of normal human working conditions, and not something unusual. Here, near the zone, they should have been concerned about that right after the accident, but they do not have suitable concern for it in many places after almost three years. As much else is also lacking, by the way.

I have seen reports on the food well-being of the republic many times on television. But as a rule, my television colleagues have not looked further down the shelves of the cafeterias and oblast stores. And the shame is that disruptions in supplies for any region afflicted by the radiation are called problem number one by the residents. There are considerably more elderly people in the towns than in the cities, and you know what pensions they have, they have surrendered all the poultry from their yards, they put aside cucumbers and cabbage for the winter. And the prices for meat and sausage in the local stores are as bad as cooperative ones. I got interested and asked the chairman of the Khoynikskiy Rayon Consumers' Union, A. Kugali, whether it would not be possible as an exception to organize the sale of meat products at state prices in the rayon.

"We get little of it from the oblast," he replied. "In counting up the requirements of the rayon, someone 'didn't notice' several hundred indigenous residents and did not count the 'mouths' of people here on business or on expeditionary work shifts, of which we have many. Their heads just go around and around."

At a recent session of the Khoynikskiy Rayon Soviet, the deputy chairman of the rayon ispolkom, V. Denisyuk, recently demanded the replacement of A. Kulagi "for acting like gentry, with impunity and complete permissiveness, undermining the pillars of Soviet society." After all, there are sometimes, if not often, sausages, fresh fruits and many other products that are practically delicacies for the rural residents. They should go first of all to the hospitals and pre-school and public-catering institutions. But visit the kindergartens, for two years no one has seen any of these products. Crudely violating sanitary norms, the food is being trucked on horse-drawn wagons... There was a vote, and the majority was in favor of removing A. Kulagi, but since it was an open session, its decision was considered to be invalid, and the chairman of the rayon consumers' society remained...

The preconditions for all sorts of abuses are arising due to the fact that there has not been a material redistribution of produce stocks. Is it a normal situation where village stores serving 300-400 families get 50-60 kg [kilograms] of kielbasa to sell along with about twenty boxes of milk, and that not on a daily basis? At Belkoopsoyuz [Belorussian Cooperative Union] they blame the lack of proper conditions, refer to the shortage of refrigerators, to the fact that the rural stores do not have coolers, and the milk sours and the meat spoils, they say. It is long since time to modernize the rural stores in the afflicted regions, of course. But as early as a year ago, the deputy chairman of the republic Gosagroprom, I.N. Nikitchenko, proposed the following solution to the problem: since the most remote populated points are about forty kilometers from the rayon center and the trip does not take much time, ship the milk and meat daily according to requisitions, figuring that they would be bought up at once in the village. One need only get moving. It soon became clear, however, that the interests of Belkoopsoyuz and this proposal were incompatible concepts. Selfish departmental interests took the upper hand, as often happens here. Something like this also happened with the construction of rail sidings. Belorussian SSR Mindorstroy [Ministry of Railroad Construction] runs the railroad to the point where there is a sign that a populated point begins, and the rural or town soviet goes from the "sign." The capabilities of these "firms" are absolutely different, and "there is no agreement among friends."

One could have closed one's eyes to this before and nothing would happen, you would get away with it, but today, when behind every truck in the afflicted regions is a cloud of dust, and not just dust, but radioactive nuclei, it is criminal to be reconciled to such negligence. Belsestroy [Belorussian Rural Construction Trust], however,

regularly disrupts the plans for operations in the construction of hard-surfaced roads, asphalt town streets and sidewalks, children's squares, farm areas and mechanical yards.

I appealed to that organization with a request to explain the reasons for the disruptions. In reference information prepared for me, the discussion concerned simply "assimilated and unassimilated millions." It was impossible to discern where and how many social and consumer facilities or sanitary and hygienic facilities had not been built and who was to blame for it. "We do not do an accounting of such trifles," the workers of the department declared to me. Is that really so? I don't think so. Most likely they are at odds with glasnost and self-criticism at Belsestroy. It is difficult to resolve to have open discussion of one's own errors and omissions.

The most acute of the problems following Chernobyl is key personnel. There are not enough physicians, engineers and agronomists. And even if the flood of requests for retirement has ebbed, it has not completely dried up...

Isn't that why people are leaving inhabited places, the fact that attention toward them has weakened, that they are not seeing the proper concern and participation? "They're tired..."—remember? That is from the conversation on the bus with N.I. Mikhed. She was talking both about her countrymen and about those who are concerned with the fate of the thousands of people living in the special-attention zone...

They were not afraid to go into battle against the radioactive death in April and May of 1986. Now, with the passage of time, this is not needed. Now courage of another sort is needed—to fight for the truth against departmental bureaucracy. Fear of ruining a career, fear of losing one's cushy chair has deprived many of this courage. When calamity struck, the situation itself forced them to make crucial and correct decisions independently. Then a brief phone call was worth dozens of official papers and consents.

Now everything is taking shape differently. What are the roots of these changes? It seems to me that the shoots began to appear as early as in 1986. At a time when we were simultaneously trying to convince each other that essentially nothing terrible had happened, when we made a grand gesture of not reducing the production plans for all types of agricultural output. And after all, some 20 kolkhozes and sovkhozes with fixed productive assets of over 100 million rubles were eliminated in Gomel Oblast alone. More than 270 million rubles of agricultural output had been produced on them. The arable land of about another hundred kolkhozes and sovkhozes was moreover subjected to radioactive contamination. Today there is not enough people, funding or material resources, but to ask for assistance is already somehow just not done. In for a penny, as they say... But it is clear, after all, that assistance is essential. Capital

spending to eliminate the consequences of the accident must be materially covered. The republic itself cannot manage this. As the chairman of the Gomel Oblast Ispolkom, A. Grakhovskiy, expressed it one day, "every spring we go crawling from office to office for funds." The necessity of additional evacuations from some of the populated areas of Mogilev Oblast has moreover become acute.

The real threat to the health of the population is causing a lack of confidence. The number of complaints is not diminishing, and people sometimes begin to disbelieve the official assurances and reduce their labor activeness and discipline.

A comprehensively worked-out and dedicated program for eliminating the consequences of the accident is essential. This has been declared more than once by leaders in both Gomel and Mogilev oblasts. Judging from everything, however, neither Gosagroprom nor the other ministries and departments has any aspiration to be engaged in creating it.

The situation is far from normal today, but the indifference and alienation from human concerns and alarms is more and more noticeable.

#### **The Negative Sum of the Three "R's" (Radio-Secrecy, Radiophobia and Radio-Indifference)**

Much can be seen from a distance. The accident has confirmed once again the necessity of a decisive struggle against the negative phenomena that were engendered by the "times of stagnation." We should assimilate solidly that today's world is different from yesterday's and that we cannot live the way we did before, before April of 1986. And we must fight against more than what we have already seen. When I, a journalist, came with the request to familiarize me with the course of elimination of the consequences of the accident, they told me, by way of example, at Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom to "bring in a certificate that you may know this." At Belselstroy I could not get an intelligible answer to question of what they had not finished building and why, at Belkoopsoyuz what they had not delivered, at Minsobes [Ministry of Social Security]... And are the tens of thousands of people living at the boundaries of the zone also supplied with certificates and recommendations? Do they exchange them, for example, for the personal dosimeters that they do not have and that will hardly appear in the foreseeable future? Maps of the radioactive contamination of the territory of the republic were created and the recommendations of scholars from the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences developed long ago: which of the gifts of nature on which territories could be gathered and cultivated. The maps and recommendations were transmitted to Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom. But even journalists writing about this topic are not able to take a look, although, for good sense, they should be published in every rayon newspaper with a detailed description of the radioactive situation and changes in it. We are still

consoling ourselves and the population with the fact that goods are checked before being sold in the major markets. But if you live in the village, take your vegetables for checking to the rayon center—go a long way for nothing. If they do take it there, then it is just a handful...

When will we finally realize that excessive secrecy in everything that concerns the health and safety of people and the elimination of the consequences of the accident cannot help but put us on guard and even get frightened? It is moreover our illiteracy that has given rise to a new disease—radiophobia...

MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency] had discussed as early as 1982 that the question of "...informing the population is an important aspect of all emergency planning so as not to permit the degeneration of an insignificant incident into a 'catastrophe' and to avert unnecessary apprehensions." It was noted therein that "insofar as specialists are not schooled in the rapid, simple and exhaustive answering of the questions of the population, it is necessary to take steps to form the correct popular impression of the relative degree of radiation danger."

The events surrounding Chernobyl have confirmed the justice of this.

Today scholars are asserting that the population residing near nuclear power plants should be informed of all possible consequences and even trained for actions in emergency situations—the consequences of radiophobia will then be less. As of yet, all except Dr. Gale have refrained from concrete predictions. Recall: "The long-term effects of small doses of radiation on the organism are as yet insufficiently studied, but... it is completely harmless." And suddenly a new formulation shines through in MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA: "Based on the no-threshold concept of the dependence of effects on dosage (i.e., in plain language, any rise in the dosage of radiation undesirable for the organism—Author), additional (surplus) mortality from malignant tumors within the limits of hundredths of a percent of the spontaneous level can theoretically be expected, and the number of genetic defects in the first two generations of exposed parents is correspondingly on the order of hundredths or thousandths of a percent." It is impossible to detect this increase in practice, it is insignificantly small. But such information looks more like the truth, and had it appeared at once in the danger zones, they would tracked the observance of sanitary and hygienic requirements much more carefully.

It is paradoxical: we in Belorussia who have suffered so much have to collect tidbits of information. Last year AIF published the growth trends of oncological illness rates for Mogilev Oblast: there were 239 cases per 100,000 population in 1985, 258 in 1986 and 267.8 in 1988. Small but clear growth. And after all, the indicators are taken for the oblast overall, and not for a specific region subject to radioactive contamination. Scholars

have moreover acknowledged (in the eighth issue of the journal *ZNANIYE—SILA* for 1988) that although "there has been no epidemic, somewhat of an increase in morbidity has been observed... the duration of various types of illnesses, including pneumonia, has increased, and the flu epidemic is lasting longer. Medical personnel are complaining about a weakening of immunity, and that it is possibly a result of the accident." In this same journal, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member D. Gradzinskiy cites many ways to correct the situation. They are, first and foremost, strengthening immune systems with the aid of vitamins and special drugs essential for increasing the resistivity of the organism to the effects of radiation.

By virtue of the excessive hypochondria that is arising as a result of radiophobia, people associate any indisposition, and the more so any illness, with the effects of radiation. And then any illness can be complicated and become chronic. One consequence of radiophobia is psychological stress and the rejection of vegetative foods, causing disorders to the health of people due to a lack of proteins, fats and carbohydrates.

**What treatment can be employed?** Having made the diagnosis, it is hard to find one. The causes of the disease must be eliminated first and foremost. Popular-scientific and widely accessible literature and skilled speakers are needed, not laymen who come to the afflicted regions with their products and just aggravate the situation with their behavior.

Reports recently appeared in the newspapers on the radioactive situation, and they are transmitted by republic radio as well. Tests confirm that the background radiation in Minsk, Gomel and Mogilev do not exceed the norms today. This is in and of itself an appreciable step forward in issues of expanding glasnost and treating radiophobia. I imagined myself in the place of the people who live in the small rayon cities and populated points. What were they thinking? They were probably reasoning as follows: "Everything is fine for them 'in the capitals,' that's what they are reporting, but here, a little closer to the zone, the background radiation is higher and they said nothing about us. That means..." It is not difficult to guess what stands behind this "that means." Do people really need such mistrust? No, of course not. But let a rayon journalist try and get interested in the "level," and you'll hear what an alarmist he is. And if he starts a conversation about reviving the health of children or the shortage of vitamins in the food ration, he might even be "called onto the carpet..."

The information that is needed is first and foremost truthful, not simply classified. An answer must be given to any question, even a naive one.

The general thrust of features has great significance as well as their content. A cheerful tone often has the opposite impact from that expected. But the main thing

is that people should not feel indifference toward their fate, they should not fear for the health of their children. It is more than impermissible to dissipate this fear the way it was done before.

Last year, at the first international scientific conference "Medical Aspects of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant" in Kiev, USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President L. Il'in declared that "it would be criminal to assert that there are no radiation problems whatsoever associated with the Chernobyl accident. It is enough to cite the broad range of radioactive nuclei that were discharged from the reactor. And the danger cannot be underestimated."

There are radiation-monitoring services in every rayon. There are not reliable instruments everywhere, however, and not everyone knows how to employ them most effectively in this or that instance. I was told about one sorry monitor who was measuring the radiation level on a road that had just been laid. And he should have gone to the water fountain, checked the porch of the store or the manure at a farm.

Carefree daredevils—most frequently mechanics, drivers and those who must first and foremost observe working hygiene—do not even make use of the gauze masks, never mind the respirators. And housewives that wash off the special clothing of their husbands and sons pour the water into the same usual place, fostering the concentration of radioactive nuclei near the home.

They are not allocating tilled pastureland for the grazing of private livestock on many kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The herds, it turns out, are even wandering into the territory of the "zone."

"Enterprising" farm managers, in their desire to "drag along" the plan, are not beyond sowing and cutting a hectare or two on the rejected land.

Several thousand officials have been subjected to fines and penalties and hundreds have been dismissed over the last two years alone for violating the sanitary-hygienic and anti-epidemiological regimen. On one hand, such monitoring could make one glad. On the other, however, the negligence of these punished managers could cost someone his health. And where is the guarantee that others are observing the sanitation norms to the extent defined by Minzdrav [Ministry of Health]? Aren't other managers forgetting about the people working in the fields and on the farms in their concern for liters of milk and hectares sown?

How, in what way, what considerations can explain to Mogilev residents why only now, two and a half years after the accident, has the resettlement of people just begun, and not even yet from the lightly populated areas in the territories subjected to radioactive contamination? Why has the issue of additional payments to the population not yet been decided, a population, it turns

out, which also lives on the same territory where agricultural produce is contaminated above the allowable norms, but the initial ukaz regarding monetary compensation has not gone through? Why does the republic "Health" program not reflect any questions of ensuring radiation safety at all? Another problem that cannot be solved without "surgical" intervention is already becoming acute. No few "squatters" have already returned to the "zone." People are abandoning their "well-equipped settlements and cottages and detached homes of an urban type." It had become impossible to live in them. The houses, built in a rush, are leaky, and the wind howls in the rooms. There is nothing even resembling a social and consumer sphere in many of the resettlement towns. But a return to the old place does not in any way signify a return to humane conditions. The "squatters" are not registered, and it is as if their old homes do not even exist. They live there without light, mail or stores. There are already hundreds of these "resettlers" in Khoynikskiy and Braginskiy rayons. And the officials close their eyes to all of this.

#### The Fate of the "Zone"

It begins to get painful when you realize that the "special-attention zone" will cease to be such. It is as if the "sarcophagus" over the exploded reactor covered the post-accident problems as well. What is next? While they are beginning a partial evacuation in some rayons of Mogilev Oblast, they are already planning a return in Gomel Oblast. Remember that the plans for industrial and agricultural output here have not been reduced. And today, despite the fact that the oblast has lost a whole agricultural region, the plan targets are going up. Is a return to the "zone" possible or what? The opinions of scholars differ, but the majority of them warn against a return.

I have been to the "zone" more than once. I have visited the plant, I traveled on Ukrainian soil to it for the first time.

The road to the Chernobyl AES. Everything seemingly humdrum, with the only difference that in our republic I did not see such a quantity of special equipment for "washing" the road on the way to the "zone." In the summer the asphalt is wet for the whole distance, there is no dust, and the sidewalks are also dark from the water. Local caretakers have long ago replaced their archaic brooms with coils of hoses installed on special carts...

Two years ago, on the road from Bragin to Khoyniki, every vehicle was stopped at a dosimeter station without fail, and a year later, they were stopped only selectively. Today, if there even are pickets at the station at all, they lazily glance over vehicles that have slowed down just to observe the proprieties.

And maybe it is all for nothing? A small spot with enhanced background radiation was detected last spring on the premises of a kindergarten in Bragin. From where? It turned out that it was from just the spot where a vehicle unloading vegetables regularly stops.

And on the Ukrainian side, patrols cover the whole boundary of the "zone," and a special Skala signaling system has been deployed. It is practically impossible to traverse this barrier undetected. The warning signs have long since disappeared somewhere in our own Gomel Oblast, and the patrols have diminished appreciably as well. Is that because we started talking about returning prematurely?

Scientists, I repeat, have a very restrained attitude toward the very idea of returning. One reason for this is the necessity, in their opinion, of preserving the closed zone for the purpose of averting the spread of radioactive nuclei. Professor V. Knizhnikov, widely known in Belorussia and twice heading a USSR Minzdrav team working in Gomel Oblast, expressed himself on this score at a conference in Kiev as follows: "Medical personnel should not yet even discuss returning. There are doubtless sections of the 'zone' where one could seemingly return. But it must be taken into account that they neighbor on 'contaminated' ones. Who will monitor that people will not go further afield in search of mushrooms or berries? And even if the production of agricultural output on the relatively 'clean' plots seemingly presents no problems from the point of view of exposing people to radiation, who needs it—after all, it won't be used as food. Why make such expenditures for the sake of increasing the plan? And then the temptation will come up to mow the neighboring 'slightly unsafe' meadow or mix in a little 'dirty' hay with the 'clean.' There have already been such instances in my experience. We detect, by way of example, poorly explained flashes of radioactive cesium content in milk. It then turns out that they had gone into the zone and gotten some feed there. I am surprised more than once at the radiation illiteracy of the population, submissively fulfilling the directives of their own illiterate superiors."

It is not superfluous to recall that in creating the "zone" we were concerned first and foremost about averting the possible removal of the radioactive nuclei that had fallen there. We are only facilitating that by plowing up the land. Highly productive equipment is moreover needed for working in the "zone" so as to reduce to a minimum the presence of the person in the field. And there is not enough of it.

But first and foremost, the return of people to relatively safe places must be linked with rehabilitating a great many municipal support services for the settlements and providing them with services and utilities. The calculations of scholars from the Economics Institute of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences (referring to them, since we have heard nothing of the sort from our own economists yet) are instructive on this plane. They assert that in the

event of the possible return of people to roughly 20 populated points with an arable land area of 20,000 hectares, the economic impact would be about 2 million rubles a year. And the spending for rehabilitating this region would be 40 million rubles. An incredible amount of manpower and an enormous inventory of equipment would be required. Relying on the data of our Ukrainian neighbors obtained via sociological polling, I can say that only 14 percent of those polled have expressed themselves in favor of residing in their former places. I think that number would not be greater among us either.

Other points of view must also be cited for the sake of objectivity. Professor K. Gordeyev, no less well known in Belorussia, referring to the new radiation and hygienic concepts for safe residence in the territories subjected to radioactive contamination that he has developed in conjunction with his colleagues, feels that in the near future it will be possible to remove almost all restrictions on the territories adjoining the thirty-kilometer "zone."

I am not a specialist in the realm of radiation ecology. It would seem I do not have the right to comment on this, the more so dispute it. But I remember one episode from my very first trip into the afflicted zones. A young worker at a cheese-processing combine, without seeing that she was being observed, offhandedly touched the surface of the milk in the cans that had been brought from the farms with the probe of the dosimeter. And only having noticed the worker from the sanitation and epidemiological office did she start to lower the instrument deeper and hold it there for the length of time needed for checking... And as soon as the discussion began concerning the removal of all restrictions and the abolition of all forms of monitoring, many will be repeatedly convinced right away that they are not needed. There are still many examples of an undisciplined attitude toward the observance of radiation-safety measures...

And the last. The Belorussian SSR State Environmental Protection Committee and the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences have prepared a plan for the creation of a 140,000-hectare Polesskoye State Ecological Preserve on the territory of the "zone." A 95,000-hectare preserve is also being planned for the Ukrainian part of the "zone." Both Belorussian and Ukrainian scientists feel that it should fall under the republic environmental-protection committees, while general scientific and methodological guidance for the research will be accomplished by the academies of science of the Belorussian SSR and UkrSSR. Specialists from Minatomenergo [Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering], however, referring to their department's good supply of resources, have proposed the subordination of the preserve to that ministry. One could ask, why does the department need a preserve? Or else why not simply extend a helping hand in gentlemanly fashion—to aid the scientists with money and materials? Minatomenergo could also render financial assistance in the creation of the preserve as a duty of honor.

The problems of the first difficult years after the accident are already in the past. But life does not stand still, and its has advanced new problems that are no less difficult. And in solving them, we cannot forget for an instant that the atom has two faces and does not forgive mistakes.

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#### Georgians Warned Against Unrealistic Independence Aspirations

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[Editorial Report] Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO in Georgian No 49, 2 December 1988 carries on page 2 under the title "To Young People" Academician Vakhtang Chichinadze's 1900-word article praising Georgia's young people for their dedication and noble motives but warning them against further demonstrations and action that could lead to dire consequences for their beloved homeland and people. He explains at the outset that his article "was not dictated by anyone."

The author briefly contrasts Georgians' young people's triumph in 1978 with the terrible tragedy of 1956; the latter was a pro-Stalin demonstration, but the government's armed actions against the demonstrators was "vandalism." The lesson to be learned is that protests can lead to "unpleasant consequences," not excluding "punitive operations." He does not want to see a repetition of "what my generation lived through." The present course of perestroika has "many enemies who fear a loss of their own power and who would exploit these protests" as an excuse to revert, "if not to Stalinism, at least to Brezhnevism." Considering Georgia's ethnic diversity, "too many rallies could become contagious, spread to other regions, and be turned against Georgians." In a related consideration, the author laments that these demonstrations have come at the same time as the unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgians must not get involved, "lest we become the next target [obyekt]."

Academician Chichinadze is also disturbed over many young people's demands for independence. Consider economic independence: Georgian industry cannot even compete with other Soviet republics, owing to poor product quality, lack of skilled workers, engineers, and executives. He cites as examples Georgian-made footwear and the quality of buildings. Too many executives care nothing about quality, only their own "illegal earnings." In an aside, he notes that the Balts (Estonians) do not have the same level of corruption that Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Central Asians have. As for agriculture, it will not get better until "the peasant returns to the land" and, moreover, "is assured against having the fruits of his labors taken away from him." Some people place their hopes on tourism, but it has its own problems. Not least, all the good buildings and structures belong to the USSR and would be difficult to acquire.

Long passages examine the unrealistic hopes of those who ask for political independence. "Even if the USSR were to grant it," could Georgia survive, considering its location and neighbors [okruglenyi]? "Georgia could end up losing Adjaria, Adigeni, Akhaltsikhe, and Akhal-kalaki." And don't forget that not long ago, Iran again lodged its claim to Georgia as "a Persian province taken from it by Russia."

There are some who are so naive as to believe that the U.S., Great Britain, or France would prevent Turkey or Iran from annexing Georgia. Let them reflect on similar fantasies that prevailed during the Menshevik period, when people thought the European powers would step in and help Georgia against Turkey and, finally, the 11th Red Army. In fact, Germany did provide a little help, stopping the Turks at the Choloki River—but that left Adjaria in Turkish hands. There was no intervention during the Georgian-Armenian clash, even when the Dashnaks were marching toward Tbilisi—until the Armenians were defeated and the British did step in briefly to halt the pursuing Georgians at the border.

Similar vain hopes encouraged the hapless Georgian revolt against Soviet rule in 1924.

Hence, says Academician Chichinadze, it is unlikely that the U.S., Britain, or France would get involved if Turkey or Iran were to invade an independent Georgia now (though the U.N. might discuss the matter).

In one passage, the author reminds young people that when Dean Rusk was Secretary of State, the U.S. Congress decided to withhold recognition of the Soviet status of the Baltic Republics—but not Georgia or the others. In two different places the author expresses his personal puzzlement as to what motivated the Congress in that regard. After all, Georgians were the only nation to take up arms against invading Soviet troops; never a shot was fired on the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, or—in 1940—the Baltics. Whatever the case, "let no one think an independent Georgia will get any help from the outside" in the event of trouble.

A couple of concluding paragraphs again focus on economic independence and ask readers to compare Georgia's potential with, e.g., the position of ex-colonial countries. The Arab lands, of course, live well on their oil—but most of them have nothing to worry about from stronger neighbors, either.

In conclusion, Academician Chichinadze urges restraint, avoidance of excessive emotion and provocations. An allusive passage urges young people "not to trust" leaders who "cry and repent" when the authorities crack down on them. All protests must be halted, lest Georgia be hurt.

#### KiSSR Official Discusses First Steps Toward Regional Khozraschet

18200268 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 22 Feb 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Kirgiz SSR deputy GOSPLAN chairman Mamat Aybalayev by SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent L. Kondrashevskiy: "The Republic on Khozraschet: Prospects, Problems"; first paragraph is source introduction; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Kirgiz SSR deputy Gosplan chairman M. Aybalayev responds to the questions of SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent L. Kondrashevskiy.

[Kondrashevskiy] As far as I know, a working group especially established in the republic has finished drawing up a concept or a model for regional economic accountability [khozraschet]. But before we move on to a detailed discussion of this, I would like to determine specifically, Mamat Marilovich, how urgent the necessity for such a project is for Kirgizia. One must assume that this is not a pursuit of "style," but a search for effective solutions to economic problems.

[Aybalayev] First of all, let us define the term "regional khozraschet" itself. In our view, it is more correct to talk about models of self-management and self-financing of the republic. And the concept "khozraschet" is more appropriate to a production collective, to an enterprise or organization where it is really possible to calculate incomes and expenditures. On a territorial scale, this is much more complicated since here a whole system of economic and administrative interrelationships is in operation, for which it is difficult to give a precise assessment in value terms.

However, let us return to your question.

Excessive centralization of management frequently does not take into account regional demands, suffocates initiative, and engenders a free-ride mentality in local areas. This has led to a dictatorship by the management system, of which authoritarianism and subjectivism are characteristic. For example, our republic controls only 6 percent of our industrial fixed capital, and the rest belongs to the enterprises of all-union ministries. And these—and this is no secret—are interested above all in the plan and, only in the final instance, in solution of social questions in our cities and villages. As a result, the material and cultural life of the population has not received its desired development here, and in some ways there is even a tendency toward decline. Regional khozraschet is intended to help eliminate such distortions.

[Kondrashevskiy] To what extent can Estonia's experience be of use here?

[Aybalayev] Estonia was the initiator of this idea but even there it is still too early to talk about any kind of practical experience. So that, in essence, we too are travelling an untrdden path.

[Kondrashevskiy] What is the correlation of our republic's imports and exports within the USSR? In other words, how much production do we supply to other regions and how much do we receive ourselves? Even the specialists have conflicting opinions on this score, and this is grounds for a great deal of speculation.

[Aybalayev] According to data from the inter-sectoral balance, which is compiled once every five years, our import-export balance equals one billion rubles, but is not in our favor. In rubles, we import more goods. A large volume of raw material resources are still being exported from Kirgiziya—wool, hides for leather, tobacco, sugar, and nonferrous metals; electric power is being sent to the unified power system, etc. During the period of the 13th and 14th five-year plans it is planned to create a whole series of processing and science-intensive production facilities here. This, in the final account, will allow us to balance imports and exports and, consequently, to increase the republic's budget earnings for the solution of our own regional problems, first of all in the social sphere.

I have already spoken z'out the distortions which result from excessive centralization of management. Thus, retail commodity turnover for Kirgiziya came to 3710 million rubles last year, while we produced consumer goods worth 2878 million. Thus, even if 100 percent of the goods produced ended up in the republic's trade network, we imported 830 million rubles worth from the outside. Desirably, of course, the exchange of goods should be on an equal basis.

[Kondrashevskiy] At whose initiative is the development of a regional model for Kirgiziya? Who has participated in it?

[Aybalayev] This is a demand of the time of restructuring. In November 1988, by a decree of the republic Council of Ministers, a working group was established consisting of 15 persons. Those participating are specialists from the Academy of Sciences, Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee for Labor and Social Security, the State Agro-Industrial Committee, and the state university. Its composition, as you see, is representative. The group prepared proposals and concepts for republic khozraschet.

At the same time, analogous work was being carried out in Moscow under the direction of USSR Gosplan Chairman Yu. D. Maslyukov and with the participation of the Gosplan chairmen of the union republics, chairmen of the country's economic departments, and well-known

economic scholars. They developed the "General Principles for Restructuring Management of the Economic and Social Sphere in the Union Republics on the Basis of Self-Management and Self-Financing."

A comparison of our proposals with the all-union ones has shown that they are close. But there are also certain fundamental differences, about which it is now still too early to speak as discussions are continuing on a number of problems and questions. Final conclusions and results can be expected in the very near future. Obviously, the refined fundamental principles of the republic's change-over to khozraschet will be published for public information and we are waiting for proposals from readers.

[Kondrashevskiy] Can this stage be considered a logical continuation of the experiment of shifting Oshskaya Oblast to khozraschet? What sort of lessons can be drawn from the experience of the people living there?

[Aybalayev] The change-over of Oshskaya Oblast to khozraschet in January 1988 encompassed, if you remember, only the sectors of the agro-industrial complex. Some changes have been noted. Thus, the number of unprofitable and low-profit farms declined and there has been a change in the psychology of people—they have gotten a taste for independence in the solution of production and social problems. However, I think that it is still too early to draw final conclusions.

[Kondrashevskiy] Many, including leading economists in the country, have expressed their thoughts in the press concerning imperfections in certain documents having to do with economic reform and about the slowness and inconsistency of its practical implementation. Has this been taken into consideration in developing the concept and how much of a barrier can these reasons be to introduction of khozraschet on the scale of the republic?

[Aybalayev] Let us take the Law on the State Enterprise (association). Even with indicators—control figures, state orders, limits, and norms—being passed down by directive, the self-reliance of enterprises has grown considerably. The task of higher management organs is not to "send down" directives in the form of orders, but to regulate economic processes in the interests of the region and of the country as a whole. It is true that material and technical supply still is basically realized on the basis of funds which, of course, reduces the effectiveness of the economic reform. But this is a matter of time and will be resolved with the shifting of supply over to wholesale trade.

But, nonetheless, the laws on the state enterprise and on cooperation have great significance, since they serve as an essential condition for the transition of regions to self-financing. However, the formation of earnings and the procedures for their utilization have varied status on the levels of the republic, the oblast, the city, and the rayon. Besides this, while the earnings of an enterprise

are designated for production activities and are used only in part for the solution of social problems, then the expenditure of regional funds has above all a social orientation.

On the other hand, the better each enterprise works, the higher will be the well-being of the region and the better will be the balance between the monetary earnings of the population and the volume of goods available. Therefore, republic self-financing and khozraschet at the level of the labor collectives are mutually interrelated and will supplement one another.

[Kondrashevskiy] As it applies to the enterprises, we talk about two models of khozraschet, although both of them are imperfect. Are these models applicable to the khozraschet complex of Kirgiziya, and which of them is the more suitable?

[Aybalayev] Yes, there is now a polemical argument surrounding the models, about which of them is best. Preference nonetheless is being given to the second, which more fully responds to the principles of khozraschet: material expenses are deducted from income and standard deductions are made, and all the rest remains at the disposal of the labor collective. The more the income, the higher also the wages and the funds for production and social development. However, unfortunately, enterprises so far are unable to make full use of earned funds for their designated purposes because of a shortage of certain kinds of resources and weaknesses in the construction base.

[Kondrashevskiy] What is the further path of the working group's proposals through the system, and when is it planned to begin transition by the republic to self-financing?

[Aybalayev] As has already been said, only the general principles for the republic's transition to self-management and self-financing have been worked out. Ahead lies thorough study of questions of the interface of all-union and republic and of republic and local budgets and of questions in the field of mutual relationships between the all-union level and the regions in planning social and economic development, as well as the development of corresponding USSR and republic legislation.

This year will be decisive in providing a juridical foundation for the independence of the republics in the economic and other areas. Following the elections, a congress of peoples deputies will convene, which will decide a whole series of questions connected with the transition of the republic to new principles of management and financing. This process is supposed to be basically completed during the current five-year plan, so that already during the next five-year plan the republic will receive its own kind of economic sovereignty.

#### TaSSR Oriental Studies Institute's Ties to UNESCO Noted

18300378 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA  
in Russian 21 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by A. Tursunov, director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences: "It Is Impossible to Remain Inactive: Scientific Provincialism in Social Science Is Fraught with Negative Consequences"]

[Text] The democratization of Soviet society is extremely favorable to the development of the social sciences. It must be confessed: Not so long ago, in the situation of spiritual inertia and social apathy that had seized society, few people were worried by questions of the moral duty of scholars or the prestige of science. Now, when in our society a new political and ideological situation is being consolidated, when there is an increase in civic activity and creative initiative, scholars, and indeed the entire thinking intelligentsia, cannot remain inactive. It is time to resolutely free ourselves of the burden of playing it safe, to fully realize the moral responsibility before the people and the country.

Unfortunately, the unfavorable external circumstances are not the only reason for the stagnation. There are also significant factors within science, which have to do with the special features of the contemporary stage of the development of science.

I will take a sphere close to me—oriental studies. What was the strength of classical oriental studies? In the systematic character and well-founded character of its theoretical generalizations and hypotheses, and in the many-sidedness of the scientific creativity of its outstanding representatives.

In present-day oriental studies, another situation has developed. The notorious phenomenon of our age, called the "deafness of specialization," now also holds sway in the science of the Orient: The number of orientalists has begun to decline in reverse proportion to the degree of the common character of the scientific problems being solved by them. Properly speaking, all-round orientalists in the classical sense of this word already no longer remain; there are not even specialists in Iranian or Indian culture—there are only isolated specialists on history (and those by its individual stages), literature, or language of the respective Oriental country.

At the same time, another regularity—a trend toward internal unity, which is manifested in the aspiration to problem-oriented and methodological integration, is forcing its way in the depths of science.

The new methodological situation that is taking shape in the natural and technical sciences, as well as in the social sciences and humanities, in its turn, confirms the necessity of introducing appropriate correctives into the organizational and management structure of science that has

taken shape. Meanwhile, our academic science, in particular the science of Oriental studies, up to now is being restructured very slowly in this direction.

This is what scholars at the 3rd All-Union Conference of Orientalists, which took place in Dushanbe during the past year, talked about in the most definite terms.

For the young body of Tajik Orientalists (the average age of the associates of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the TaSSR Academy of Sciences is 31 years), this conference is the first experience of the organization of such a representative scientific forum. In creative respect, it proved to be extremely useful. At the preceding (1983) [conference], speeches and reports predominated which frequently bore a momentary character. At the Dushanbe conference, which was held in favorable spiritual-ideological conditions of the time of restructuring, classical Oriental studies, especially studies in Iranian culture, which received primary development in the Academy and VUZ science of the republic, predominated.

The conference also revealed a number of our shortcomings and omissions, both of the organizational and creative plan. We are talking, above all, about the necessity of a sharp increase in the general theoretical level of Oriental studies research. With the solution of this important task, we will depart from the scientific positions already attained. In a number of spheres of contemporary Oriental studies, Tajik specialists occupy a leading position. These are, first of all, textual study and criticism and Iranian languages. A detachment of specialists on Afghanistan and young shoots of Arabists and source study specialists that has already taken shape is gathering strength. An academic school of Islamic studies specialists is beginning to take shape, which is called upon—moving away from the tradition of propagandistic-atheistic criticism of religion as an ideological phenomenon, which has compromised itself—to engage in basic academic research on Islam as a socio-cultural phenomenon, relying on a broad basis of source studies and textual criticism.

In the planning of its scientific research activity, the Institute of Oriental Studies proceeds from the scientific tradition that has already developed in the republic and takes into account the all-union division of labor in the sphere of Oriental studies that has been mapped out. This is why we are attaching priority significance to the study of Iranian culture, which is called upon to determine the creative feature of Tajik Oriental studies during the next several decades. It will develop in four directions: The peculiarities of the socio-economic, political and cultural development of Afghanistan (the modern and most recent time); the Persian-language literature of India and Pakistan (11th-20th centuries), as well as of Iran (16th-20th centuries); Iranian-language monuments

of the written culture of the Orient (literature and art, science and religion); the history and theory of civilizations (on the material of the history of the civilizations of the Iranian peoples).

These directions of research, which have already taken shape and are now developing, are closely interrelated and interconditioned. Precisely in such scientific and scientific-organizational integrity, they can secure for Tajik Oriental studies an illustrious place in the general rank of specialized centers of Oriental studies in our country. The commission of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was recently in the republic academy, also called our attention to this important aspect.

The scientific collective of the Institute of Oriental Studies is striving to proclaim itself as a center of active research on Iranian culture in the USSR in the near future. To realize this goal, it is necessary to provide the indicated directions of research with first-class specialists, who are capable of solving scientifically and ideologically significant theoretical and applied tasks. Thus, the plans of the institute call for the training of highly-qualified Oriental studies cadres in the sphere of culture studies, where Soviet Oriental studies have noticeably fallen behind the level of world science.

Important scientific-organizational work has already begun in the department of history and theories of civilizations of our institute. A great stimulus for the expansion and deepening of theoretical research in this sphere is the participation of leading scientific associates of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the realization of the scientific programs of UNESCO, in particular within the framework of the International Association for the Study of the Cultures of Central Asia. Previously UNESCO subsidized the project "East-West", which was advanced at the initiative of Soviet orientalists, and after its completion, began to extend comprehensive assistance in the realization of another proposal of theirs—the creation of a multi-volume "History of the Civilizations of Central Asia." (Mean are Soviet Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia). The first three volumes of this fundamental study, on which a large international collective of authors and editors of a number of countries is working, have practically already been completed. At the recent 4th session of the buro of the International Editorial Committee, in whose work I happened to take part, the thematic structure was discussed in detail, as well as the composition of the authors and scientific editors of the fourth volume, which chronologically encompasses in two books the "golden age" of the history of the civilizations of the peoples of Central Asia (8th-15th centuries).

The Institute is arranging practical contacts also with the International Editorial Board of two other scientific UNESCO projects. The first project, which envisages the publication of the multi-volume work "History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind", in

part, concerning the history of the classical literature of the Iranian peoples, is directly related to the problems being elaborated by the institute. The second project is devoted to the history and development of Muslim culture. Our active participation in it (plans call for the preparation of a 6-volume scientific work under the aegis of the Arab section of UNESCO) is dictated not only by the fact that the project touches on stages of the scientific and cultural development of the Central Asian region during the Middle Ages, but also by the fact that the corresponding parts of the last volumes will be devoted to an analysis of the spiritual situation in those regions of the USSR where Islam is disseminated.

One of the widespread ailments of the republic academic institutions is scientific provincialism, which is fraught with negative consequences. Provincialism is manifested, of course, not in the selection of the subject of research, but in the methodological approach to it, in the

methods of its formulation, and the level of its solution. The high standard of scientific thinking—this is what can cure this chronic disease. Hence—the necessity for lively scientific intercourse, which is the most effective method of the exchange of opinions, ideas and methodological practices. In this respect, the 3rd All-Union Conference of Orientalists contributed a great deal. Next in line are other scientific forums of specialists on the Orient, connected with the holding of jubilees (the 1000th anniversary of the completion of the first edition of Firdousi's "Shakhname", the 1400th anniversary of the day of birth of Borbada, the 575th anniversary of Abdurakhman [Abdurakhman] Dzhami, etc.). These measures, the majority of which will bear an international and all-union character, are called upon to promote the further consolidation of the scientific forces which are engaged in the study of the Orient. We hope that they will also prove to be a good school for the training of the new generation of Tajik orientalists.

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